Kant's Conception of Inner Value

Abstract: This article addresses a foundational issue in Kant's moral philosophy, the question of the relation of the Categorical Imperative to value. There is an important movement in current Kant scholarship that argues that there is a value underlying the Categorical Imperative. However, some scholars have raised doubts as to whether Kant has a conception of value that could ground the Categorical Imperative. In this paper I seek to add to these doubts by arguing, first, that value would have to be of a particular kind in order to be the foundation of Kant's moral philosophy. Second, I argue that Kant does not have such a conception of value, and that his arguments rule out that value could ground his moral philosophy. I then outline an alternative reading of how Kant uses ‘inner value’. My conclusion will be that Kant does not derive the Categorical Imperative from an underlying value. While some of his passages could also be read as if value were foundational for Kant, a close look at these passages and his arguments point away from this conclusion.     

“Of course I will ...”: The combined effect of certainty and level of expectancies on persistence and performance

The importance of performance expectancies for the prediction of regulation of behavior and actual performance has long been established. Building on theories from the field of social cognition, we suggest that the level of performance expectancies, as well as the certainty of the expectancy, have a joint influence on an individual’s beliefs and behavior. In two studies (one cross sectional using a sample of secondary school students and one longitudinal using a sample of university students) we found that expectancies more strongly predicted persistence, and subsequent performance, the more certain the expectancy was. This pattern was found even if prior performance was controlled, as in Study 2. The data give an indication that it may be useful to include certainty as an additional variable in expectancy models.     

The effect of induced anxiety on cognition: threat of shock enhances aversive processing in healthy individuals

Individuals with anxiety disorders demonstrate altered cognitive performance including (1) cognitive biases towards negative stimuli (affective biases) and (2) increased cognitive rigidity (e.g., impaired conflict adaptation) on affective Stroop tasks. Threat of electric shock is frequently used to induce anxiety in healthy individuals, but the extent to which this manipulation mimics the cognitive impairment seen in anxiety disorders is unclear. In this study, 31 healthy individuals completed an affective Stroop task under safe and threat-of-shock conditions. We showed that threat (1) enhanced aversive processing and abolished a positive affective bias but (2) had no effect on conflict adaptation. Threat of shock thus partially models the effects of anxiety disorders on affective Stroop tasks. We suggest that the affective state of anxiety—which is common to both threat and anxiety disorders—modulates the neural inhibition of subcortical aversive processing, whilst pathologies unique to anxiety disorders modulate conflict adaptation.     

The relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias: an investigation of generality and process

The need for closure predicts an evaluative bias against people whose opinions or behaviors deviate from those of other members of their social groups. In the present study, we investigated whether the relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias generalized to nonsocial stimuli, and we examined the process underlying this relationship. Sixty-one undergraduate students completed measures of the need for closure, the need for structure, intolerance for ambiguity, and the ability to be decisive and achieve cognitive structure. They then rated their liking for letters of the Latin alphabet ("A" & "B") whose locations were consistent and inconsistent with relevant categories ("A circle" and "B circle"). Participants liked category-inconsistent letters less than category-consistent letters. Measures related to the need for structure and closed-mindedness correlated positively with this deviant bias, whereas measures related to the ability to be decisive and achieve cognitive structure did not. These results imply that the relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias is a relatively basic and pervasive effect that is not unique to social deviance and is driven by the need for structure and closed-mindedness. Implications for social and nonsocial stimuli are discussed.     

Skeptical Conclusions

For a putative knower S and a proposition P, two types of skepticism can be distinguished, depending on the conclusions they draw: outer skepticism, which concludes that S does not know that P, and inner skepticism, which concludes that S does not know whether P. This paper begins by showing that outer skepticism has undesirable consequences because that S does not know that P presupposes P, and inner skepticism does not have this undesirable consequence since that S does not know whether P does not presuppose P. We indicate that the two types of skepticism aim to different loci of doubts: while outer skepticism doubts whether we can gain an epistemic warrant for the actuality, inner skepticism doubts whether we can gain epistemic identification of the actuality. It is further indicated that responses to skepticism from externalist theories, as well as from fallibilist internalist theories, can only respond to outer skepticism but not to inner skepticism.     

Phases of Organ Integration and Conflict in a Transplant Recipient: A Longitudinal Study Using a Diary

In this paper the results from a research project on self-perception and psychological processing following transplantation of solid organs are presented. A diary at the individual case level was introduced to generate a longitudinal analysis. In the following paper we describe an evaluation of the entries of a single patient following a living donor kidney transplant. Conflicts in the relationship between the transplant recipient and the donor, who is also his wife, are clearly evident, and these are interpreted as incorporation conflicts in light of current psychoanalytic theory.     

The developmental psychometrics of big five self-reports: acquiescence, factor structure, coherence, and differentiation from ages 10 to 20

How do youths' personality reports differ from those of adults? To identify the year-by-year timing of developmental trends from late childhood (age 10) to early adulthood (age 20), the authors examined Big Five self-report data from a large and diverse Internet sample. At younger ages within this range, there were large individual differences in acquiescent responding, and acquiescence variability had pronounced effects on psychometric characteristics. Beyond the effects of acquiescence, self-reports generally became more coherent within domains, and better differentiated across domains, at older ages. Importantly, however, different Big Five domains showed different developmental trends. Extraversion showed especially pronounced age gains in coherence but no gains in differentiation. In contrast, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness showed large age gains in differentiation but only trivial gains in coherence. Neuroticism and Openness showed moderate gains in both coherence and differentiation. Comparisons of items that were relatively easy versus difficult to comprehend indicated that these patterns were not simply due to verbal comprehension. These findings have important implications for the study of personality characteristics and other psychological attributes in childhood and adolescence.