The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue

Many people want to hold that some theoretical virtues—simplicity, elegance, familiarity or others—are only pragmatic virtues. That is, these features do not give us any more reason to think a theory is true, or close to true, but they justify choosing one theoretical option over another because they are desirable for some other, practical purpose. Using pragmatic virtues in theory choice apparently brings with it a dilemma: if we are deciding what to accept on the basis of considerations that are not truth-conducive, it looks like we should either refrain from believing what we accept, and adopt some sort of instrumentalist attitude to the theories we cherish; or alternatively, we stand charged with engaging in theoretical irrationality in our belief formation. This paper discusses the appropriate response to this dilemma.     

Comparative Diagnostic Judgments from the Rorschach and the MMPI

Three experienced psychologists made diagnostic judgments from the Rorschach, the MMPI, and gave an overall diagnostic impression for 50 male and 48 female patients. Judgment on the first test viewed was given before looking at the second test. Order of viewing the tests and sex of patient were counterbalanced. The results indicated (a) the judges consistently rated the tests on a given individual as agreeing on diagnostic impression significantly more often than disagreeing; (b) interjudge agreement was low but significant for the MMPI and overall impressions, not significant for the Rorschach impressions; (c) in cases of disagreement, there was a highly significant tendency for the Rorschach to be seen as indicating more pathology than the MMPI.     

Blockade of GABAA Receptors in the Interpositus Nucleus Modulates Expression of Conditioned Excitation but not Conditioned Inhibition of the Eyeblink Response

The cerebellum and related brainstem structures are essential for excitatory eyeblink conditioning. Recent evidence indicates that the cerebellar interpositus and lateral pontine nuclei may also play critical roles in conditioned inhibition (CI) of the eyeblink response. The current study examined the role of GABAergic inhibition of the interpositus nucleus in retention of CI. Male Long-Evans rats were implanted with a cannula positioned just above or in the anterior interpositus nucleus before training. The rats were trained with two different tones and a light as conditioned stimuli, and a periorbital shock as the unconditioned stimulus. CI training consisted of four phases: 1) excitatory conditioning (8 kHz tone paired with shock); 2) feature-negative discrimination (2 kHz tone paired with shock or 2 kHz tone concurrent with light); 3) summation test (8 kHz tone or 8 kHz tone concurrent with light); and 4) retardation test (light paired with shock). After reaching a criterion level of performance on the feature-negative discrimination (40% discrimination), 0.5 microl picrotoxin (a GABAA receptor antagonist) was infused at one of four concentrations, each concentration infused during separate test sessions. Picrotoxin transiently impaired conditioned responses during trials with the excitatory stimulus (tone) in a dose-dependent manner, but did not significantly impact responding to the inhibitory compound stimulus (tone-light). The results suggest that expression of conditioned inhibition of the eyeblink conditioned response does not require GABAergic inhibition of neurons in the anterior interpositus nucleus.     

Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of Indicative Conditionals

One very popular kind of semantics for subjunctive conditionals is aclosest-worlds account along the lines of theories given by David Lewisand Robert Stalnaker. If we could give the same sort of semantics forindicative conditionals, we would have a more unified account of themeaning of ``if ... then ...' statements, one with manyadvantages for explaining the behaviour of conditional sentences. Such atreatment of indicative conditionals, however, has faced a battery ofobjections. This paper outlines a closest-worlds account of indicativeconditionals that does better than some of its cousins in explaining thebehaviour of such conditionals. The paper then discusses objectionsoffered by Dorothy Edgington and Frank Jackson to closest-worldsaccounts of indicative conditionals, and shows that these objections canbe met by the account outlined.     

Descartes' Theory of Universals

Philosophical Studies -     

Conditionals and Curry

Curry’s paradox for “if.. then..” concerns the paradoxical features of sentences of the form “If this very sentence is true, then 2 + 2 = 5”. Standard inference principles lead us to the conclusion that such conditionals have true consequents: so, for example, 2 + 2 = 5 after all. There has been a lot of technical work done on formal options for blocking Curry paradoxes while only compromising a little on the various central principles of logic and meaning that are under threat. Once we have a sense of the technical options, though, a philosophical choice remains. When dealing with puzzles in the logic of conditionals, a natural place to turn is independently motivated semantic theories of the behaviour of “if... then...”. This paper argues that a closest-worlds approach outlined in previous work offers a philosophically satisfying reason to deny conditional proof and so block the paradoxical Curry reasoning, and can give the verdict that standard Curry conditionals are false, along with related “contraction conditionals”.     

Fit with what? The influence of multiple self‐concept images on organizational attraction

This study tests the applicability of image congruity theory to the employment decision‐making process. A sample of workers from a variety of jobs/organizations (N = 193) read a series of job advertisements presenting unique organizational personalities, rated the extent to which these personalities matched their self‐concept perceptions, and reported evaluations of organizational attraction. In accordance with the tenets of image congruity theory, results suggest prospective job seekers are attracted to organizations with personalities they perceive as similar to their own actual and ideal self‐concepts. Actual congruence exerted a greater influence on organizational attraction than did ideal congruence. However, both ideal and actual image congruence explained significant unique variance in organizational attraction.