On the role of causal intervention in multiple-cue judgment: positive and negative effects on learning

Previous studies have suggested better learning when people actively intervene rather than when they passively observe the stimuli in a judgment task. In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the hypothesis that this improvement is associated with a shift from exemplar memory to cue abstraction. In a multiple-cue judgment task with continuous cues, the data replicated the improvement with intervention and participants who experimented more actively produced more accurate judgments. In a multiple-cue judgment task with binary cues, intervention produced poorer accuracy and participants who experimented more actively produced poorer judgments. These results provide no support for a representational shift but suggest that the improvement with active intervention may be limited to certain tasks and environments.     

Influences of Affect Associated with Routine Out-of-Home Activities on Subjective Well-Being

A survey of a random sample of 1,330 Swedish residents assessed the relationships between affect associated with performance of routine out-of-home activities, mood, and judgments of life satisfaction (cognitive subjective wellbeing, CSWB). Regression analyses showed that sociodemographic variables accounted for most variance in CSWB (7%) and least in mood (2%). In agreement with previous research, CSWB increased with income, employment, and cohabiting with a spouse, and had a U-formed relationship with age. Affect associated with routine activities accounted for more variance than the socio-demographic variables in mood (30%) and in CSWB (13%). Mood partially mediated the effect on CSWB of affect associated with the activities. The results suggest that future policy-related research should consider the possibility that community-provided resources that facilitate performance of routine out-of-home activities would increase life satisfaction.     

Ways of probing situated concepts

Two ways of eliciting conceptual content have been to instruct participants to list the intrinsic properties that concept exemplars possess or to report any thoughts that come to mind about the concept. It has been argued that the open, unconstrained probe is better able to elicit the situational information that concepts contain. We evaluated this proposal in two experiments comparing the two probes with regard to the content that they yield for object concepts at the superordinate and basic levels. The results showed that the open probe was better able to elicit situated conceptual knowledge and point out differences in the representations of superordinate and basic concepts.     

Impulsivity and Paced Tapping

The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that impulsivity is positively related to both the intraindividual variability and the rate of performance of a paced tapping task. Selected experimental conditions which have been demonstrated to influence paced tapping were included in the experimental design of the tapping task. The independent variables in the tapping task were: feedback vs. no feedback; tempo; concurrent cognitive task (counting) vs. no concurrent cognitive task. Three measures of tapping performance were computed: absolute or total error of tapping, tapping rate, and the intraindividual variability of tapping. The results confirm the hypothesis that impulsivity is positively related to rate of paced tapping, although the degree of relationship varied under different experimental conditions within the paced tapping task. Intraindividual variability of tapping was not significantly related to impulsivity, but the results were suggestive of a positive relationship.     

The Impossibility of Coherence

There is an emerging consensus in the literature on probabilistic coherence that such coherence cannot be truth conducive unless the information sources providing the cohering information are individually credible and collectively independent. Furthermore, coherence can at best be truth conducive in a ceteris paribus sense. Bovens and Hartmann have argued that there cannot be any measure of coherence that is truth conducive even in this very weak sense. In this paper, I give an alternative impossibility proof. I provide a relatively detailed comparison of the two results, which turn out to be logically unrelated, and argue that my result answers a question raised by Bovens and Hartmann’s study. Finally, I discuss the epistemological ramifications of these findings and try to make plausible that a shift to an explanatory framework such as Thagard’s is unlikely to turn the impossibility into a possibility.