The Interrater Reliability of Subjective Assessments of the Babinski Reflex

The Babinski reflex is a clinical diagnostic tool; however, the interrater reliability of this tool is currently greatly contested. A comparison between rater groups with objective measurements of the Babinski reflex was therefore conducted. Fifteen recorded Babinski reflexes were assessed by 12 neurologists and 12 medical students as being either pathological or nonpathological. Kinematic and electromyographic variables were collected and used to assess which aspects of the Babinski reflex predict classification. Substantial interrater agreement within the neurologist and student groups (κ = .72 and .67, respectively) was shown; however, there were some differing aspects between what neurologists and students used to assess the reflex as determined by objective kinematic measurements.     

Anticipated cooperation vs. competition moderates interpersonal projection

Two experiments investigated the impact of anticipated interdependence on people’s projection of their characteristics onto an unknown target. After participants had rated themselves on a list of personality traits, they were led to expect a situation of cooperation or competition with another participant and rated this participant on the same list of traits. In both experiments, projection of self-attributed traits was stronger under cooperation than competition. This effect was independent of trait valence, whether defined a priori (Experiment 1) or as an idiosyncratic measure (Experiment 2). Experiment 2 also revealed that the moderation of interpersonal projection by interdependence was not driven by changes in participants’ self-representation. These findings suggest that the anticipated interdependence context influences the way we perceive similarity with unknown others. We discuss possible cognitive and motivational mechanisms underlying this effect.     

Footprints sticking out of the sand. Part 1: Children's perception of naturalistic and embossed symbol stimuli

The shading information in images that depict surfaces of three-dimensional objects cannot be perceived correctly unless the direction of the illuminating light source is known, and, in the absence of this knowledge, adults interpret such images by assuming that light comes from above. In order to investigate if children make use of a similar assumption, we analysed data from 171 children between the ages of 4.6 and 10.8 years using 10 images (shown upright and upside-down) that could be perceived as either convex or concave. Each of five images depicted a naturalistic picture (e.g., a footprint), each of the other five depicted an embossed symbol (e.g., a square). On each of 20 trials, a child was presented with either an upright or upside-down image, and indicated whether the depicted shape appeared convex or concave. Our main findings are that (i) naturalistic stimuli are significantly more likely to be perceived as if light comes from above than symbol stimuli, and (ii) children's propensity to interpret stimuli as if light comes from above increases significantly with age, and at a similar rate for naturalistic and symbol stimuli. These results suggest that, irrespective of any innate competence, children's ability to interpret shading information is gradually refined throughout childhood.     

Metacognition,Executive Functions and Aging: The Effect of Training in the Use of Metacognitive Skills to Solve Mathematical Word Problems

The aim of our research was to study the effects of metacognition training on the performance of older adults solving mathematical word problems. A further aim was to study the links between metacognition and executive function. Thirty-two subjects aged over 60, divided into an experimental and a control group, took part in this study which involved five training sessions. Results show that metacognition training enhanced the two metacognition components (knowledge and skills) and the mathematical problem-solving capacities of the participants. They also suggest that the use of metacognition by older people to solve mathematical word problems is supported by executive functions (updating, shifting) and particularly by processing speed.     

Categorization,categorical perception,and asymmetry in infants’ representation of face race

The present study examined whether 6‐ and 9‐month‐old Caucasian infants could categorize faces according to race. In Experiment 1, infants were familiarized with different female faces from a common ethnic background (i.e. either Caucasian or Asian) and then tested with female faces from a novel race category. Nine‐month‐olds were able to form discrete categories of Caucasian and Asian faces. However, 6‐month‐olds did not form discrete categories of faces based on race. In Experiment 2, a second group of 6‐ and 9‐month‐olds was tested to determine whether they could discriminate between different faces from the same race category. Results showed that both age groups could only discriminate between different faces from the own‐race category of Caucasian faces. The findings of the two experiments taken together suggest that 9‐month‐olds formed a category of Caucasian faces that are further differentiated at the individual level. In contrast, although they could form a category of Asian faces, they could not discriminate between such other‐race faces. This asymmetry in category formation at 9 months (i.e. categorization of own‐race faces vs. categorical perception of other‐race faces) suggests that differential experience with own‐ and other‐race faces plays an important role in infants’ acquisition of face processing abilities.     

Substitute or stepping stone? Assessing the impact of low‐threshold online collective actions on offline participation

Anecdotes of past social movements suggest that Internet‐enabled technologies, especially social media platforms, can facilitate collective actions. Recently, however, it has been argued that the participatory Internet encourages low‐cost and low‐risk activism—slacktivism—which may have detrimental consequences for groups that aim to achieve a collective purpose. More precisely, low‐threshold digital practices such as signing online petitions or “liking” the Facebook page of a group are thought to derail subsequent engagement offline. We assessed this postulation in three experiments (N = 76, N = 59, and N = 48) and showed that so‐called slacktivist actions indeed reduce the willingness to join a panel discussion and demonstration as well as the likelihood to sign a petition. This demobilizing effect was mediated by the satisfaction of group‐enhancing motives; members considered low‐threshold online collective actions as a substantial contribution to the group's success. The findings highlight that behavior that is belittled as slacktivism addresses needs that pertain to individuals' sense of group membership. Rather than hedonistic motives or personal interests, concerns for the ingroup's welfare and viability influenced the decision to join future collective actions offline. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A focused attention intervention for coping with ostracism

Ostracism—being excluded and ignored—thwarts satisfaction of four fundamental needs: belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence. The current study investigated whether training participants to focus their attention on the here-and-now (i.e., focused attention) reduces distress from an ostracism experience. Participants were first trained in either focused or unfocused attention, and then played Cyberball, an online ball-tossing game for which half the participants were included or ostracized. Participants reported their levels of need satisfaction during the game, and after a short delay. Whereas both training groups experienced the same degree of need-threat in the immediate measure, participants who were trained in focused attention showed more recovery for the delayed measure. We reason that focused attention would not reduce the distress during the ostracism experience, but it aided in recovery by preventing participants from reliving the ostracism experience after it concludes.     

Social support from evaluative familiar persons – a buffer against stress? Preliminary evidence of neuroendocrine and psychological responses

ABSTRACT

Background and Objectives: Social support may have a stress-buffering effect when an individual is or could be negatively judged by others, but paradoxically may also exacerbate stress. The aim of our study was to examine these findings when social support was provided by a positive or negative evaluative audience composed of familiar and close others (teachers).

Design and Methods: 84 men were confronted with the Trier Social Stress Test for Groups through a 3 (negative, positive, no-audience) x?2 (familiar, unfamiliar) experimental design with four measurement points of cortisol levels and state anxiety. We also tested whether closeness with the committee members predicted these variables for the participants in the familiar conditions.

Results: Using both a frequentist and a Bayesian approach, familiarity and social support did not have stress-buffering effects (or merely anecdotal effects) on cortisol levels but buffered self-reported anxiety only for the participants faced with a supportive audience composed of familiar persons. Closeness with the experimenters was not a significant predictor of the stress responses.

Conclusions: Because these results are preliminary evidence, further investigations into the relations between support provider and recipient during evaluative tasks would be worthwhile to better explain opposing findings found in this growing literature.     

Bats, balls, and substitution sensitivity: cognitive misers are no happy fools

Influential work on human thinking suggests that our judgment is often biased because we minimize cognitive effort and intuitively substitute hard questions by easier ones. A key question is whether or not people realize that they are doing this and notice their mistake. Here, we test this claim with one of the most publicized examples of the substitution bias, the bat-and-ball problem. We designed an isomorphic control version in which reasoners experience no intuitive pull to substitute. Results show that people are less confident in their substituted, erroneous bat-and-ball answer than in their answer on the control version that does not give rise to the substitution. Contrary to popular belief, this basic finding indicates that biased reasoners are not completely oblivious to the substitution and sense that their answer is questionable. This calls into question the characterization of the human reasoner as a happy fool who blindly answers erroneous questions without realizing it.