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341.
Michael J. Raven 《Philosophia》2011,39(4):751-757
Aristotelian relativism about the future (as recently defended by MacFarlane (2003)) claims that a prediction made on Monday, such as ‘It will rain’, can be indeterminate on Monday but determinate on Tuesday.
A serious objection to this intuitively appealing view is that it cannot coherently be attested: for if it is attested on
Monday, then our blindness to what the future holds precludes attesting that the prediction is determinate on Tuesday, and
if it is attested on Tuesday (when, suppose, it rains), then the fact that it rains precludes attesting that the prediction
is indeterminate on Monday. In this paper, I focus on Moruzzi and Wright (2009)’s recent development of this objection and argue that it fails. This result removes a major obstacle to defending the Aristotelian
view. 相似文献
342.
Kevin Meeker 《Philosophia》2011,39(2):369-373
W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth
century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically,
this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit
in David Hume. 相似文献
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Andrew C. Khoury 《The Journal of value inquiry》2011,45(2):135-146
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Peter Hawke 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(3):351-364
In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday
modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed
from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism,
offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s
recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The
author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account
of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology. 相似文献