Radioligands for PET and SPECT Imaging of the central noradrenergic system

In the central nervous system, the neurotransmitter norepinephrine is involved in normal physiology, neuropsychiatric disorders, and the effects of numerous drugs. Although alterations of the central noradrenergic system are involved in the pathophysiology and pharmacotherapy of mood disorders, the basis and nature of these changes remain unresolved. Positron emission tomography (PET) and single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) imaging agents will be valuable for further elucidating the roles of norepinephrine in health and disease. This review discusses PET and SPECT radioligands that have been developed for the enzymes, receptors, and transporters involved in noradrenergic neurotransmission. Currently, imaging agents that exhibit specific in vivo uptake in the brain have been described for monoamine oxidase A and beta-adrenergic receptors, but have not undergone detailed evaluation or experimental application. Based on the successful development and utilization of in vivo imaging agents for elements of the central dopaminergic and serotoninergic systems, PET and SPECT radioligands are expected to serve as new tools for studying the physiology, pathophysiology, and pharmacology of the central noradrenergic system.     

Are the interpersonal and identity disturbances in the borderline personality disorder criteria linked to the traits of affective instability and impulsivity?

This study examines the degree to which two putative biologically influenced personality traits, affective instability and impulsive aggression, are associated with some of the interpersonal and intrapsychic disturbances of borderline personality disorder (BPD) and with choice of defense mechanism. In a sample of 152 personality disorder patients, affective instability and impulsive aggression were measured. Defense mechanisms were assessed in 140 of these patients using the Defensive Style Questionnaire (DSQ). The correlations between the traits of affective instability and impulsive aggression and the eight DSM-III-R criteria for borderline personality disorder and 20 DSQ defenses were examined. Affective instability was significantly correlated with the DSM-III-R criteria of identity disturbance, chronic emptiness or boredom, inappropriate anger, suicidality, and the affective instability criteria. It also was associated with the defenses of splitting, projection, acting out, passive aggression, undoing, and autistic fantasy. Impulsive aggression was related to unstable interpersonal relationships, inappropriate anger and impulsiveness and with the defense of acting out. It was negatively correlated with the defenses of suppression and reaction formation. A number of the interpersonal and experiential disturbances and defense mechanisms that are features of BPD are associated with the traits of affective instability and impulsive aggression among patients with personality disorders.     

Expiation,Substitution and Surrender: Levinasian Implications for Psychotherapy

This essay will build on Emmanuel Levinas’s rejection of ontology as foundational and draw out the implications for psychotherapy. We will explore Levinas’s concept of substitution (in both his more Jewish writings and his philosophical treatises) and consider its meaning in relationship to the role of a psychotherapist. Levinas understands the Other as a calling for substitution of the self and of a taking on of responsibility. We explore the notion of surrender in the work of the psychoanalyst Emmanuel Ghent and argue that his position is ultimately lacking in ethical injunction; requiring nothing of the self in relationship to the Other. It remains within the confines of the conventional, self-reflexive models that Levinas critiques. Following Levinas, we suggest that the therapist bear the burden of ethical responsibility by being exposed to the client’s ethical call and by responding out of a kenotic self-emptying.

Developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias on young children's event memory and false reports

The present study investigated developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias on children's memory and suggestibility. Three- and 5-year-olds were singly or repeatedly interviewed about a play event by a highly biased or control interviewer. Children interviewed once by the biased interviewer after a long delay made the most errors. Children interviewed repeatedly, regardless of interviewer bias, were more accurate and less likely to falsely claim that they played with a man. In free recall, among children questioned once after a long delay by the biased interviewer, 5-year-olds were more likely than were 3-year-olds to claim falsely that they played with a man. However, in response to direct questions, 3-year-olds were more easily manipulated into implying that they played with him. Findings suggest that interviewer bias is particularly problematic when children's memory has weakened. In contrast, repeated interviews that occur a short time after a to-be-remembered event do not necessarily increase children's errors, even when interviews include misleading questions and interviewer bias. Implications for developmental differences in memory and suggestibility are discussed.     

Social Cynicism and Job Satisfaction: A Longitudinal Analysis

Social cynicism, a negative view about people and social institutions, was found to show a negative correlation with job satisfaction across societies. A preliminary study in Hong Kong showed that social cynicism and job satisfaction correlated negatively across individuals as well. To confirm the causal effect of social cynicism on job satisfaction, a longitudinal study in Shanghai, China, with three waves of surveys, was conducted. Results showed that social cynicism correlated negatively with job satisfaction measured concurrently, and was predictive of job satisfaction measured subsequently. Consistent with the buffering hypothesis, perceived well‐being was a significant moderator in that the negative relationship between social cynicism and job satisfaction was significant only when perceived well‐being was low. On s'est aperçu que le cynisme social (une vision négative des gens et des institutions sociales) entretenait une corrélation négative avec la satisfaction professionnelle quelle que soit la société. Une étude préliminaire à Hong‐Kong a montré que le cynisme social et la satisfaction professionnelle présentaient également une corrélation négative au niveau de l'individu. Dans le but de confirmer le statut causal du cynisme social sur la satisfaction professionnelle, on a mené une étude longitudinale en Chine, à Shanghai, avec trois enquêtes successives. Les résultats montrent que le cynisme social est négativement reliéà la satisfaction professionnelle mesurée au même moment et prédit la satisfaction professionnelle mesurée ultérieurement. En accord avec l'hypothèse portant sur la résistance aux aléas de l'existence, le bien‐être perçu est un modérateur actif dans la mesure où la relation négative entre le cynisme social et la satisfaction professionnelle n'est significative que lorsque le bien‐être perçu est médiocre.     

Knowing against the odds

We present and discuss a counterexample to the following plausible principle: if you know that a coin is fair, and for all you know it is going to be flipped, then for all you know it will land tails.     

BUDDHISM,NATURALISM, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

Owen Flanagan's important book The Bodhisattva's Brain presents a naturalized interpretation of Buddhist philosophy. Although the overall approach of the book is very promising, certain aspects of its presentation could benefit from further reflection. Traditional teachings about reincarnation do not contradict the doctrine of no self, as Flanagan seems to suggest; however, they are empirically rather implausible. Flanagan's proposed “tame” interpretation of karma is too thin; we can do better at fitting karma into a scientific worldview. The relationship between eudaimonist and utilitarian strands in Buddhist ethics is more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize incautious and imprecise claims that Buddhism will make practitioners happy. We can make progress by distinguishing between happiness in the sense of a Buddhist version of eudaimonia, and happiness in the sense of attitudinal pleasure. Doing so might result in an interpretation of Buddhist views about happiness that was simultaneously philosophically interesting, historically credible, and psychologically testable.     

ALTRUISM AND THE GOLDEN RULE

This essay addresses recent claims about the compatibility of the sociobiological theory of reciprocal altruism with standard Western formulations of the Golden Rule. Derek Parfit claims that the theory of reciprocal altruism teaches us to be “reciprocal altruists,” who benefit only those people from whom we can reasonably expect benefits in the future. The Golden Rule, on the other hand, teaches us to benefit anyone regardless of their intention or ability to return the favor, or as Parfit puts it, the Golden Rule teaches us to be “suckers.” I argue that this distinction is founded on a misconception of the nature of the theory of reciprocal altruism, which is sociobiological as opposed to moral, and that this distinction accordingly confuses is with ought. Sociobiological theories may explain underlying psychological motivations in individuals (and perhaps even in populations), but these theories do not prescribe any sort of moral behavior. Furthermore, the theory of reciprocal altruism does not imply mental states of which agents are aware. The unconscious motivations assumed by this theory are in fact compatible with certain formulations of the Golden Rule; I will accordingly argue for the view that certain words with moral content related to the Golden Rule—such as “altruism” and “selfishness”—exist only insofar as they are social tools, which can further the self‐interests of an individual in any group.     

Do people keep believing because they want to? Preexisting attitudes and the continued influence of misinformation

Misinformation—defined as information that is initially assumed to be valid but is later corrected or retracted—often has an ongoing effect on people’s memory and reasoning. We tested the hypotheses that (a) reliance on misinformation is affected by people’s preexisting attitudes and (b) attitudes determine the effectiveness of retractions. In two experiments, participants scoring higher and lower on a racial prejudice scale read a news report regarding a robbery. In one scenario, the suspects were initially presented as being Australian Aboriginals, whereas in a second scenario, a hero preventing the robbery was introduced as an Aboriginal person. Later, these critical, race-related pieces of information were or were not retracted. We measured participants’ reliance on misinformation in response to inferential reasoning questions. The results showed that preexisting attitudes influence people’s use of attitude-related information but not the way in which a retraction of that information is processed.