Psychological Abuse Experienced in Groups Scale: Psychometric Properties of the Japanese Version

The purpose of this study was to adapt the Psychological Abuse Experienced in Groups Scale (PAEGS) for use in the Japanese population. This scale evaluates the frequency with which an individual has experienced psychologically abusive behaviors within a group. A questionnaire was administered to 130 former members of abusive groups and to a comparison sample composed of 124 former members of non‐abusive groups. The main results showed a one‐dimensional factor structure and an adequate reliability score. Significant correlations were found between the PAEGS and a group abusiveness measure, providing evidence of convergent validity. In addition, high discriminatory power was found, determining an optimal cut‐off point to distinguish between abusive experiences and non‐abusive experiences within groups. The Japanese version of the PAEGS is able to overcome limitations of previous instruments intended to assess the phenomenon, as sufficient empirical evidence is found for its use in research. In addition, it can be useful in clinical and legal contexts to assess the degree of psychological abuse experienced by Japanese people during their involvement in certain groups.     

Serial learning by rhesus monkeys: II. Learning four-item lists by trial and error

Three rhesus macaque monkeys were trained to produce novel 4-item lists (A-->B-->C-->D) on which all items were displayed from the start of training. Subjects were previously trained to produce 4-item lists by adding one item at a time (A, A-->B, A-->B-->C, and A-->B-->C-->D; lists K. B. Swartz et al., 1991). Those lists could be mastered by responding to each new item last. To learn lists on which all items were displayed from the start of training, subjects had to recall the consequences of errors and correct responses to each item. Errors ended the trial; correct responses to A, B, or C allowed the trial to continue. A correct response to D produced food reward. Although the probability of executing a 4-item list correctly by chance was .04, each subject mastered 4 novel 4-item lists by trial and error. The ability of monkeys to use a trial-and-error strategy to learn novel lists provides a basis for studying the development of serial expertise in animals.     

Serial learning by rhesus monkeys: I. Acquisition and retention of multiple four-item lists.

Two rhesus monkeys were trained to learn eight 4-item lists, each composed of 4 different photographs. Lists were trained in successive phases: A, A----B, A----B----C, and A----B----C----D. After List 4, retention, as measured by the method of savings, was, on average, 66% (range: 44-84%). Indeed, all 4 lists could be recalled reliably during a single session with neither a decrement in accuracy nor an increase in the latency of responding to each item. Response latencies on a subset test employing all possible 2- and 3-item subsets of each 4-item list support the hypothesis that monkeys form linear representations of a list. Latencies to Item 1 of a subset varied directly with the position of that item in the original list. On List 1, latencies to Item 2 varied directly with the number of intervening items between Item 1 and Item 2 in the original list. During the acquisition of Lists 5-8, both Ss mastered the A----B and A----B----C phases of training in the minimum number of trials possible.     

Change process in systemic therapy: A qualitative investigation

This study addresses the process of therapeutic change in individuals who received systemic therapy. This study is an exploratory qualitative study based on the client's perceptions and therapeutic experiences. The sample included 10 clients who had completed their therapy with systemic therapists. The method used for the collection of the data was semi‐structured interviews (Change Interview; Elliott, Slatick, & Urman, 2001). The interviews were analysed using grounded theory analysis. The results showed that both specific and common factors in therapy function in a co‐occurring mode, hence suggesting a synergy effect between common factors and specific techniques or therapist factors in psychotherapy. The core category ‘experience of therapeutic change, within the secure frame of therapy, is a process of deconstructing and reconstructing the house you live in: Yourself’ emerged based on self‐exploration and self‐discovery and is then discussed in a theoretical constructivist framework. Implications for research on the issue of the process of therapeutic change are discussed.     

A critique of science and R&D-based models of endogenous growth

Conclusion We have argued against the conventional treatment of science from two directions: firstly, we show that its assumptions about the mechanics of technology transfer are at odds with what occurs in practice. Secondly, the predictions of models based on conventional assumptions receive little support empirically, and are on some occasions contradicted by the data. We believe that the weaknesses we have discussed prompt a re-analysis of science as the workings of invisible colleges. Moreover, we note that there appears, at present, to be no empirical or sound theoretical reason to suppose that, for reasons of economic growth, governments need fund science. the author of The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, Macmillan/St Martin’s Press, 1996.     

Commands as Divine Attributes

Theories of ethics that attempt to incorporate divine speech or commands as necessary elements in the construction of moral obligations are often viewed as vulnerable to a challenge based on the so‐called Euthyphro dilemma. According to this challenge, opponents of theistic ethics suppose that divine speech either informs one of a preexisting set of values and obligations, which makes it inconsequential, or is entirely arbitrary, which makes it irrational. This essay analyzes some of the debates on the nature of divine commands in eleventh‐century works of Islamic jurisprudence (u?ūl al‐fiqh). I show that Mu?tazilī jurisprudents advanced the view that divine commands were actions performed in time that had concrete manifestations, while Ash?arīs argued that divine speech in general, and commands in particular, were eternal divine attributes. After exposing certain weaknesses in the Euthyphro‐inspired objections to theistic ethics, I argue that the Ash?arī idea of commands as divine attributes is a promising move for scholars interested in defending a divine command view of moral obligation.     

Al-Ghazali’s Position on the ‘Second Proof’ of the ‘Philosophers’ for the Eternity of the World,in the First Discussion of the Incoherence of the Philosophers

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) raised objections against the doctrine of the ‘philosophers’ (represented chiefly by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina) on 20 specific points. In the first, and longest discussion, he examines and rebuts four of their proofs of the pre-eternity of the world—that is, that the universe as a whole had no beginning but extends perpetually into the past. Al-Ghazali rejects that doctrine. But his own position on the issue does not become clear until he discusses the philosophers’ ‘second proof.’ In this paper, I will examine the relevant text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in order to clarify the nature of Al-Ghazali’s position in relation to the second proof. I will explain why Al-Ghazali cannot adopt what I refer to as the ‘naïve’ theological position, according to which God temporally preceded the world. Instead, Al-Ghazali concurs with the philosophers that time is the measure of motion, but he asserts that time was created with the world, both having a beginning before which there was no time. God, on the other hand, is not temporally prior to the world, but neither is he simultaneous, as the second proof supposes. As timelessly eternal, God bears no temporal relation to the world at all. In conclusion, I describe what I refer to as a naïve philosophical position, which is entailed by the second proof, but distinct from both Al-Ghazali’s position and that adopted by Ibn Rushd in his critique of Al-Ghazali in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. I argue that this naïve philosophical position (and thus, the second proof) is incoherent.