Contour-based object identification and segmentation: Stimuli,norms and data,and software tools

We summarize five studies of our large-scale research program, in which we examined aspects of contour-based object identification and segmentation, and we report on the stimuli we used, the norms and data we collected, and the software tools we developed. The stimuli were outlines derived from the standard set of line drawings of everyday objects by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). We used contour curvature as a major variable in all the studies. The total number of 1,500 participants produced very solid, normative identification rates of silhouettes and contours, straight-line versions, and fragmented versions, and quite reliable benchmark data about saliency of points and object segmentation into parts. We also developed several software tools to generate stimuli and to analyze the data in nonstandard ways. Our stimuli, norms and data, and software tools have great potential for further exploration of factors influencing contour-based object identification, and are also useful for researchers in many different disciplines (including computer vision) on a wide variety of research topics (e.g., priming, agnosia, perceptual organization, and picture naming). The full set of norms, data, and stimuli may be downloaded fromwww.psychonomic.org/archive/.     

Profiting from poverty

We consider whether and under what conditions it is morally illicit to profit from poverty. We argue that when profit counterfactually depends on poverty, the agent making the profit is morally obliged to relinquish it. Finally, we argue that the people to whom the profit should be redirected are those on whom it counterfactually depends.     

Blocking the Vagueness Block - A New Restricted Answer to the Special Composition Question

The vagueness objection seems to block any moderate answer to the Special Composition Question leaving us with the two extreme alternatives that there either is no composite object or that any set of things compose an object. In this technical paper I introduce the notion of causal objects and a definition of a predicate that permits the set of all parts to be divided into equivalence classes. On this view we can use equivalence classes of parts to define the notion of composite objects why vagueness is blocked. The block works in a hypothetical domain where all parts have a cause so the aim is not to suggest empirically detectable parts and composites, nor to claim any kind of existence of the things being defined, but to present a consistent account of a possible moderate answer to the Special Composition Question that avoids the vagueness objection. The underlying idea is that an object, as such, is not caused whereas its parts are. For example, if we have three caused parts A, B and C constituting the composite D, we have three things that are caused (A, B and C) whereas the composite D has no cause over and above the three causes of A, B and C.

     

Towards a Better Understanding of Cognitive Deficits in Absence Epilepsy: a Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

Neuropsychology Review - Cognition in absence epilepsy (AE) is generally considered undisturbed. However, reports on cognitive deficits in AE in recent years have suggested otherwise. This review...     

Ritual and Recovery: Traditions in Disaster Ritualizing

The aim of this article is partly to analyze and discuss the ritual traditions in the Norwegian context, called disaster services, which consists in ritualizing as a response to accidents and disasters. Furthermore, we find it relevant to understand these traditions in relation to two aspects of recovery: personal and social recovery. From a practical theological perspective, the new traditions are interesting for the understanding of how the churches work in situations where people have stressful experiences, and for developing an understanding of contemporary religion.     

Discriminatory Capacities,Russell's Principle,and the Importance of Losing Sight of Objects

What capacities for discrimination must a subject possess in order to entertain singular thoughts? Evans has suggested that a subject must be able to discriminate his referent from all other entities in order to be able to do so; what he calls Russell's Principle. Evans' view has few followers, and he has been repeatedly accused of presenting no argument in its favour. In this paper I present what I take to be Evans' argument. I suggest that he has been misinterpreted as introducing Russell's Principle for the purpose of fixing reference. Rather, he introduces it in order to ensure that our conceptual capacities have the functional complexity to allow for objective thought. I suggest that the logical types of our thought are constituted by their inferential potential and argue that, even though singular thought may be possible without the satisfaction of Russell's Principle, singular thought that forms part of an objective world view is not.