Perceived quality of maternal care in childhood and structure and function of mothers' brain

Animal studies indicate that early maternal care has long‐term effects on brain areas related to social attachment and parenting, whereas neglectful mothering is linked with heightened stress reactivity in the hippocampus across the lifespan. The present study explores the possibility, using magnetic resonance imaging, that perceived quality of maternal care in childhood is associated with brain structure and functional responses to salient infant stimuli among human mothers in the first postpartum month. Mothers who reported higher maternal care in childhood showed larger grey matter volumes in the superior and middle frontal gyri, orbital gyrus, superior temporal gyrus and fusiform gyrus. In response to infant cries, these mothers exhibited higher activations in the middle frontal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus and fusiform gyrus, whereas mothers reporting lower maternal care showed increased hippocampal activations. These findings suggest that maternal care in childhood may be associated with anatomy and functions in brain regions implicated in appropriate responsivity to infant stimuli in human mothers.     

Mimesis: Where play and narrative meet

There is a great deal of narrative in play and also of play in narrative, especially in the narrative and play of young children. Part of the reason for this may be that they share an important pattern or structure in the way they work as mental instruments, mimesis. Mimesis is a mode of representation in which the relation between the symbol that represents and the thing in the world that is represented is in some sense imitative; that is, the representation resembles the thing represented. The concept of mimesis is not precise, but it has two important, though not entirely distinct, strands which are based on two kinds of imitation: the imitation found in the indexical symbol, or sign, and the imitation that is found in literary representation. The general notion of imitation that these two strands share is somewhat elusive, but it seems clear that both play and narrative would share equally in it. Further consequences are discussed.     

Looking Good and Lying to Do It: Deception as an Impression Management Strategy in Job Interviews

The present study investigated job applicants' use of deception. The study examined applicants' deception on written applications, as well as in a job interview; whether individuals would lie to conform to job requirements; and whether extraversion and self-monitoring are related to lying. Fifty-nine candidates completed an application and interview. After the interview, candidates were informed that they were actually participating in an experiment. They then watched a videotape of their interview and indicated any lies they told. As hypothesized, it was found that applicants lied both on the job applications and during the interview, primarily to appear to conform to job requirements. Furthermore, candidate extraversion was positively correlated with number of lies told, although self-monitoring was unrelated to lying.     

Maternal sensitivity and behaviour problems in young children with developmental delay

Children with developmental delay are at increased risk for behaviour problems, but little is known about risk and resilience factors. Previous research has established links between maternal sensitivity and behaviour problems in typically developing children, but no studies have examined maternal sensitivity in the development of behaviour problems in children with developmental delay. In this study, we coded videotaped interactions of 30 2‐year‐olds with developmental delay and their mothers using the maternal behaviour Q‐sort and a child behaviour coding system. Mothers completed the child behaviour checklist when their children were 2 and 3 years old. Results revealed significant inverse relations between maternal sensitivity and concurrent and later externalizing problems, and significant positive relations between maternal sensitivity and concurrent observed appropriate behaviour (compliance and social engagement). This study informs developmental theory and identifies an important maternal variable that may reduce the risk of behaviour problems in children with developmental delay. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Actual Utility, The Objection from Impracticality, and the Move to Expected Utility

Utilitarians are attracted to the idea that an act is morally right iff it leads to the best outcome. But critics have pointed out that in many cases we cannot determine which of our alternatives in fact would lead to the best outcome. So we can’t use the classic principle to determine what we should do. It’s not “practical”; it’s not “action-guiding”. Some take this to be a serious objection to utilitarianism, since they think a moral theory ought to be practical and action-guiding. In response, some utilitarians propose to modify utilitarianism by replacing talk of actual utility with talk of expected utility. Others propose to leave the original utilitarian principle in place, but to combine it with a decision procedure involving expected utility. What all these philosophers have in common is this: they move toward expected utility in order to defend utilitarianism against the impracticality objection. My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on this way of replying to the objection. My central claim is that if utilitarians are worried about the impracticality objection, they should not turn to expected utility utilitarianism. That theory does not provide the basis for a cogent reply to the objection. Originally presented at the 2004 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Bellingham Washington, August 2, 2004, with comments by Gustaf Arrhenius and Elizabeth Harman. I am grateful to Arrhenius and Harman for their challenging criticism, as well as to Chris Heathwood, Michael Zimmerman, Owen McLeod, Elinor Mason, Eric Moore and other participants at the Bellingham Conference for comments and suggestions. In October, 2004 I discovered Mark Strasser’s ‘Actual Versus Probable Utilitarianism’. I see that in that paper Strasser anticipates a number of the points I make here.     

Are Emotions Natural Kinds?

ABSTRACT— Laypeople and scientists alike believe that they know anger, or sadness, or fear, when they see it. These emotions and a few others are presumed to have specific causal mechanisms in the brain and properties that are observable (on the face, in the voice, in the body, or in experience)—that is, they are assumed to be natural kinds. If a given emotion is a natural kind and can be identified objectively, then it is possible to make discoveries about that emotion. Indeed, the scientific study of emotion is founded on this assumption. In this article, I review the accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature. I then consider what moving beyond a natural-kind view might mean for the scientific understanding of emotion.     

Treating obsessive compulsive behavior and enhancing peer engagement in a preschooler with intellectual disability

Intellectual disability (ID) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by impairments in cognitive and adaptive functioning in social, practical, or conceptual domains. Individuals with ID present with higher‐order repetitive behaviors such as a need for sameness, ritualistic, and compulsive behaviors. Often referred to as obsessive compulsive behaviors (OCBs), these behaviors increase in prevalence between 2 and 5 years of age. The present study evaluated an exposure‐based behavioral intervention for decreasing OCBs and concomitantly increasing play skills in a 4‐year‐old boy with mild ID in an inclusive preschool setting. Using a multiple baseline across behaviors design, the intervention was associated with a decrease in target behaviors and an increase in the duration of peer social engagement, with results maintained at 3‐week follow‐up. The intervention consisted of exposure and response prevention with function‐based components. Procedures including prompting and reinforcement were generalized to parent and teacher mediators. This study provides preliminary support for the use of an exposure‐based behavioral intervention to treat OCBs in children of preschool age with ID.     

Family and individual difference predictors of trait aspects of negative interpersonal behaviors during emerging adulthood.

A latent trait-state-occasion (TSO) model (D. A. Cole, N. C. Martin, & J. H. Steiger, 2005) was used to isolate the trait and state components of negative interpersonal behaviors toward a friend or romantic partner during emerging adulthood. Results indicate that variance in negative interpersonal behaviors was due to nearly equal portions of Trait and Occasion factors. Variability in the trait aspects of negative interpersonal behaviors was then predicted by theoretically relevant constructs. In particular, mothers' negative behaviors during adolescence, adolescent core self-evaluations, negative emotionality, and feelings of security in close relationships had independent effects in predicting the enduring aspects of negative interpersonal behaviors. All told, these results indicate that TSO models can be helpful tools for understanding the developmental antecedents of the trait-like aspects of interpersonal processes.     

Modest deontologism in epistemology

Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say, these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do not in fact have. Thus, deontologism in epistemology, combined with anti-skepticism, has implausible implications. I first describe one sort of control that people typically have over ordinary actions but do not have over typical beliefs. I then argue that there is a paradigmatic type of epistemic evaluation that does properly apply to beliefs even though we lack this sort of control over them. Finally, I argue that these paradigmatic epistemic evaluations are sufficient to make true some of the deontological sentences.