The Leftward Cradling Bias and Prosody: An Investigation of Cradling Preferences in the Deaf Community

Popular theory on the tendency to cradle an infant to the left side points to the specialization of the right hemisphere for the perception and expression of emotion. J. S. Sieratzki and B. Woll (1996) recently suggested that more emphasis be placed on the auditory modality, specifically focusing on the role of prosodic information. In this study, the direction of the lateral cradling bias in a group of profoundly deaf children, a group of deaf adults, and a control group of adults with no hearing impairment was investigated. The authors found a strong leftward cradling bias in all groups, a bias that was, if anything, stronger in the deaf participants. Given that people who are profoundly deaf, especially those who have been deaf from birth, have not been exposed to auditory prosody, the data do not support the suggestion that such prosodic information is the basis for the leftward cradling bias.     

Measuring the speed of recognising facially expressed emotions

Faces provide identity- and emotion-related information—basic cues for mastering social interactions. Traditional models of face recognition suggest that following a very first initial stage the processing streams for facial identity and expression depart. In the present study we extended our previous multivariate investigations of face identity processing abilities to the speed of recognising facially expressed emotions. Analyses are based on a sample of N=151 young adults. First, we established a measurement model with a higher order factor for the speed of recognising facially expressed emotions (SRE). This model has acceptable fit without specifying emotion-specific relations between indicators. Next, we assessed whether SRE can be reliably distinguished from the speed of recognising facial identity (SRI) and found latent factors for SRE and SRI to be perfectly correlated. In contrast, SRE and SRI were both only moderately related to a latent factor for the speed of recognising non-face stimuli (SRNF). We conclude that the processing of facial stimuli—and not the processing of facially expressed basic emotions—is the critical component of SRE. These findings are at variance with suggestions of separate routes for processing facial identity and emotional facial expressions and suggest much more communality between these streams as far as the aspect of processing speed is concerned.     

The anticipatory construction of reality as a central concern for psychology and robotics

How is it that, given our diverse sensors that are moving at any moment, we get to the idea that there is a more or less permanent world around us that contains objects and living beings and that is endowed with spatial and temporal properties? This question is difficult, it is “the child’s construction of reality” issue. Given the complexity of the underlying phenomena, it requires a dialog between engineering sciences and life sciences to be solved. In this paper, we introduce the contributions to this dialog that have been collected in this special issue.     

Optimal versus heuristic planning of object manipulations: A review and a computational model of the continuous end-state comfort effect

Human beings select actions that facilitate the execution of later actions. For example, humans tend to select grasps that ensure that forthcoming object manipulations end in a comfortable posture (“end-state comfort effect”). Basic experimental results and their explanation within the optimal control framework are reviewed. I conclude that the discrete grasp selection tasks, which are commonly used to study anticipatory planning, leave room for alternative explanations. Moreover, the results of seven experiments employing a continuous grasp selection task seem incompatible with the optimal control (of end-state comfort) account. I introduce the weighted integration of multiple biases (WIMB) model, which accounts for many aspects of the selection of human grasp orientations in continuous tasks. Additionally, it accounts for the precision effect and hysteresis effect. The model shows that the brain may rely on a simple heuristic and does not actually has to anticipate the end-state of a movement to select effective grasps for object manipulations.     

When we like what we know – A parametric fMRI analysis of beauty and familiarity

This paper presents a neuroscientific study of aesthetic judgments on written texts. In an fMRI experiment participants read a number of proverbs without explicitly evaluating them. In a post-scan rating they rated each item for familiarity and beauty. These individual ratings were correlated with the functional data to investigate the neural correlates of implicit aesthetic judgments. We identified clusters in which BOLD activity was correlated with individual post-scan beauty ratings. This indicates that some spontaneous aesthetic evaluation takes place during reading, even if not required by the task. Positive correlations were found in the ventral striatum and in medial prefrontal cortex, likely reflecting the rewarding nature of sentences that are aesthetically pleasing. On the contrary, negative correlations were observed in the classic left frontotemporal reading network. Midline structures and bilateral temporo-parietal regions correlated positively with familiarity, suggesting a shift from the task-network towards the default network with increasing familiarity.     

The World Wide Wait: Exploring Physiological and Behavioral Effects of Download Speed

ABSTRACT

When people use humorous media content, their behavior and assessments of the content may depend on the emotional expressions (e.g., laughter) of those around them. In a laboratory experiment in which 80 participants watched a movie clip with a confederate who either laughed or remained silent, we identified two parallel processes. The confederate’s laughter induced behavioral responses in our participants (laughing or smiling). Through those responses, a corresponding appraisal of the media content was generated: The content was rated funnier in comparison to situations in which the confederate did not laugh. This effect corresponds to emotional contagion processes and was especially pronounced in introverts. Additionally, participants who were low in conscientiousness directly elevated their funniness ratings (more than their own emotional expressions would suggest) when the confederate laughed. Those who were high in conscientiousness, however, lowered their ratings of the content’s funniness in the presence of a laughing confederate. This finding suggests the existence of an additional cognitive process that links confederate’s laughter and participant’s content ratings beyond automatic contagion. Participants with low conscientiousness use the confederate’s laughter as a heuristic cue for the content’s funniness, while highly conscientious participants discount the confederate’s laughter as a cue for content funniness.     

Can the Paradox of Forgiveness Be Dissolved?

The “paradox of forgiveness” can be described as follows: Forgiving, unlike forgetting, is tied to reasons. It is a response to considerations that lead us to think that we ought to forgive. On the other hand, acts of forgiveness, unlike excuses, are responses to instances of culpable wrongdoing. If, however, the wrongdoing is culpable, there is (or seems to be) no reason to forgive it. So two mutually exclusive theses about forgiveness both seem to be equally warranted: Forgiveness is related to reasons, but there can be no reasons for forgiveness. In this paper, I attempt to dissolve this paradox. I argue that the paradox arises as a result of a too narrow conception of “reason” and that it can be dissolved if we acknowledge different kinds of reasons for forgiveness. More specifically, I examine three kinds of reasons for forgiving an act of wrongdoing: (1) Moral reasons that make forgiveness morally mandatory. (2) Prudential reasons for forgiveness. (3) Moral reasons that pertain to the character of the forgiver and that favor forgiveness without making it morally mandatory. I show that while the paradox of forgiveness arises when we consider reasons of the first kind, it can be dissolved with recourse to reasons of the second and third kind. The upshot of the argument is that we can be rational in deciding to overcome our feelings of resentment towards an act of unjustified and unexcused wrongdoing—and this is a strong point in favor of forgiveness.     

Fractal Dynamics of Heart Beat Interval Fluctuations in Corticotropin-Releasing Factor Receptor Subtype 2 Deficient Mice

Non-linear fractal analysis of cardiac interbeat time series was performed in corticotropin-releasing factor receptor subtype 2 (CRFR2) deficient mice. Heart rate dynamics in mice constitutes a self-similar, scale-invariant, random fractal process with persistent intrinsic long-range correlations and inverse power-law properties. We hypothesized that the sustained tachycardic response elicited by intraperitoneal (ip) injection of human/rat CRF (h/rCRF) is mediated by CRFR2. In wildtype control animals, heart rate was increased to about maximum levels (approximately 750 bpm) while in CRFR2-deficient animals baseline values were retained (approximately 580 bpm). The tachycardic response elicited by ip-application is mediated by CRFR2 and is interpreted to result from sympathetic stimulation. However, the functional integrity of CRFR2 would not present a prerequisite to maintaining the responsiveness and resiliency of cardiac control to external environmental perturbations experimentally induced by extrinsic ip-application of h/rCRF or under physiological conditions that may be associated with an increased peripheral release of CRF. Under stressful physiological conditions achieved by novelty exposure, CRFR2 is not involved in the cardiodynamic regulation to external short-term stress. While the hypothesis of involvement of CRFR2 in cardiac regulation upon pharmacological stimulation cannot be rejected, the present findings suggest that the mechanism of action is by sympathetic stimulation, but would not unambiguously allow to draw any conclusions as to the physiological role of CRFR2 in the control of cardiac dynamics.     

Social inequality and the reduction of ideological dissonance on behalf of the system: evidence of enhanced system justification among the disadvantaged

According to system justification theory, people are motivated to preserve the belief that existing social arrangements are fair, legitimate, justifiable, and necessary. The strongest form of this hypothesis, which draws on the logic of cognitive dissonance theory, holds that people who are most disadvantaged by the status quo would have the greatest psychological need to reduce ideological dissonance and would therefore be most likely to support, defend, and justify existing social systems, authorities, and outcomes. Variations on this hypothesis were tested in five US national survey studies. We found that (a) low‐income respondents and African Americans were more likely than others to support limitations on the rights of citizens and media representatives to criticize the government; (b) low‐income Latinos were more likely to trust in US government officials and to believe that ‘the government is run for the benefit of all’ than were high‐income Latinos; (c) low‐income respondents were more likely than high‐income respondents to believe that large differences in pay are necessary to foster motivation and effort; (d) Southerners in the USA were more likely to endorse meritocratic belief systems than were Northerners and poor and Southern African Americans were more likely to subscribe to meritocratic ideologies than were African Americans who were more affluent and from the North; (e) low‐income respondents and African Americans were more likely than others to believe that economic inequality is legitimate and necessary; and (f) stronger endorsement of meritocratic ideology was associated with greater satisfaction with one's own economic situation. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the dissonance‐based argument that people who suffer the most from a given state of affairs are paradoxically the least likely to question, challenge, reject, or change it. Implications for theories of system justification, cognitive dissonance, and social change are also discussed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.