Is visual short-term memory object based? Rejection of the “strong-object” hypothesis

Is the capacity of visual short-term memory (VSTM) limited by the number of objects or by the number of features? VSTM for objects with either one feature or two color features was tested. Results show that capacity was limited primarily by the number of colors to be memorized, not by the number of objects. This result held up with variations in color saturation, blocked or mixed conditions, duration of memory image, and absence or presence of verbal load. However, conjoining features into objects improved VSTM capacity when size-orientation and color-orientation conjunctions were tested. Nevertheless, the number of features still mattered. When feature heterogeneity was controlled, VSTM for conjoined objects was worse than VSTM for objects made of single features. Our results support a weak-object hypothesis of VSTM capacity that suggests that VSTM is limited by both the number of objects and the feature composition of those objects.     

The vulnerability of values to attack: inoculation of values and value-relevant attitudes

Based on the values-as-truisms hypothesis and inoculation theory, two experiments tested whether providing cognitive defenses for the value of equality induces resistance against a message attacking this value. Experiment 1 found that participants who generated cognitive support in an active-supportive or an active-refutational defense were less persuaded by a subsequent message attacking equality than were participants who engaged in no prior defense. Experiment 2 examined the effects of an active-refutational defense and a passive-refutational defense, which simply asked participants to read reasons supporting or opposing equality. Results indicated additive effects of the active and passive defenses, such that participants were most resistant to the anti-equality message when they were given both defenses. Mediational analysis across both experiments revealed that the defenses increased counterargumentation of the anti-equality message, which led to increased post-attack importance of equality and predicted more favorable equality-relevant attitudes and values.     

Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder

Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.     

Consequences of ‘tiger’ parenting: a cross‐cultural study of maternal psychological control and children's cortisol stress response

Parenting strategies involving psychological control are associated with increased adjustment problems in children. However, no research has examined the extent to which culture and psychological control predict children's stress physiology. We examine cultural differences in maternal psychological control and its associations with children's cortisol. Chinese (N = 59) and American (N = 45) mother‐child dyads participated in the study. Mothers reported on psychological control. Children's cortisol was collected during a stressor and two indices of Area Under the Curve (AUC) were computed: AUCg which accounts for total output, and AUCi, which captures reactivity. Results indicate that Chinese mothers reported higher levels of psychological control and Chinese children had higher levels of AUCg than their American counterparts. Across both cultures, psychological control was significantly associated with increased cortisol levels as indexed by AUCg. There were no associations for AUCi. Finally, mediation analyses demonstrated that psychological control fully explained cultural differences in children's cortisol stress response as indexed by AUCg.     

Individual prediction of dyslexia by single versus multiple deficit models

The overall goals of this study were to test single versus multiple cognitive deficit models of dyslexia (reading disability) at the level of individual cases and to determine the clinical utility of these models for prediction and diagnosis of dyslexia. To accomplish these goals, we tested five cognitive models of dyslexia--two single-deficit models, two multiple-deficit models, and one hybrid model--in two large population-based samples, one cross-sectional (Colorado Learning Disability Research Center) and one longitudinal (International longitudinal Twin Study). The cognitive deficits included in these cognitive models were in phonological awareness, language skill, and processing speed and/or naming speed. To determine whether an individual case fit one of these models, we used two methods: 1) the presence or absence of the predicted cognitive deficits, and 2) whether the individual's level of reading skill best fit the regression equation with the relevant cognitive predictors (i.e., whether their reading skill was proportional to those cognitive predictors.) We found that roughly equal proportions of cases met both tests of model fit for the multiple deficit models (30-36%) and single deficit models (24-28%); hence, the hybrid model provided the best overall fit to the data. The remaining roughly 40% of cases in each sample lacked the deficit or deficits that corresponded with their best-fitting regression model. We discuss the clinical implications of these results for both diagnosis of school-age children and preschool prediction of children at risk for dyslexia.     

When feeling right leads to being right in the reporting of implicitly-formed attitudes,or how I learned to stop worrying and trust my gut

Previous research indicates that attitudes can form via the implicit (unconscious) detection of covariations between attitude objects and other valenced stimuli (Olson & Fazio, 2001, 2002). We posit that due to the lack of awareness of their origins, attitudes resulting from implicit evaluative conditioning are more affective in nature and resemble gut intuitions more than rational beliefs. This suggests that circumstances exist when individuals will be more likely to express implicitly-formed attitudes, and across a correlational study and 2 experiments, the present research demonstrates factors that increase conditioning-consistent decision-making. Specifically, we demonstrate that feelings of intuitiveness and expertise, both of which can foster a sense that one can “trust one's gut,” lead one to express attitudes recently formed through an implicit evaluative conditioning procedure. We conclude that while implicit attitude formation may be a pervasive phenomenon, implicitly formed attitudes may be expressed only under certain conditions.     

Shifting attention among working memory representations: testing cue type, awareness, and strategic control

It is well known that visual working memory (VWM) performance is modulated by attentional cues presented during encoding. Interestingly, retrospective cues presented after encoding, but prior to the test phase also improve performance. This improvement in performance is termed the retro-cue benefit. We investigated whether the retro-cue benefit is sensitive to cue type, whether participants were aware of their improvement in performance due to the retro-cue, and whether the effect was under strategic control. Experiment 1 compared the potential cueing benefits of abrupt onset retro-cues relying on bottom-up attention, number retro-cues relying on top-down attention, and arrow retro-cues, relying on a mixture of both. We found a significant retro-cue effect only for arrow retro-cues. In Experiment 2, we tested participants' awareness of their use of the informative retro-cue and found that they were aware of their improved performance. In Experiment 3, we asked whether participants have strategic control over the retro-cue. The retro-cue was difficult to ignore, suggesting that strategic control is low. The retro-cue effect appears to be within conscious awareness but not under full strategic control.     

Children Apply Principles of Physical Ownership to Ideas

Adults apply ownership not only to objects but also to ideas. But do people come to apply principles of ownership to ideas because of being taught about intellectual property and copyrights? Here, we investigate whether children apply rules from physical property ownership to ideas. Studies 1a and 1b show that children (6–8 years old) determine ownership of both objects and ideas based on who first establishes possession of the object or idea. Study 2 shows that children use another principle of object ownership, control of permission—an ability to restrict others’ access to the entity in question—to determine idea ownership. In Study 3 , we replicate these findings with different idea types. In Study 4 , we determine that children will not apply ownership to every entity, demonstrating that they do not apply ownership to a common word. Taken together, these results suggest that, like adults, children as young as 6 years old apply rules from ownership not only to objects but to ideas as well.