Memory demands on facial composite identification

Face composites created with FACES 3.0 composite software were used to identify target photographs under varying conditions of memory load. Composites created while viewing a mugshot were presented concurrently with a five‐photograph lineup of actual criminal suspects, immediately preceding the lineup, or with a filled delay between composite and lineup. Compared to a baseline using the mock witness technique, results demonstrated above‐chance identification of target photographs from their composites in all four experiments. Identification was highest with concurrent composite‐lineup presentation and lower under immediate, 30‐second‐delayed, and 4‐minute‐delayed conditions, with no significant identification differences across the three memory conditions. Confidence ratings in target selection only weakly predicted identification accuracy at best. These findings extend the limited research on computerized facial composite systems while addressing composite software use, efficacy, guidelines and limitations. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Generating Race,Gender, and Other Subgroup Data in Personnel Selection Simulations: A pervasive issue with a simple solution

In the past 25 years, organizational researchers and practitioners have relied heavily on computer simulation research to understand how group mean differences and correlations affect overall validity and adverse impact in protected groups (e.g., racial/ethnic groups and gender) as they relate to personnel selection practices. We point out a multilevel issue affecting nearly all past simulations: The total correlations that these simulations intended to specify are somewhat distorted after group mean differences were introduced into the data. Although this distorting effect is minimal in most cases, it matters in some cases, and after all, the main virtue of statistical simulations is precision, both in the population parameters and sample data and statistics those parameters are supposed to generate. We demonstrate this distorting effect through one specific example, based on multiple predictors and meta‐analytic data, followed by a broader simulation for single predictors across a wide variety of selection conditions. Rather than merely point out this problem, we also provide a straightforward solution: multilevel formulas that incorporate both between‐ and within‐group correlations that always correct for this biasing problem, yielding more accurate simulation results. We conclude by discussing applications and promising extensions of this work.     

Why misinformation is reported: evidence from a warning and a source-monitoring task

People report suggested misinformation about a previously witnessed event for manifold reasons, such as social pressure, lack of memory of the original aspect, or a firm belief to remember the misinformation from the witnessed event. In our experiments (N?=?429), which follow Loftus's paradigm, we tried to disentangle the reasons for reporting a central and a peripheral piece of misinformation in a recognition task by examining (a) the impact a warning about possible misinformation has on the error rate, and (b) whether once reported misinformation was actually attributed to the witnessed event in a later source-monitoring (SM) task. Overall, a misinformation effect was found for both items. The warning strongly reduced the misinformation effect, but only for the central item. In contrast, reports of the peripheral misinformation were correctly attributed to the misinformation source or, at least, ascribed to guesswork much more often than the central ones. As a consequence, after the SM task, the initially higher error rate for the peripheral item was even lower than that of the central item. Results convincingly show that the reasons for reporting misinformation, and correspondingly also the potential to avoid them in legal settings, depend on the centrality of the misinformation.     

Event and form: two themes in the Davos-debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer

The article reconsiders the Davos-debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer to reassess the discussion of interrelations and differences of their philosophies. The focus is the fecund motifs of thought that each philosopher presents. These are worked out by dispersing the contexts. Heidegger’s primary motifs of thought are identified through the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard as the question of finitude understood as continuance of the event and as the act of understanding the event. The primary motif of thought in Cassirer’s philosophy is identified with the question of form and formation. It is argued that it is possible to think the motifs of event and form in connection with each other. The focal point of connection between their philosophies is uncovered in the relations of form between persons—in the rigorous practice of promising and demanding. The philosophies of Heidegger and Cassirer are thus read in a way where they productively enhance each other without minimizing the differences of their motifs of thought.     

Information search and mental representation in risky decision making: The advantages first principle

In three experiments the problem is investigated how people identify early in the decision process those alternatives that are worthwhile to be examined in more detail. We assume that decision makers employ the Advantages first Principle: They first search for information about positive outcomes and then focus their information search (e.g., for negative consequences or for risk defusing operators) on those alternatives that appear attractive after this initial evaluation. In Experiment 1 (120 participants), initial information about consequences was varied for eight alternatives (no information, positive consequences, negative, or mixed for four alternatives). In all conditions, the great majority of participants followed both aspects of the Advantages first Principle. In Experiment 2, 60 participants decided in two quasi‐realistic scenarios with two alternatives each. Initial information was presented so that one alternative had better positive consequences, worse negative consequences, or both. In all conditions, more information was searched for in the initially better alternative. In Experiment 3 (20 participants) the Advantages first Principle was not only confirmed for a scenario but also for choices in traditional gambling tasks with two and eight alternatives, respectively. Participants could win or lose real money. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Understanding Anti‐Arab Reactions Post‐9/11: The Role of Threats,Social Categories,and Personal Ideologies1

This study examined social psychological processes associated with anti‐Arab reactions (prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination) following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Participants (N= 201) responded to an online survey. Perceived threats, self‐categorization, social dominance orientation, and just‐world beliefs were tested for their effectiveness in predicting anti‐Arab reactions. The results reveal that self‐categorization and social dominance orientation each individually accounted for a substantial percentage of the variance, while perceived threats accounted for a relatively small amount of the variance in anti‐Arab responses. However, an integrated model demonstrated that social dominance orientation, threats, self‐categorization, and a threat by self‐categorization interaction provided the best prediction of anti‐Arab reactions. Results are discussed in terms of the theoretical and practical applications for understanding out‐group derogation following political‐cultural world events.     

Comparing Personality Test Formats and Warnings: Effects on criterion‐related validity and test‐taker reactions

The potential for applicant response distortion on personality measures remains a major concern in high‐stakes testing situations. Many approaches to understanding response distortion are too transparent (e.g., instructed faking studies) – or are too subtle (e.g., correlations with social desirability measures as indices of faking). Recent research reveals more promising approaches in two methods: using forced‐choice (FC) personality test items and warning against faking. The present study examined effects of these two methods on criterion‐related validity and test‐taker reactions. Results supported incremental validity for an FC and Likert‐scale measure in warning and no‐warning conditions, above and beyond cognitive ability. No clear differences emerged between the FC vs Likert measures or warning vs no‐warning conditions in terms of validity. However, some evidence suggested that FC measures and warnings may produce negative test‐taker reactions. We conclude with implications for implementation in selection settings.