Spelling-sound regularity effects on eye fixations in reading

An interaction of word frequency and word regularity has typically been observed in naming and lexical decision experiments in which, in addition to an overall effect of word frequency, responses to low-frequency exception words are slower than those to low-frequency regular words, while no such difference occurs with high-frequency words. The only eye movement study to examine this effect in reading (Inhoff & Topolski, 1994) reported only transient effects of regularity. In the present experiment, we examined the frequency x regularity interaction using different stimuli than those of Inhoff and Topolski and also varied the parafoveal preview of the target word prior to fixation. When the preview was valid, the frequency x regularity interaction appeared. However, with an invalid preview, the effect of regularity disappeared. The results suggest that the activation of phonological codes is a very early component of reading.     

Evaluating frequency proximity in stream segregation

Consecutive sounds of similar structure that are close in frequency or pitch are more likely to be perceived as part of the same sequence than those at greater frequency separations. The principle of grouping into such perceptual sequences, or auditory streams, is known as frequency proximity. However, the metric by which one frequency difference is judged to be greater or less than another in complex auditory scenes is not yet known. Two experiments explored the metric for frequency proximity. We presented repeating three-tone stimulus patterns at a rate where they are normally heard as two streams, one containing the highest tone and one containing the lowest. The middle tone joined one stream or the other depending on its frequency. Subjects reported the perceived allocation of the variable tone by responding on a 5-point scale. The frequency at which either of these two percepts was equally probable was found to be lower than a logarithmic midpoint or the midpoints on a cochlear map or the Mel scale; that is, it was unlike metrics arrived at by direct comparisons of tones. Further, the midpoint for high and low tones presented synchronously was lower than that for the same tones presented sequentially, demonstrating that in addition to a proximity factor, some additional factor or factors must operate differently when the lower and upper fixed tones are, or are not, presented simultaneously.     

The psychophysics of imagery

A series of experiments considers the extent to which the interrelations among subjective magnitudes aroused by images corresponds to those for subjective magnitudes aroused by physical stimuli. In Experiment 1, 68 undergraduates typed phrases in response to graded categories regarding the imagined magnitude of lights, sounds, and smells. In Experiment 2, 5 undergraduates and, in Experiment 3, 3 graduate students then magnitude estimated the image intensity aroused by each of these stimulus phrases. In Experiments 4 and 5, the same subjects performed cross-modality matches between phrases arousing images for different attributes (light, sound, and smell). Statistical analysis indicates that estimates based on images display many of the same patterns as those based on physical stimuli. The major exception involves sequence effects, present for actual stimuli but not for images.     

Revisiting the constraint attunement hypothesis: reply to Ericsson, Patel, and Kintsch (2000) and Simon and Gobet (2000)

This article is part of an exchange concerning the contributions of the constraint attunement hypothesis (CAH) to the understanding of expertise effects in memory recall. K. A. Ericsson, V. Patel, and W. Kintsch (2000) and H. A. Simon and F. Gobet (2000) claim that the CAH is not novel and that existing theories of this phenomenon do not have the limitations that were attributed to them. In this reply, the CAH is argued to be the only theory of expertise effects in memory recall to adopt the abstraction hierarchy as a theory of the environment, a feature that has important theoretical implications. Also, other theories focus on psychological mechanisms but have not satisfied the burden of scientific proof required of process theories. Progress can be made by integrating the complementary advantages of existing theories into a unified theory that acknowledges the equally important roles of the organism and the environment.     

Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases

A cognitive-ecological approach to judgment biases is presented and substantiated by recent empirical evidence. Latent properties of the environment are not amenable to direct assessment but have to be inferred from empirical samples that provide the interface between cognition and the environment. The sampling process may draw on the external world or on internal memories. For systematic reasons (proximity, salience, and focus of attention), the resulting samples tend to be biased (selective, skewed, or conditional on information search strategies). Because people lack the metacognitive ability to understand and control for sampling constraints (predictor sampling, criterion sampling, selective-outcome sampling, etc.), the sampling biases carry over to subsequent judgments. Within this framework, alternative accounts are offered for a number of judgment biases, such as base-rate neglect, confirmation bias, illusory correlation, pseudo-contingency, Simpson's paradox, outgroup devaluation, and pragmatic-confusion effects.     

On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

A multinomial model is used to disentangle the respective contributions of reasoning processes and response bias in conclusion-acceptance data that exhibit belief bias. A model-based meta-analysis of 22 studies reveals that such data are structurally too sparse to allow discrimination of different accounts of belief bias. Four experiments are conducted to obtain richer data, allowing deeper tests through the use of the multinomial model. None of the current accounts of belief bias is consistent with the complex pattern of results. A new theory of belief bias is proposed that assumes that most reasoners construct only one mental model representing the premises as well as the conclusion or, in the case of an unbelievable conclusion, its logical negation. New predictions derived from the theory are confirmed in 4 additional studies.     

Assessing social dysfunction: the contributions of laboratory and performance-based measures

Reviewed research studies in which laboratory and performance-based measures were used with success to identify problematic social interaction patterns and social skills deficits associated with poor peer relationships. However, the clinical utility of these measures remains an empirical question. In this article, social competence is conceptualized as an organizational construct, reflecting the child's capacity to integrate behavioral, cognitive, and affective skills to adapt flexibly to diverse social contexts and demands. Correspondingly, performance-based measures of social functioning that include complex social interaction stimuli and require integrative responses appear more likely to demonstrate social validity than measures focused on isolated behaviors or cognitions. Research studies are reviewed that involve observations of children in three types of analogue social situations: play groups, friendship pairs, and social-challenge situations. In addition, studies that have utilized performance-based measures to screen and evaluate children for social skills training programs are reviewed. We conclude that performance-based measures are unlikely to be useful in determining whether a child is experiencing social dysfunction but may enhance the clinical analysis of the nature of the child's social difficulties. We identify gaps in the current knowledge regarding the clinical utility of performance-based measures of social dysfunction, along with directions for future research.     

Social Anxiety Scale for Adolescents: normative data and further evidence of construct validity

Replicates and extends prior work with the Social Anxiety Scale for Adolescents (SAS-A) by providing psychometric data, further evidence of construct validity, and large-sample based normative data. Participants were 2,937 students (1,431 boys and 1,506 girls) in Grades 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11. Students completed the SAS-A, the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS), and the Children's Depression Inventory (CDI). Results replicated a three-factor structure for the SAS-A, with good internal consistencies for its subscales. Normative data were subdivided by sex and grade group. Construct validity included replication of prior relations with general anxiety (RCMAS) and depressive symptomatology (CDI). Implications of these results for further use and norming of the SAS-A are discussed.