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321.
Simon Robertson 《Synthese》2011,181(1):81-106
What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both. 相似文献
322.
Athanasios Raftopoulos 《Synthese》2011,181(3):489-514
Macpherson (Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, construed
as the theory which holds that the phenomenal character is explained by the nonconceptual content of experience. Her argument
is the claim that representationalism is committed to the thesis that differences in the experience of ambiguous figures,
the gestalt switch, should be explained by differences in the NCC of perception of these figures. However, with respect to
the square/regular diamond and some other ambiguous figure representationalism fails to offer a unified account of how representational
content makes them ambiguous. In this paper, I aim, first, to offer a representationalist account of ambiguous figures and,
second, to examine and rebut Macpherson’s arguments. My main point is that in each ambiguous figure Macpherson discusses there
are differences in representational content that can explain differences in phenomenal character or content. The representational
differences are due to the ways the Cartesian frame of reference in which perceptual content is always cast cuts the figure,
underlying different properties of the figure with respect to the axes of the Cartesian frame of reference. 相似文献
323.
John L. Pollock 《Synthese》2011,181(2):317-352
In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application. 相似文献
324.
Michela Massimi 《Synthese》2011,182(1):101-116
This paper investigates some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind Bogen and Woodward’s data-to-phenomena inferences.
I raise a series of points and suggest an alternative possible Kantian stance about data-to-phenomena inferences. I clarify
the nature of the suggested Kantian stance by contrasting it with McAllister’s view about phenomena as patterns in data sets. 相似文献
325.
James Ladyman 《Synthese》2011,178(1):87-98
van Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes
them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches
to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism,
verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Materialists regard
the theoretical picture of the world as matter in motion as a true and explanatory account and insist on not taking ‘spooky’
entities or processes seriously as potential explanations of phenomena that so far lie outside the scope of successful science.
The history of science shows us that both stances have been instrumental in the achievement of progress at various times.
It is therefore plausible for a naturalist to suggest that science depends for its success on the dialectic between empiricism
and materialism. A truly naturalist approach to philosophy ought then to synthesise them. Call the synthesized empiricist
and materialist stances ‘the scientistic stance’. This paper elaborates and defends it. 相似文献
326.
Haim Gaifman 《Synthese》2011,179(3):501-502
327.
Elliott Sober 《Synthese》2011,181(1):3-21
This paper is a sympathetic critique of the argument that Reichenbach develops in Chap. 2 of Experience and Prediction for the thesis that sense experience justifies belief in the existence of an external world. After discussing his attack
on the positivist theory of meaning, I describe the probability ideas that Reichenbach presents. I argue that Reichenbach
begins with an argument grounded in the Law of Likelihood but that he then endorses a different argument that involves prior
probabilities. I try to show how this second step in Reichenbach’s approach can be strengthened by using ideas that have been
developed recently for understanding causation in terms of the idea of intervention. 相似文献
328.
Frederick Eberhardt 《Synthese》2011,181(1):125-136
Hans Reichenbach is well known for his limiting frequency view of probability, with his most thorough account given in The Theory of Probability in 1935/1949. Perhaps less known are Reichenbach’s early views on probability and its epistemology. In his doctoral thesis
from 1915, Reichenbach espouses a Kantian view of probability, where the convergence limit of an empirical frequency distribution
is guaranteed to exist thanks to the synthetic a priori principle of lawful distribution. Reichenbach claims to have given
a purely objective account of probability, while integrating the concept into a more general philosophical and epistemological
framework. A brief synopsis of Reichenbach’s thesis and a critical analysis of the problematic steps of his argument will
show that the roots of many of his most influential insights on probability and causality can be found in this early work. 相似文献
329.
Maria van der Schaar 《Synthese》2011,180(3):391-417
The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology
in general. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’ that needs to be given an account
of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge
that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’. This means that a cognitive
act is an act that counts as cognitive from a first-person point of view. The method of linguistic phenomenology is used to
explain or elucidate our epistemic notions. One of the advantages of the theory is that an answer can be given to some of
the problems in modern epistemology, such as the Gettier problem. 相似文献
330.
Douglas Walton 《Synthese》2011,179(3):377-407
This paper argues that some traditional fallacies should be considered as reasonable arguments when used as part of a properly
conducted dialog. It is shown that argumentation schemes, formal dialog models, and profiles of dialog are useful tools for
studying properties of defeasible reasoning and fallacies. It is explained how defeasible reasoning of the most common sort
can deteriorate into fallacious argumentation in some instances. Conditions are formulated that can be used as normative tools
to judge whether a given defeasible argument is fallacious or not. It is shown that three leading violations of proper dialog
standards for defeasible reasoning necessary to see how fallacies work are: (a) improper failure to retract a commitment,
(b) failure of openness to defeat, and (c) illicit reversal of burden of proof. 相似文献