Rethinking naive realism

Philosophical Studies - Perceptions are externally-directed—they present us with a mind-independent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know what...     

Is the victim Max (Planck) or Moritz? How victim type and social value orientation affect dishonest behavior

Does the potential victim of dishonest behavior—a family or a bank, a pensioner or an insurance firm—affect the propensity to engage in such behavior? We investigate the effect of victim type—an individual person or an impersonal institution—on dishonest behavior and test whether it interacts with potential perpetrators' social value orientation (prosocial or proself). In a between‐subjects design, we allowed experimental participants (N = 368) to misreport private information in order to increase (decrease) their profit (loss) at the expense of either another participant or the experimenter's budget. Both prosocials and proselfs engaged in dishonesty, but proselfs did so much more. Furthermore, prosocials reduced their dishonesty when the victim was another person, rather than an institution, but proselfs did not. A direct implication is that the dishonesty of prosocials may be curbed by increasing the salience of the adverse effect their dishonesty has on other individual people but that such interventions will not be effective for proselfs. In contrast with recent results, we did not find a general effect of increased dishonesty under a loss (vs. gain) frame.     

Knowledge central: A central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations

Five experiments (N?=?1710) demonstrate the central role of knowledge attributions in social evaluations. In Experiments 1–3, we manipulated whether an agent believes, is certain of, or knows a true proposition and asked people to rate whether the agent should perform a variety of actions. We found that knowledge, more so than belief or certainty, leads people to judge that the agent should act. In Experiments 4–5, we investigated whether attributions of knowledge or certainty can explain an important finding on how people act based on statistical evidence, known as “the Wells effect”. We found that knowledge attributions, but not certainty attributions, mediate this effect on decision making.     

Metacognitive Experiences: Response to Commentaries

The stimulating commentaries by Huber (2004), Lee (2004), and Pham (2004) raised important questions. This response elaborates on some of their themes by addressing the assessment of naive theories, the role of expectations, the influence of metacognitive experiences on consumer choice, as well as parallels between different metacognitive experiences and moods. Receiving thoughtful and stimulating commentary from three of my favorite consumer researchers, whose work has influenced my own thinking, is a great privilege. In this response, I elaborate on some of the themes of their commentaries (Huber, 2004; Lee, 2004; Pham, 2004), although space constraints do not allow me to do full justice to their thoughts.     

The Alpha-1 Association Genetic Counseling Program: An Innovative Approach to Service

In an era of specialty medicine, genetic counselors are becoming increasingly focused in their service provision. The Alpha-1 Association Genetic Counseling Program, established in September 2007, specializes in confidential toll-free genetic counseling provided by a certified genetic counselor for Alpha-1 Antitrypsin deficiency, a co-dominant condition associated with lung and/or liver disease. The program received more than 600 callers in its first 2 years. Sixty-seven percent of new callers were family members, carriers, or health professionals. The number of callers increased between the first 2 years, with the greatest increases being family members and health professionals. Testing options and explanation of results encompassed 60% of initial reasons for calls. Seventy-two percent of referrals came from family and friends, test result letters, and the Alpha-1 Association. Between year 1 and 2 family member referrals showed the largest increase. This disease-specific genetic counseling program provides a model that may be useful for other rare disease communities.     

Ownership and object history

Appropriate behavior in relation to an object often requires judging whether it is owned and, if so, by whom. The authors propose accounts of how people make these judgments. Our central claim is that both judgments often involve making inferences about object history. In judging whether objects are owned, people may assume that artifacts (e.g., chairs) are owned and that natural objects (e.g., pinecones) are not. However, people may override these assumptions by inferring the history of intentional acts made in relation to objects. In judging who owns an object, people may often consider which person likely possessed the object in the past--such reasoning may be responsible for people's bias to assume that the first person known to possess an object is its owner.