Artifactual selves: a response to Lynne Rudder Baker

Baker’s critique of my view of the self as a fiction captures some of its points well but misses the possibility of a theorist’s fiction, like the Equator or a center of gravity, which is not an illusion, but rather an abstraction, like dollars, poems, and software—made of no material but dependent on material vehicles. It is an artifact of our everyday effort to make sense of our own (and others’) complex activities by postulating a single central source of meaning, intention, and understanding. This is revealed in an example of the heterophenomenological method in action.     

Multiple context mere exposure: Examining the limits of liking

Recent evidence suggests that increased liking of exposed stimuli—a phenomenon known as the mere exposure effect—is dependent on experiencing the stimuli in the same context at exposure and test. Three experiments extended this work by examining the effect of presenting target stimuli in single and multiple exposure contexts. Target face stimuli were repeatedly paired with nonsense words, which took the role of contexts, across exposure. On test, the mere exposure effect was found only when the target face stimuli were presented with nonsense word cues (contexts) with which they had been repeatedly paired. The mere exposure effect was eliminated when exposure to target face stimuli with the nonsense word cues (contexts) was minimal, despite the overall number of exposures to the target face being equated across single- and multiple-context exposure conditions. The results suggest that familiarity of the relationship between stimuli and their context, not simply familiarity of the stimuli themselves, leads to liking. The finding supports a broader framework, which suggests that liking is partly a function of the consistency between past and present experiences with a target stimulus.     

The Impact of Family-Friendly Practices on Work–Family Balance in Spain

Not being able to combine work with family properly is negatively related to employees’ quality of life. Some firms are aware of this reality and provide their employees family-friendly practices, a set of practices designed to enable employees a work–family balance. Family-friendly practices are classified in three subsets: family support practices, flexible arrangement practices, and parental leave practices. Then, this paper analyzes the impact of different subsets of family-friendly practices on work–family balance for women and men subsamples, as well as to disentangle the mechanisms through with such effects occur. Based on a representative sample of 8,061 Spanish workers and using the Baron and Kenny procedure to test for mediation, the results show that the three subsets of family-friendly practices increase work–family balance for both genders, although some of them have different effects for women and men. In line with societal gender role expectation, family support practices better accommodate men’s need, increasing work–family balance almost for them, and parental leave practices women’s need, increasing work–family balance more for them. However, flexible arrangement practices increase work–family balance equally for both genders. Moreover, in all cases, the effect of family-friendly practices on work–family balance goes beyond the effect of time outside work and time at work, then this partial mediation indicates that time is an important mechanism in achieving work–family balance. In sum, offering employees family-friendly practices is a good starting point in order to increase people’s quality of life by helping them achieve work–family balance.     

Personality Disorders in Older Adult Inpatients with Chronic Mental Illness

It has been hypothesized that some types of personality disorders tend to remit with age whereas others may become more prominent. The present study determined the prevalence and nature of 13 personality disorders with a self-report inventory (Coolidge Axis II Inventory) in an older group of chronically mentally ill inpatients (N = 30, mean age = 63 years) and a younger group of similar patients (N = 30, mean age = 39 years). All patients met DSM-IV criteria for either Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, or recurrent severe Major Depression with psychotic features. The prevalence rate of personality disorders was high for both groups: 58% for the older sample and 66% for the younger group. The younger group was more likely to be diagnosed Antisocial, Borderline, Passive-Aggressive, Sadistic, and Schizotypal, but the groups were not different in the rates of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. This study supports the hypothesis that some personality disorders remit with age. However, no evidence was found to suggest that other personality disorders become more prominent in older adult psychiatric populations. Suggestions for future research are offered.     

Phenomenology in Mexico: A historical profile

The paper presents a journey along the history of phenomenology (Husserlian Phenomenology or phenomenology derived from Husserl) in Mexico, dealing mainly with its appropriation in the field of philosophy proper. The survey covers almost the whole century, leaving out only the last years and the present situation. Although all those philosophers who came in touch with phenomenology in a significant way in that period are mentioned here, particular attention is laid upon three figures and their meaning in Mexican philosophical culture: they are Antonio Caso, the first influential thinker and professor to dedicate a book to Husserl's philosophy; José Gaos, who enjoys a well-deserved fame as teacher and translator of phenomenological works, and Jorge Portilla, the author of a most valuable phenomenological essay: Phenomenology of Relajo. Thus, in these three cases, their contributions are explored in a somewhat more detailed way.     

Two Philosophical Problems in the Study of Happiness

In this paper two philosophical issues are discussed that hold special interest for empirical researchers studying happiness. The first issue concerns the question of how the psychological notion(s) of happiness invoked in empirical research relates to those traditionally employed by philosophers. The second concerns the question of how we ought to conceive of happiness, understood as a purely psychological phenomenon. With respect to the first, I argue that 'happiness', as used in the philosophical literature, has three importantly different senses that are often confused. Empirical research on happiness concerns only one of these senses, and serious misunderstandings about the significance of empirical results can arise from such confusion. I then argue that the second question is indeed philosophical and that, in order to understand the nature of (what I call) psychological happiness, we need first to determine what a theory of happiness is supposed to do: what are our theoretical and practical interests in the notion of happiness? I sketch an example of how such an inquiry might proceed, and argue that this approach can shed more light on the nature and significance of happiness (and related mental states) than traditional philosophical methods.