Development of depth perception mediated by motion parallax in unidimensional projections of rotation in depth.

Motion parallax is a composite of five transformations demonstrated to be effective in adult judgments of rotation direction in polar motion projections of a horizontal row of dots rotating in depth. The effectiveness of these transformations as a function of age was tested by presenting six such motion projections to first graders (age = 6 years), seventh graders (age = 13 years), and college students (age = 19 years). Identical age functions were obtained for judged rotation direction from the four motion projections representing (1) Velocity, corresponding to the traditional definition of motion parallax as differential velocity, (2) Velocity plus differences between ratios of instantaneous displacement to instantaneous acceleration for dots on the near and far sides of the rotation axis ($\text{D}\text{A}$ Difference), (3) Velocity, $\text{D}\text{A}$ Difference, and a gradient across the row of $\text{D}\text{A}$ ratios, and (4) all transformations. First graders, unable to use horizontal transformations, performed at chance on these four projections, while older students made correct judgments. Order, separated from Velocity for the first time, resulted in chance performance at all ages, while Direction, also separated from Velocity for the first time, resulted in veridical judgments in only 4 of 24 college students.     

Unwilling versus unable: infants' understanding of intentional action

Infants experienced a female adult handling them toys. Sometimes, however, the transaction failed, either because the adult was in various ways unwilling to give the toy (e.g., she teased the child with it or played with it herself) or else because she was unable to give it (e.g., she accidentally dropped it). Infants at 9, 12, and 18 months of age reacted with more impatience (e.g., reaching, looking away) when the adult was unwilling to give them the toy than when she was simply unable to give it. Six-month-olds, in contrast, showed no evidence of this differentiation. Because infants' behavioral responses were appropriately adapted to different kinds of intentional actions, and because the adult's actions sometimes produced results that did not match her goal (when having accidents or failed attempts), these findings provide especially rich evidence that infants first begin to understand goal-directed action at around 9 months of age.     

The relationship between masculine gender role stress and psychological adjustment: A question of construct validity?

Masculine gender role stress is a theoretical construct that describes the stress created in men when they feel they are not meeting society's expectations for masculinity, or when the situation forces men to act in feminine-typed ways. The stress produced by these feelings or actions are thought to be related to negative psychological outcomes for men, but should be unrelated to well-being for women. The present study investigated the validity of the masculine gender role stress construct, especially with regard to the assumption that masculine gender role stress is related to negative psychological outcomes for men more than for women. Participants were a group of mostly Caucasian undergraduates. Results indicated that masculine gender role stress was related to depression, hostility, and anxiety, but to the same degree for both men and women. These findings suggest that, if MGRS is a valid construct, then researchers need to explore other ways in which this type of stress can negatively affect men, but not women.     

Cognitive moderators of alcohol's effects on anxiety

The present study was designed to test the prediction from the attention-allocation model that intoxication in the absence of a pleasant distractor will fail to produce anxiolytic effects. A second prediction, that the sequence of intoxication and exposure to the anxiety-producing situation would influence alcohol's effects, was also tested. Subjects were male social drinkers who received an 0.85 g/kg dose of alcohol or a placebo. Conventional statistical analysis of the results indicated an anxiolytic effect of alcohol on heart rate but a problem with this analysis is identified. An alternative interpretation provides no support for an anxiolytic effect. Exposure to the anxiety-producing stimulus prior to intoxication led to greater heart rate reactivity than if it followed intoxication.     

Reaction times for simple shape discriminations requiring one or both visual cortices

Reaction times for a simple two-choice shape discrimination requiring either one or both visual cortices were measured.

In a total reaction time of around 400 millisec. the difference found was 3.0 ± 2.6 millisec. If subjects were weighted according to number of observations, and -- 1.34 ± 1.68 millisec. if thery were weighted according to reciprocals of variances of differences of means; that is, it was not significant.     

A Meta‐Analysis of the ELM's Argument Quality × Processing Type Predictions

One of the key dual‐process model predictions is that audiences will be more persuaded by strong persuasive arguments than weak and that this difference in persuasiveness will be larger when they are processing centrally rather than peripherally. A series of meta‐analyses were conducted (k = 134) to assess this claim and explore moderators. The data were generally consistent with the hypothesized interaction. The effects tended to be smaller when pre‐post designs were used rather than post‐test only. Assessments of the strength of the inductions did not tend to be associated with the size of the effects associated with those inductions.     

Great apes infer others’ goals based on context

In previous studies claiming to demonstrate that great apes understand the goals of others, the apes could potentially have been using subtle behavioral cues present during the test to succeed. In the current studies, we ruled out the use of such cues by making the behavior of the experimenter identical in the test phase of both the experimental and control conditions; the only difference was the preceding “context.” In the first study, apes interpreted a human’s ambiguous action as having the underlying goal of opening a box, or not, based on that human’s previous actions with similar boxes. In the second study, chimpanzees learned that when a human stood up she was going to go get food for them, but when a novel, unexpected event happened, they changed their expectation—presumably based on their understanding that this new event led the human to change her goal. These studies suggest that great apes do not need concurrent behavioral cues to infer others’ goals, but can do so from a variety of different types of cues—even cues displaced in time.