From Homeostatic to Hedonic Theories of Eating: Self-Regulatory Failure in Food-Rich Environments

Psychological theories of weight regulation are based on homeostatic feedback assumptions. They mostly attribute the cause of overweight and obesity to lowered sensitivity to internal hunger and satiety cues. Based on the assumption that human food consumption in food-rich environments is increasingly driven by pleasure rather than need for calories, a goal conflict theory of hedonic eating is presented. This theory is not only supported by the outcome of our own research programme but can also account for findings of the research conducted in the context of other psychological theories. Some implications for weight loss strategies are discussed.
Les théories psychologiques sur la régulation du poids sont basées sur des hypothèses d'une rétroaction homéostasique. Elles attribuent généralement la cause de la surcharge pondérale et de l'obésitéà une sensibilité interne amoindrie à la faim et aux indicateurs de satiété. Reposant sur l'hypothèse que la consommation alimentaire humaine dans des environnements riches en nourriture est de plus en plus guidée par le plaisir plutôt que par le besoin de calories, une théorie "goal conflict theory of hedonic eating" est présentée. Cette théorie qui ne s'appuie pas seulement sur les résultats de notre propre programme de recherches, peut aussi expliquer les résultats d'études réalisées dans le cadre d'autres théories psychologiques. Des implications concernant des stratégies de perte de poids sont discutées.     

Being flexible or rigid in goal-directed behavior: When positive affect implicitly motivates the pursuit of goals or means

Building on previous research on the role of positive affect as implicit motivator we investigated both flexibility and rigidity in goal-directed behavior. Given that goal-directed behavior can be represented in terms of goals or means, we suggest that goal-directed behavior is more flexible in switching means when positive affect implicitly motivates a person to reach the goal, but is more rigid in switching means when positive affect implicitly motivates a person to perform a specific means. Three experiments corroborated this idea: the speed of switching from a learned goal-directed means to a new means was facilitated when positive affect was attached to the representation of the goal, whereas this switching was slowed down when positive affect was attached to the representation of the learned means. Together, these findings provide new insights into the occurrence of flexibility and rigidity in implicitly motivated goal-directed behavior.     

Breaking and creating habits on the working floor: A field-experiment on the power of implementation intentions

Previous research has shown that implementation intentions are effective tools to promote new behavior. The present study aimed to provide the first evidence that conscious planning is an effective tool in replacing well-learned habits with new habits. This was tested in a field-experiment on repetitive behavior in the domain of recycling, using 109 employees of a tele-company as participants. Recycling behavior of the participants was observed by the actual amount of paper and the number of plastic cups in their personal wastebaskets. Following a pre-measure, participants were assigned to either implementation intention conditions, conditions in which an eye-catching facility was placed to promote recycling behavior, or control conditions. Recycling behavior was substantially improved in the facility as well as the implementation intention conditions in week 1 and week 2 and still 2 months after the manipulation. These data supported our hypothesis that planning breaks down unwanted habits and creates new ones.     

Prime and probability: causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences

Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action–outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their (combined) contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal knowledge that was either relevant or irrelevant by varying the probability of co-occurrence (50% or 80%) of specific actions and outcomes. Afterwards, we measured self-agency experiences in an action–outcome task where outcomes were primed or not. Results showed that motor prediction only affected self-agency when relevant actions and outcomes were learned to be causally related. Interestingly, however, inference effects also occurred when no relevant causal knowledge was acquired.     

Description of a Behavioral Intervention to Reduce Substance Use and Related Risk and Increase Positive Parenting among Urban Mothers with Alcohol and Other Drug Problems

The abuse of alcohol and other substances by mothers raising adolescent children has serious adverse effects on family functioning and youth outcomes, and on mothers’ own health and adaptation. Mothers who are also HIV-infected face additional challenges. In the present report, we describe a multi-session intervention conducted in individual sessions for mothers with alcohol and other substance use problems who are raising adolescent children. We outline the primary components of the intervention and include case studies and examples of exercises and tools. We found that engagement with the intervention and high rates of attendance were facilitated by tapping into mothers’ desires to improve their relationships with their adolescent children, the use of a harm reduction approach toward substance use, and intensive outreach. We also discuss lessons learned in the course of implementing and evaluating the intervention.     

Memory and attention for social threat: anxious hypercoding-avoidance and submissive gaze aversion

Rivalry for dominance is a recurrent challenge in human social interaction. During these social dominance interactions, some people rapidly break eye contact, whereas others merely try to avoid such eye-to-eye confrontations. The first is an example of submissive gaze aversion, whereas the second reflects anxious gaze avoidance. We tested these distinct forms of gaze behavior within a social-memory setting and show that anxious individuals vigilantly attend to, superiorly remember, and subsequently avoid social threats (i.e., angry faces). Furthermore, submissive individuals, as indexed by high trait anxiety and low trait anger, exhibit rapid gaze aversion from facial anger. Mechanisms of hypervigilance-avoidance thus seem to underlie natural gaze behavior and enhanced memory for threat in anxiety. Accordingly, we propose the term hypercoding-avoidance, which describes how anxious individuals habitually scan their immediate social environment for threat, remember its location, and subsequently avoid it. Moreover, this is the first experimental evidence showing that submissive gaze aversion is distinct from anxious gaze avoidance.     

Automatic goal inferences

The social psychological literature on automatic social inferences has focused on one construct that helps explaining human behavior—traits (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Trope, 1986; Winter & Uleman, 1984). The dispositional roots of behavior, however, go beyond relatively stable constructs such as traits to include more transient causes such as one’s intentions and goals. Evidence from young infants and adult chimpanzees, knowledge acquired in the text-comprehension literature and hypotheses derived from the Automatic Causal Inferences framework (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002), seems to converge: they all suggest that perceivers may automatically infer goals from behaviors. This paper reports four studies that examine this hypothesis. The first two use surprise cued-recall, and look at goal inferences when the road to goal achievement seems straightforward and when it seems blocked. Studies 3 and 4 use on-line methodologies—probe recognition task and lexical decision—to examine whether these inferences are made at encoding.     

Unconscious goal activation and the hijacking of the executive function

Building on research on unconscious human goal pursuit and the dynamic nature of our mental and physical world, this study examined the idea that an unconsciously activated goal hijacks executive control for its own attainment. This "hijacking" of the executive function by an unconscious goal should be evidenced by impaired performance on an unrelated task relying on executive control. The results of 6 experiments show that subliminal activation of a socializing goal, or an idiosyncratic personal goal, or an academic goal, harmed participants' performance on an executive function task, such as inhibition of prepotent responses and detection of text errors during reading. These effects were unique to executive control, were similar when the goal was activated consciously, and were independent of task motivation and perceived inter-goal relatedness between the primed goal and task goal. Furthermore, an unconscious goal occupied executive control to advance itself more strongly when the goal had personal value. Implications for theory and research on unconscious goal pursuit and the executive function are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).