Human action and virtue in Descartes and Spinoza

In this paper, I argue that despite undeniable fundamental differences between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s accounts of human action, there are some striking similarities between their views on right action, moral motivation, and virtue that are usually overlooked. I will argue, first, that both thinkers define virtue in terms of activity or freedom, mutatis mutandis, and thus in terms of actual power of acting. Second, I will claim that both Descartes and Spinoza hold a non-consequentialist approach to virtue, by which human actions are evaluated as virtuous or good on the basis of their motivational forces rather than their consequences. I will show further that both philosophers identify virtue qua free action with the highest good (summum bonum), and thus with that which is to be sought for its own sake and not as a means to anything preferable to it.     

Should I use a computer-assisted career guidance system? It depends on where your career decision-making difficulties lie

The present study examined the pattern of career decision-making difficulties encountered by 417 young adults who used one or more of the computer-assisted career guidance systems (CACGSs) available at one of the Israeli Veteran Administration's counselling centres, and assessed the effectiveness of these CACGSs in reducing their career decision-making difficulties. Career decision-making difficulties were found to be highest for individuals who were prior to the pre-screening stage of the career decision-making process and lowest for those who were at the choice stage. The reduction in difficulties after using the CACGSs was statistically significant in seven of the 10 difficulty categories examined: an especially marked reduction was found for difficulties related to lack of information. No such reduction was observed for difficulties related to external conflicts. Participants' perception of having been assisted through the dialogue with the CACGSs was highest for individuals who used all three systems, and lowest for those who accessed only one of the three CACGSs.     

Group-based guilt and shame in the context of intergroup conflict: The role of beliefs and meta-beliefs about group malleability

Group-based guilt and shame are part of a wide range of moral emotions in intergroup conflicts. These emotions can potentially motivate group members to make compromises in order to promote conflict resolution, and increase support for reparations and apologies following moral transgressions committed by the in-group. Thus, it is important to understand how to induce these emotions and the mechanisms for their effects. In the present paper, we examined the mechanisms underlying group-based guilt and shame in four studies. Across the first three studies, conducted in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we found that group-based guilt was mostly predicted by individuals’ implicit theories about groups (ITG). Specifically, we found that the more participants believed that groups are malleable, the more they experienced group-based guilt. Group-based shame, however, was found to be dependent upon individuals’ perception of other people’s perceptions about the malleability of groups (i.e., meta-ITG), as the perceived damage to one’s in-group image is a major component in experiencing shame. In Study 4, conducted in the context of gender relations, we differentiated between the two components of shame, that is, moral and image shame. As predicted, while group-based guilt and moral shame showed similar patterns of results, meta-ITG had a moderating effect on the association between ITG and group-based image shame. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed in relation to promoting intergroup conflict resolution and reconciliation.     

WHAT IS TOKEN PHYSICALISM?

Abstract: This paper investigates the thesis of token physicalism by examining what kinds of particulars there are and what it is for such particulars to be physical. It concludes that there is no coherent thesis of token physicalism that is strictly stronger than substance physicalism and strictly weaker than property physicalism on one or another of its interpretations, and spells out the implications of this for the project of defining minimal physicalism. In the course of the discussion the paper offers interpretations of the views of Davidson and Fodor and argues for an asymmetry between the concepts of the mental and the physical.     

“I’ll do it later”: Type of motivation,self-efficacy and homework procrastination

The aim of this study is to explore the role of motivation in the relations between self-efficacy and procrastination. One hundred seventy-one-fifth-grade students completed questionnaires that assessed the type of motivation the students have for homework, the level to which they procrastinate on doing homework, and their self-efficacy regarding homework. The results indicated that autonomous motivation both mediates and moderates the relations between self-efficacy and procrastination. These results highlight the importance of students’ type of motivation for homework, suggesting procrastination cannot be reduced simply by addressing students’ self-efficacy; but, they must be supported to adopt a more autonomous type of motivation.     

1 + 2 is more than 2 + 1: Violations of commutativity and identity axioms in mental arithmetic

Over the past decade or so, a large number of studies have revealed that conceptual meaning is sensitive to situational context. More recently, similar contextual influences have been documented in the domain of number knowledge. Here we show such context dependency in a length production task. Adult participants saw single digit addition problems of the form n1 + n2 and produced the sum by changing bi-directionally the length of a horizontally extended line, using radially arranged buttons. We found that longer lines were produced when n1 < n2 compared to n1 > n2 and that unit size increased with result size. Thus, the mathematical axioms of commutativity and identity do not seem to hold in mental addition. We discuss implications of these observations for our understanding of cognitive mechanisms involved in mental arithmetic and for situated cognition generally.