The ambivalence of challenge stressors: Time pressure associated with both negative and positive well-being

According to the challenge–hindrance model, challenge stressors contain both stressful and challenging aspects, hindrance stressors only stressful aspects. Typically, negative outcomes of challenge stressors refer to well-being (strain), positive outcomes to so-called work outcomes (e.g., productivity, intention to quit). As both effects occur simultaneously, the positive outcomes often emerge only when controlling for the negative effects. We suggest that the negative and the positive effects of challenge stressors may refer to well-being. Specifically, we propose challenge to indicate competence, thus fostering organization-based self-esteem (OBSE), which, in turn, should enhance more general indicators of positive well-being. We explored the effect of time pressure (a prototypical challenge stressor) on a general well-being variable (positive attitude towards life; PAL). We postulated challenge stressors to be associated with PAL positively via OBSE and negatively via strain. These processes should (a) result in a non-significant bivariate association, which should (b) become significant once strain is controlled (suppression), but (c) become insignificant again once OBSE is controlled (mediation). Using structural equation modeling, we could confirm our hypotheses in a cross-sectional study. Results confirm the inherently ambivalent nature of time pressure, containing both positive and negative variance. In line with our theoretical position, results suggest that the negative and the positive outcomes may be conceived in terms of different aspects of well-being, in addition to “work outcomes” that do not refer to well-being. This concept of challenge stressors may help to explain why many people do not reduce challenge stressors even when they could: Feeling good about themselves and their lives may, at least temporarily, outweigh the strain.     

In support of anti-intellectualism

Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere “armchair knowledge.” Know how is a mental state characterized by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential of know how, but not propositional knowledge, that it makes possible performance errors and has the functional role of guiding action. The theory is attractive, in part, because it allows for propositional, non-propositional and perhaps even non-representational varieties of know how.     

‘Knowledge’ as a natural kind term

Naturalists who conceive of knowledge as a natural kind are led to treat ‘knowledge’ as a natural kind term. ‘Knowledge,’ then, must behave semantically in the ways that seem to support a direct reference theory for other natural kind terms. A direct reference theory for ‘knowledge,’ however, appears to leave open too many possibilities about the identity of knowledge. Intuitively, states of belief count as knowledge only if they meet epistemic criteria, not merely if they bear a causal/historical relation to the term. I will develop this objection and show that it is grounded in modal considerations central to Kripke’s work on reference. I will also argue that a more plausible externalist semantics for natural kind terms disarms the objection.     

Immobility reaction at birth in newborn infant

Objective

To describe an immobility reaction (IR) that was not previously reported at or immediately after birth in human newborns.

Method

We analyzed 31 videos of normal term vaginal deliveries recorded from Time 0 of birth defined as the as the moment that lies between the birth of the thorax and the pelvis of the infant. We searched for perinatal factors associated with newborn's IR.

Results

IR at birth was observed in 8 of the 31 newborns. The main features of their behavior were immobilization, frozen face, shallow breathing and bradycardia. One of the 8 newborns had sudden collapse 2 h after birth. We found significant relationships between maternal prenatal stress (PS) and IR (p = .037), and a close to significant one between infants’ lividness at Time 0 and IR (p = .053). The first breath of the 31 newborns occurred before and was not associated with the first cry (p < .001).

Discussion

The main features of IR at birth are similar to those of the universal most severe response to severe stress or danger. The relationship with PS suggests that children who had IR at birth might be at risk for similar disorders as those associated with PS. Sudden neonatal collapse of one of the IR newborns needs further research to determine if they are at risk for sudden infant death syndrome.

Conclusion

This first report of an IR reaction at birth in human infants could open up new paths for improving early neonatal care. Further research is needed for maternal PS, stress hormones, umbilical cord blood pH measurements in IR newborns. The challenge of education and support for parents of IR newborns is outlined.     

Performance monitoring in obsessive–compulsive disorder: A temporo-spatial principal component analysis

Hyperactive performance monitoring is a robust finding in obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). Patients show increased amplitudes of the error-related negativity (ERN) and correct-related negativity (CRN). Recently, two temporo-spatial factors were shown to contribute to both ERPs in healthy individuals. In the present study, it was investigated whether the factor structure underlying ERN and CRN is similar in OCD and which factors differ between groups. A principal component analysis (PCA) was employed to investigate the temporo-spatial factor structure of ERN and CRN. Twenty-six OCD patients and 26 healthy controls conducted a flanker task. EEG data were analyzed as conventional ERP components and as factor scores derived from temporo-spatial PCA. ERP results showed expected increases in ERN and CRN amplitudes in OCD patients. For both groups, the PCA confirmed the assumed factor structure of a central and a fronto-parietal factor contributing to ERN and CRN. Factor scores of both factors were differently affected by response correctness in OCD. Alterations in factor scores indicate increased activity in both an outcome-independent monitoring process and an error-sensitive process, contributing to overactive performance monitoring in OCD.     

Simulating bistable perception with interrupted ambiguous stimulus using self-oscillator dynamics with percept choice bifurcation

A behavioral stochastic self-oscillator model is used for simulating interrupted ambiguous stimulus-induced percept reversals. The results provide further support for a dynamical systems foundation of cognitive and psychological problems as discussed in detail within the context of Gestalt psychology by Wagemans et al. (Concept Theor Found Psychol Bull 138(6):1218–1252, 2012), and for coordination dynamics of the brain (Kelso in Philos Trans R Soc B 367:906–918, 2012). Statistical evaluation of simulated reversal time series predicts a maximum of the percept reversal rate that conforms with a number of results in the literature. The macroscopic model is based on two inhibitorily coupled sets of three coupled nonlinear equations, one triplet for each percept. The derivation of our specific dynamics equations is based on a drastically simplified field theoretical approach using well-known phase synchronization for explaining brain dynamics on the macroscopic EEG level. The degree of coherence (contrast μ, 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1) of the superimposed fields required for onset of bistable dynamics is related to a phase synchronization index of EEG fields, and it is used in the present context as ambiguity control parameter. For quantitative agreement with the experimental data, the addition of a stochastic Langevin force term in the attention equation proved essential. Formal analysis leads to a quantification of well-known “cognitive inertia” and supports the interplay between percept choice (bifurcation) dynamics during stimulus onset and adaptive gain (attention fatigue) driven quasiperiodic percept reversals.     

Gekränkte Eitelkeiten

The aim of terror is not (only) damage to individual people but the uncertainty and threat to society that also suffers considerable damage. This secondary damage is usually substantially greater than the primary damage. This objective of terror is not only pursued by extremist organizations and groups but also by lone terrorist fighters. In the last 100 years 4 people were known internationally as lone wolf terrorists in the western hemisphere: the highschool teacher Ernst August Wagner, the American “unabomber” Theodore John Kaczynski, the Austrian letter bomber Franz Fuchs and the Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik. Franz Fuchs was examined by the author and the background to his actions can be taken from own professional experience. Information available about the other perpetrators also reveals similarities to the personality traits and developmental steps which seem to have been important for the terrorist actsand include long periods of a lack of social resonance, rejection and mortification, social withdrawal and autistic demarcation and development of a pseudopolitical ideas (of grandiosity). Each of these lone wolf terrorists tried to pursue their ideals through terror, threats and intimidation of the public, and their own importance grew by the wide public attention which was fueled by the insecurity of the public. The interest should not only be directed to those individual lone wolf terrorists of this caliber or to the terrorism of states, organizations and groups or to their structure and dynamics but also to the media and public reactions, and finally to the response of society, as they mutually reinforce actions of the terrorists and help the offenders to achieve their goals.     

Sensorimotor theory,cognitive access and the ‘absolute’ explanatory gap

Sensorimotor Theory (SMT) is the claim that it is our practical know-how of the relations between our environments and us that gives our environmental interactions their experiential qualities. Yet why should such interactions involve or be accompanied by experience? This is the ‘absolute’ gap question. Some proponents of SMT answer this question by arguing that our interactions with an environment involve experience when we cognitively access those interactions. In this paper, I aim to persuade proponents of SMT to accept the following three claims. First, that appeals to cognitive access fail to answer the absolute gap question. Second, that SMT can be read in a way that rejects the gap question. Third, that if proponents of SMT are prepared to read SMT in a way that rejects the absolute gap question, then they can also reject the claim that cognitive access is needed to explain experience.