Evaluating the influence of time of day on activity engagement in persons with dementia

Dementia is a serious disease affecting a growing number of people. With the onset of dementia comes a decline in social activity engagement that can negatively impact multiple aspects of a person's life. Research suggests that time of day may influence a person with dementia's behavior, including activity engagement, but such research is limited. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the influence of time of day on engagement in activities in persons diagnosed with dementia. An alternating treatments design was used with three participants to measure activity engagement during two times of day, morning and afternoon, and during two activities, a moderately preferred and a low preferred. Results showed no differentiation in engagement between morning and afternoon activities for all three participants, with high levels of engagement during both times of day. For two participants, results showed no differentiation in engagement between moderately preferred and low preferred activities. For one participant, levels of engagement were higher during moderately preferred activities than during low preferred activities.     

Searle on the unity of the world

According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true—“the world is one”. The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle’s defence of the ontological irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility is unsuccessful. Third, I defend Nagel’s argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle’s objections to it.

The empirical status of empirically supported psychotherapies: assumptions, findings, and reporting in controlled clinical trials

This article provides a critical review of the assumptions and findings of studies used to establish psychotherapies as empirically supported. The attempt to identify empirically supported therapies (ESTs) imposes particular assumptions on the use of randomized controlled trial (RCT) methodology that appear to be valid for some disorders and treatments (notably exposure-based treatments of specific anxiety symptoms) but substantially violated for others. Meta-analytic studies support a more nuanced view of treatment efficacy than implied by a dichotomous judgment of supported versus unsupported. The authors recommend changes in reporting practices to maximize the clinical utility of RCTs, describe alternative methodologies that may be useful when the assumptions underlying EST methodology are violated, and suggest a shift from validating treatment packages to testing intervention strategies and theories of change that clinicians can integrate into empirically informed therapies.