A review of: “Dementia reconsidered: The person comes first”

Tom Kitwood (1997) Dementia Reconsidered: the Person Comes First, Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, pp. 160, $14.99 (pb), $45.00 (hb)     

Causal attributions from adolescence through adulthood

Attributional reasoning for events varying on level of informational ambiguity and context (relationship, achievement) were examined from adolescence through older adulthood. Participants rated the degree to which a cause of an event was a function of the primary character, situation, or a combination of these; wrote essays assessing underlying reasons for attributions; and responded to ego level, attributional style, and intolerance for ambiguity questionnaires. Older age groups made more interactive (relativistic) attributional ratings than did younger age groups for ambiguous events. Compared to adult and middle-aged adults, older women demonstrated a drop in dialectical attributional reasoning as assessed by the essays. Ego level, tolerance for ambiguity, and verbal ability predicted more dialectical attributional reasoning above and beyond the effects of age.     

Putnam, Peano, and the Malin Génie: could we possibly bewrong about elementary number-theory?

This article examines Hilary Putnam's work in the philosophy of mathematics and - more specifically - his arguments against mathematical realism or objectivism. These include a wide range of considerations, from Gödel's incompleteness-theorem and the limits of axiomatic set-theory as formalised in the Löwenheim-Skolem proof to Wittgenstein's sceptical thoughts about rule-following (along with Saul Kripke's ‘scepticalsolution’), Michael Dummett's anti-realist philosophy of mathematics, and certain problems – as Putnam sees them – with the conceptual foundations of Peano arithmetic. He also adopts a thought-experimental approach – a variant of Descartes' dream scenario – in order to establish the in-principle possibility that we might be deceived by the apparent self-evidence of basic arithmetical truths or that it might be ‘rational’ to doubt them under some conceivable (even if imaginary) set of circumstances. Thus Putnam assumes that mathematical realism involves a self-contradictory ‘Platonist’ idea of our somehow having quasi-perceptual epistemic ‘contact’ with truths that in their very nature transcend the utmost reach of human cognitive grasp. On this account, quite simply, ‘nothing works’ in philosophy of mathematics since wecan either cling to that unworkable notion of objective (recognition-transcendent) truth or abandon mathematical realism in favour of a verificationist approach that restricts the range of admissible statements to those for which we happen to possess some means of proof or ascertainment. My essay puts the case, conversely, that these hyperbolic doubts are not forced upon us but result from a false understanding of mathematical realism – a curious mixture of idealist and empiricist themes – which effectively skews the debate toward a preordained sceptical conclusion. I then go on to mount a defence of mathematical realism with reference to recent work in this field and also to indicate some problems – as I seethem – with Putnam's thought-experimental approach as well ashis use of anti-realist arguments from Dummett, Kripke, Wittgenstein, and others.     

Psychopathy traits and the processing of emotion words: Results of a lexical decision task

Research has indicated that individuals possessing psychopathic traits exhibit a deficit in the processing of emotional stimuli. Lexical decision task studies found that psychopathic individuals do not demonstrate affective facilitation in processing emotional words relative to nonpsychopathic individuals. However, these investigations have not examined processing of discrete affective categories and their relation to the callous/unemotional (F1) and impulse control/antisocial (F2) factors of psychopathy. Sixty undergraduate men completed a self-report measure of psychopathy traits and a lexical decision task assessing response latencies to anger, sadness, fear, and happiness words. Results reflected an association between F2 and a heightened experience of anger, whereas F1 was associated with a diminished experience of sadness. Findings are discussed in terms of the relation to existing research using alternative methods of processing affect.     

Celtic Wonder

One of the most important lessons in Jungian psychology is that we each have to contain the tension of opposites within ourselves, long past the point of comfort. Early in The Lord of the Rings, Tolkien tells us of the natural antipathy that Dwarves and Elves have toward each other, an antipathy that goes back millennia. The representatives of both can hardly stand to be in the company of each other at the great Council of Elrond in Rivendell, the Council that begins the initially awkward Fellowship of the Ring. Yet, over the course of this greatest of all quests, Gimli the Dwarf and Legolas the Elf grow from uneasy allies to inseparable friends, offering all of us an example of the reconciliation of opposites that has to take place in each of our souls.