Unravelling the Interplay Between Genetic and Environmental Contributions in the Unfolding of Personality Differences from Early Adolescence to Young Adulthood

In two studies, we examined the genetic and environmental sources of the unfolding of personality trait differences from childhood to emerging adulthood. Using self‐reports from over 3000 representative German twin pairs of three birth cohorts, we could replicate previous findings on the primary role of genetic sources accounting for the unfolding of inter‐individual differences in personality traits and stabilizing trait differences during adolescence. More specifically, the genetic variance increased between early (ages 10–12 years) and late (ages 16–18 years) adolescence and stabilized between late adolescence and young adulthood (ages 21–25 years). This trend could be confirmed in a second three‐wave longitudinal study of adolescents' personality self‐reports and parent ratings from about 1400 Norwegian twin families (average ages between 15 and 20 years). Moreover, the longitudinal study provided evidence for increasing genetic differences being primarily due to accumulation of novel genetic influences instead of an amplification of initial genetic variation. This is in line with cumulative interaction effects between twins' correlated genetic makeups and environmental circumstances shared by adolescent twins reared together. In other words, nature × nurture interactions rather than transactions can account for increases in genetic variance and thus personality variance during adolescence. © 2019 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Does intention involve belief?

Cognitivists think that intention necessarily involves belief; noncognitivists deny this claim. I argue that both sides of the debate have so far overlooked that the beliefs involved in intention are first‐personal beliefs and therefore relevantly different from ordinary beliefs that stand in need of justification through evidence. This move substantially changes the cognitivist thesis, and in such a way that the noncognitivist objections can be avoided. In Section 2, I lay out the intuitions behind cognitivism and the arguments against it that motivate noncognitivist positions. Section 3 discusses and dismisses Velleman's cognitivist response to these arguments. In Section 4, I introduce the distinction between “ordinary” and “first‐personal beliefs.” In Section 5, I argue that intention invariably involves a first‐personal belief that one will do what one intends to do. Finally, in Section 6, I return to the noncognitivist objections and show how my proposal answers them.     

Social and personal predictors of test anxiety among Norwegian secondary and postsecondary students

Social Psychology of Education - This study examined predictors of test anxiety in a sample of 2528 Norwegian upper-secondary and postsecondary students by means of structural equation modeling....     

Eidetic intuition as physiognomics: rethinking Adorno’s phenomenological heritage

Continental Philosophy Review - Adorno’s intensive criticism of phenomenology is well known, his entire early period during the 1920s and 1930s being marked by various polemical engagements...     

Recent Books in Barth Studies

Books reviewed:
Barth on the Descent into Hell: God, Atonement and the Christian Life , David Lauber, Ashgate 2004 (0-7546-3341-1), pp. vii + 186, Hb £40
Ecclesial Mediation in Karl Barth , John Yocum, Ashgate 2004 (0-7546-3322-5), pp. vii + 200, Hb £45
For the Sake of the World: Karl Barth and the Future of Ecclesial Theology , George Hunsinger (ed.), Eerdmans 2004 (0-8028-2699-7), pp. vi + 214, Pb £24.99
The Ascension in Karl Barth , Andrew Burgess, Ashgate 2004 (0-7546-3874-X), pp. viii + 209, Hb £47.50     

Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy

Quine and Davidson employ proxy functions to demonstrate that the use of language (behaviouristically conceived) is compatible with indefinitely many radically different reference relations. They also believe that the use of language (behaviouristically conceived) is all that determines reference. From this they infer that reference is indeterminate, i.e. that there are no facts of the matter as to what singular terms designate and what predicates apply to. Yet referential indeterminacy yields rather dire consequences. One thus does wonder whether one can hold on to a Quine--Davidson stance in semantics-cum-metaphysics and still avoid embracing referential indeterminacy. I argue that one can. Anyone adhering to the behaviouristic account pivotal to the Quine--Davidson stance is bound to acknowledge certain facts about verbal behaviour -- that some utterances are tied to situations, that some utterances are tied to segments in situations, that some predicates have non-contextualised conditions of application, and that use involves causal dependencies. The restrictions from these facts ensure that only reference relations generated by means of rather exceptional proxy functions are compatible with verbal behaviour. I conclude that this allows one to rebuff the Quine--Davidson argument for the indeterminacy of reference, as it were, from within. I moreover tentatively conclude that the line of thought laid out provides good reason for just about anyone to hold that there are facts about reference after all.