Belief Revision,Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency

Isaac Levi has claimed that our reliance on the testimony of others, and on the testimony of the senses, commonly produces inconsistency in our set of full beliefs. This happens if what is reported is inconsistent with what we believe to be the case. Drawing on a conception of the role of beliefs in inquiry going back to Dewey, Levi has maintained that the inconsistent belief corpus is a state of ``epistemic hell'': it is useless as a basis for inquiry and deliberation. As he has also noticed, the compatibility of these two elements of his pragmatist epistemology could be called into question. For if inconsistency means hell, how can it ever be rational to enter that state, and on what basis could we attempt to regain consistency? Levi, nonetheless, has tried to show that the conflict is only apparent and that no changes of his theory are necessary. In the main part of the paper I argue, by contrast, that his attempts to reconcile these components of his view are unsuccessful.The conflict is real andthus presents a genuine threat to Deweyan pragmatism, as understood by Levi. After an attempt to pinpoint exactly where the source of the problem lies, I explore some possibilities for how to come to grips with it. I conclude that Levi can keep his fundamental thesis concerning the role of beliefs in inquiry and deliberation, provided that he (i) gives up the view that the agent can legitimately escape from inconsistency, and (ii) modifies his account of prediction alias deliberate expansion by acknowledging a third desideratum, besides probability and informational value, namely, not to cause permanent breakdown further down the line of inquiry. The result is a position which is more similar to Peter Gärdenfors's than is Levi's original theory, while retaining the basic insights of the latter.     

Constructivist coding: learning from selective feedback

Although much learning in real-life environments relies on highly selective feedback about outcomes, virtually all cognitive models of learning, judgment, and categorization assume complete and representative feedback. We investigated empirically the effect of selective feedback on decision making and how people code experience with selective feedback. The results showed that, in contrast to a commonly raised concern, performance was not impaired following learning with selective and biased feedback. Furthermore, even in a simple decision task, the experience that people acquired was not a mere recording of the observed outcomes, but rather a reconstruction from general task knowledge.     

Adaptive changes between cue abstraction and exemplar memory in a multiple-cue judgment task with continuous cues

The majority of previous studies on multiple-cue judgment with continuous cues have involved comparisons between judgments and multiple linear regression models that integrated cues into a judgment. The authors present an experiment indicating that in a judgment task withadditive combination of multiple continuous cues, people indeed displayed abstract knowledge of the cue criterion relations that was mentally integrated into a judgment, but in a task withmultiplicative combination of continuous cues, people instead relied on retrieval of memory traces of similar judgment cases (exemplars). These results suggest that people may adopt qualitatively distinct forms of knowledge, depending on the structure of a multiple-cue judgment task. The authors discuss implications for theories of multiple-cue judgment.     

Note on the rationality of rule-based versus exemplar-based processing in human judgment

This paper reports a study of the relationship between rule- versus exemplar-based processing and criteria for rationality of judgment. Participants made probability judgments in a classification task devised by S. W. Allen and L. R. Brooks (1991). In the exemplar condition, the miscalibration was accounted for by stochastic components of the judgment with a format-dependence effect, implying simultaneous over- and underconfidence depending on the response scale. In the rule condition, there was an overconfidence bias not accounted for by the stochastic components of judgment. In both conditions the participants were additive on average and reasonably transitive, but the larger stochastic component in the exemplar condition produced somewhat larger absolute deviations. The results suggest that exemplar processes are unbiased but more perturbed by stochastic components, while rule-based processes may be more prone to bias.     

Exemplars, prototypes, and the flexibility of classification models

J. P. Minda and J. D. Smith (2001) showed that a prototype model outperforms an exemplar model, especially in larger categories or categories that contained more complex stimuli. R. M. Nosofsky and S. R. Zaki (2002) showed that an exemplar model with a response-scaling mechanism outperforms a prototype model. The authors of the current study investigated whether excessive model flexibility could explain these results. Using cross-validation, the authors demonstrated that both the prototype model and the exemplar model with a response-scaling mechanism suffered from overfilling in the linearly separable category structure. The results illustrate the need to make sure that the best-fitting model is not chasing error variance instead of variance attributed to the cognitive process it is supposed to model.     

Exemplar effects in categorization and multiple-cue judgment

Categorization and multiple-cue judgment are similar tasks, but the influential models in the two areas are different in terms of the computations, processes, and neural substrates that they imply. In categorization, exemplar memory is often emphasized, whereas multiple-cue judgment generally is interpreted in terms of integration of cues that have been abstracted in training. In 3 experiments the authors investigated whether these conclusions derive from genuine differences in the processes or are accidental to the different research methods. The results revealed large individual differences and a shift from exemplar memory to cue abstraction when the criterion is changed from a binary to a continuous variable, especially for a probabilistic criterion. People appear to switch between qualitatively distinct processes in the 2 tasks.     

Alexithymia,memory of emotion,emotional awareness,and perfectionism

The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; R. M. Bagby, J. D. A. Parker, & G. J. Taylor, 1994) is a self-assessment instrument designed to measure deficits in meta-emotional functioning (e.g., difficulties in identifying and describing emotions). Four studies were carried out to examine the association between the TAS-20 and (a) performance measures of meta-emotional functioning (memory of emotion and emotional awareness; Studies 1-2) and (b) measures of perfectionistic standards that may possibly be involved in the self-assessment of abilities-difficulties (Studies 3-4). The TAS-20 failed to correlate in the predicted direction with the performance measures but showed sizable correlations with measures of perfectionism. Moreover, perfectionism was found to predict TAS-20 scores independent of depression, anxiety, and somatic complaints. The results are discussed in terms of the TAS-20 measuring primarily certain aspects of meta-emotional self-efficacy.     

Occupational Therapists' Experience Concerning Occupational Performance in Adults With Asperger Syndrome

Persons with Asperger Syndrome often seem to have difficulty performing everyday occupations. This study aimed to describe occupational therapists' experience concerning abilities to occupational performance among adults with Asperger Syndrome. Data were collected in interviews with eight occupational therapists and analyzed using a qualitative method. Results showed that clients with Asperger Syndrome often possess abilities but seem to have difficulties knowing when, where, and how they should use them. The ability to adapt behavior in accordance with cues from the environment was identified as the core category. Environment plays a major role in how these persons interact in different situations.