Trauma and Deferred Action in the Reality of Adolescence

In the search for ever earlier determinants of adult pathology many ignore the transformative impact of adolescence. The authors suggest that the reality of adolescent development creates a vulnerability to being overwhelmed. Through deferred action childhood experiences may interact with adolescent realities and omnipotent beliefs to traumatize the adolescent. The authors suggest that trauma in adolescence can be independent both of the intensity of current external exposure or of earlier traumatic experiences.     

Folding a fish, making a mushroom: The role of diagrams in executing assembly procedures

Three experiments examined the role of step-by-step and final-state diagrams in supporting object assembly. A total of 180 college students made origami objects from instructions consisting of text only, text plus a final-state (completed-object) diagram, or text plus step-by-step and final-state diagrams. In Experiments 1 and 2, construction accuracy in the final-diagram condition was comparable to that in the step-by-step condition when the objects required few assembly steps, but it was comparable to that in the text-only condition when many steps were required. Experiment 3 independently manipulated the number of assembly steps and the ease of seeing the steps in, or inferring them from, the final diagram. The results indicated that the case of extracting the steps from the final diagram was the primary causal variable in the interaction with instructional condition. We interpret these results in terms of mental model construction and working memory load.     

Cognitive constraints on ordering operations: the case of geometric analogies

Many tasks (e.g., solving algebraic equations and running errands) require the execution of several component processes in an unconstrained order. The research reported here uses the geometric analogy task as a paradigm case for studying the ordering of component processes in this type of task. In solving geometric analogies by applying mental transformations such as rotate, change size, and add a part, the order of performing the transformations is unconstrained and does not in principle affect solution accuracy. Nevertheless, solvers may bring cognitive constraints with them to the analogy task that influence the ordering of the transformations. First, we demonstrate that solvers have a preferred order for performing mental transformations during analogy solution. We then investigate three classes of explanations for the preferred order, one based on general information processing considerations, another based on task-specific considerations, and a third based on individual differences in analogy ability. In the first and third experiments, college students solved geometric analogies requiring two or three transformations and indicated the order in which they performed the transformations. There was close agreement on nearly the same order for both types of analogies. In the second experiment, subjects were directed to perform pairs of transformations in the preferred or unpreferred order. Both speed and accuracy were greater for the preferred orders, thus validating subjects' reported orders. Ability differences were observed for only the more difficult three-transformation problems: High- and middle-ability subjects agreed on an overall performance order, but the highs were more consistent in their use of this order. Low-ability subjects did not consistently order the transformations for these difficult problems. The general information processing factor examined was working-memory load. A number of task factors have been shown to affect working-memory load during the solution of inductive reasoning problems. Of these, we chose to examine process difficulty. Because analogies are solved in working memory, performing more difficult transformations earlier may reduce working-memory load and facilitate problem solution. However, the observed performance order was not correlated with transformation difficulty. The first task-specific factor considered was that some transformations may be identified earlier, possibly because of perceptual salience, and that the performance order follows the identification order.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Covariation in natural causal induction.

The covariation component of everyday causal inference has been depicted, in both cognitive and social psychology as well as in philosophy, as heterogeneous and prone to biases. The models and biases discussed in these domains are analyzed with respect to focal sets: contextually determined sets of events over which covariation is computed. Moreover, these models are compared to our probabilistic contrast model, which specifies causes as first and higher order contrasts computed over events in a focal set. Contrary to the previous depiction of covariation computation, the present assessment indicates that a single normative mechanism--the computation of probabilistic contrasts--underlies this essential component of natural causal induction both in everyday and in scientific situations.     

Mathematical problem solving by analogy.

We report the results of 2 experiments and a verbal protocol study examining the component processes of solving mathematical word problems by analogy. College students first studied a problem and its solution, which provided a potential source for analogical transfer. Then they attempted to solve several analogous problems. For some problems, subjects received one of a variety of hints designed to reduce or eliminate the difficulty of some of the major processes hypothesized to be involved in analogical transfer. Our studies yielded 4 major findings. First, the process of mapping the features of the source and target problems and the process of adapting the source solution procedure for use in solving the target problem were clearly distinguished: (a) Successful mapping was found to be insufficient for successful transfer and (b) adaptation was found to be a major source of transfer difficulty. Second, we obtained direct evidence that schema induction is a natural consequence of analogical transfer. The schema was found to co-exist with the problems from which it was induced, and both the schema and the individual problems facilitated later transfer. Third, for our multiple-solution problems, the relation between analogical transfer and solution accuracy was mediated by the degree of time pressure exerted for the test problems. Finally, mathematical expertise was a significant predictor of analogical transfer, but general analogical reasoning ability was not. The implications of the results for models of analogical transfer and for instruction were considered.     

Putting lexical constraints in context into the visual-world paradigm

Prior eye-tracking studies of spoken sentence comprehension have found that the presence of two potential referents, e.g., two frogs, can guide listeners toward a Modifier interpretation of Put the frog on the napkin… despite strong lexical biases associated with Put that support a Goal interpretation of the temporary ambiguity (Tanenhaus, M. K., Spivey-Knowlton, M. J., Eberhard, K. M. & Sedivy, J. C. (1995). Integration of visual and linguistic information in spoken language comprehension. Science, 268, 1632–1634; Trueswell, J. C., Sekerina, I., Hill, N. M. & Logrip, M. L. (1999). The kindergarten-path effect: Studying on-line sentence processing in young children. Cognition, 73, 89–134). This pattern is not expected under constraint-based parsing theories: cue conflict between the lexical evidence (which supports the Goal analysis) and the visuo-contextual evidence (which supports the Modifier analysis) should result in uncertainty about the intended analysis and partial consideration of the Goal analysis. We reexamined these put studies (Experiment 1) by introducing a response time-constraint and a spatial contrast between competing referents (a frog on a napkin vs. a frog in a bowl). If listeners immediately interpret on the… as the start of a restrictive modifier, then their eye movements should rapidly converge on the intended referent (the frog on something). However, listeners showed this pattern only when the phrase was unambiguously a Modifier (Put the frog that’s on the…). Syntactically ambiguous trials resulted in transient consideration of the Competitor animal (the frog in something). A reading study was also run on the same individuals (Experiment 2) and performance was compared between the two experiments. Those individuals who relied heavily on lexical biases to resolve a complement ambiguity in reading (The man heard/realized the story had been…) showed increased sensitivity to both lexical and contextual constraints in the put-task; i.e., increased consideration of the Goal analysis in 1-Referent Scenes, but also adeptness at using spatial constraints of prepositions (in vs. on) to restrict referential alternatives in 2-Referent Scenes. These findings cross-validate visual world and reading methods and support multiple-constraint theories of sentence processing in which individuals differ in their sensitivity to lexical contingencies.     

To Matrix, Network, or Hierarchy: That Is the Question

The authors present a structural analysis of three spatial diagrams-matrices, networks, and hierarchies-that specifies 10 properties on which these diagrammatic representations are hypothesized to differ: global structure, building block, number of sets, item/link constraints, item distinguishability, link type, absence of a relation, linking relations, path, and traversal. Each property has a "value" for each diagram, and these property values constitute the applicability conditions for the representations. Twenty-three college students (computer science majors and math educators) selected the type of diagram they thought would be most efficient for organizing the information in each of 18 short scenarios and verbally justified the reasons for their selections. The verbal protocols were coded with respect to the structural analysis. Both the representation selection and verbal justification data provided strong support for the structural analysis. Additionally, a factor analysis of students' justifications indicated that the organization of their knowledge is consistent with the structural analysis. Students' use of the structural properties to select appropriate representations and to justify those selections indicates that the structural analysis has psychological force.