ON THE RELATION BETWEEN REINFORCER EFFICACY AND PREFERENCE

Most research on stimulus preference and reinforcer assessment involves a preference assessment that is followed by a reinforcer assessment. Typically, the most and least preferred stimuli are tested as reinforcers. In the current study, we first quantified the reinforcing efficacies of six food items and then assessed relative preference for each item. Relative preference ranking and reinforcer efficacies showed almost perfect concordance for 1 participant and partial concordance for the other. Discordance tended to occur with the weakest reinforcers.     

Further Examination of Covert Audio Coaching on Improving Employment Skills among Secondary Students with Autism

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have difficulty maintaining employment, and there are few evidenced-based practices to guide professionals when developing employment skills among this population. The purpose of this study was to extend the literature on covert audio coaching (CAC) by examining its effects on high school students with ASD performing a job task. We used a multiple baseline design across participants. With the introduction of CAC, the participants’ job task accuracy and fluency improved. Additionally, the participants’ skills maintained for several weeks and showed preliminary evidence of effectiveness for the same task completed in a community-based worksite.     

Why does the effect of short-SOA exogenous cuing on simple RT depend on the number of display locations?

When the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the cue and target is short (i.e., less than 200 msec) and the number of display locations is small (e.g., only two), exogenous spatial cues produce a benefit in simple response time (RT). However, several recent experiments have found significant costs in these tasks when a large number of display locations is employed (e.g., eight), even at the very short SOAs that usually produce a benefit. The present study explored the dependence of exogenous cuing on the number of display locations and found evidence that both the overall validity of the cues and the specific validity of the cue on the previous trial have strong, additive effects. When a large number of display locations is used, both of these factorswork against a benefit of exogenous cuing on simple RT, reversing the typical finding into a cost. These two effects are suggested to occur within motor and perceptual processes, respectively.     

On the spatial metric of short-SOA costs of exogenous cuing

When the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the cue and the target is short, exogenous spatial cues usually produce a response time benefit. However, consistent with several recent studies, we have found that a short stimulus onset asynchrony is not sufficient. At least one more factor--the number of cue and target locations--also plays a role. Even more interesting, when 8 cue and target locations are used, the effect of an exogenous cue produces a cost on valid cue trials, and the spatial metric of this negative cuing effect depends on whether the cue remains visible at target onset.     

Unfinkable dispositions

This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks and antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility that some dispositions—those which lack any causal basis—may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks and antidotes are a major obstacle to a conditional analysis of dispositions, these dispositions that are unfinkable may be successfully analysed by the conditional analysis of dispositions. This result is of importance for those who think that the fundamental properties might be dispositions which lack any distinct causal basis, because it suggests that these properties, if they exist, can be analysed by simple conditionals and that they will not be subject to ceteris paribus laws.     

Parallel patterns of spatial compatibility and spatial congruence…as long as you don't look too closely

The effects of spatial compatibility and spatial congruence have both been explained in terms of a dual-route model under which spatial information about the stimulus, regardless of task relevance, is directly passed from perception to action. Recently, however, some alternatives to the dual-route model of the Simon Effect have been proposed (or re-introduced) as viable explanations. The present experiment compared the magnitudes of the effects of spatial compatibility and spatial congruence across a range of tasks that varied in their dimensional overlap. The results exhibited a remarkable parallel between the two phenomena when viewed only in terms of the interaction between stimulus set and response set. This could be taken as new evidence for a common origin. However, when the entire pattern of results was examined, a large difference between compatibility and congruence were also seen, which implies that there is at least one important difference between the two phenomena.     

What Do We See When We See Total Darkness?

Seeing total darkness is a peculiar perceptual state: in it, the subject is visually aware of something while seeming to fail to be aware of anything. Recent treatments of the topic (Sorensen 2008 , Soteriou 2000 ) leave this particular puzzle unsolved. Here, I attempt a solution. Following Dretske, I begin by suggesting that the perceptual report ‘S sees (total) darkness’ is ambiguous between two distinct kinds of perceptual states: epistemic and non‐epistemic. This will lead to an examination of the metaphysics of what is supposed to be seen. I show, on the one hand, the difficulty of reducing the perception of total darkness to the perception of a particular instantiation of a property, and on the other, that it has important similarities with the perception of (non‐particular) ‘stuff’. I propose, finally, that the solution to the puzzle might involve postulating a novel ontological status for total darkness: that of a ‘concrete universal’. Potential implications of interest for particularism and for naïve realism are suggested.