The fallibility of memory in judicial processes: Lessons from the past and their modern consequences

The capability of adult and child witnesses to accurately recollect events from the past and provide reliable testimony has been hotly debated for more than 100 years. Prominent legal cases of the 1980s and 1990s sparked lengthy debates and important research questions surrounding the fallibility and general reliability of memory. But what lessons have we learned, some 35 years later, about the role of memory in the judicial system? In this review, we focus on what we now know about the consequences of the fallibility of memory for legal proceedings. We present a brief historical overview of false memories that focuses on three critical forensic areas that changed memory research: children as eyewitnesses, historic sexual abuse and eyewitness (mis)identification. We revisit some of the prominent trials of the 1980s and 1990s to not only consider the role false memories have played in judicial decisions, but also to see how this has helped us understand memory today. Finally, we consider the way in which the research on memory (true and false) has been successfully integrated into some courtroom procedures.     

Recollection deficits in dysphoric mood: An effect of schematic models and executive mode?

Depression and dysphoric mood states are often accompanied by quantitative or qualitative shifts in performance across a range of retention tasks. This study focuses on the recollection of both autobiographical events and word lists in dysphoric states. Recollection occurs when people are aware of some contextual detail allied to the encoding experience. This study establishes the presence of a recollection deficit in dysphoria in two distinct paradigms. In both autobiographical recall and in recognition memory, recollection in a dysphoric group was at lower levels than recollection in matched controls. The study examines the hypothesis that the extent of recollection is influenced by two factors: (1) the degree of differentiation of schematic mental models; and (2) the executive mode that predominates when memory tasks are carried out, with the latter assumed to be altered by rumination. The relationship between responses based on recollection and alternative mnemonic responses could be predicted by measures of these two factors. The results are discussed in terms of the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) and the perspective it offers on the relationship between meaning systems and executive functions (Barnard, 1999).     

Individual differences in imagery and reports of aversions

Recent theoretical models highlighting the role of imagery in trauma and aversion learning focus on the role of images in memory (e.g., Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996) and images as substitute stimuli in aversive conditioning (Dadds, Bovbjerg, Redd, & Cutmore, 1997). An unanswered question is whether individual differences in imagery are associated with different rates of traumatisation and aversion states (fear and avoidance of various stimuli). We examine one aspect of this: does high imagery ability correlate with the frequency with which people report aversions? Three samples of university students were tested on the Betts Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery, the Tellegen Absorption Scale, and a new measure we designed to sample of range of aversions. As hypothesised, vividness of imagery showed positive correlations with number of aversions reported. This relationship held after controlling for general neuroticism and proneness to disgust. Results for absorption showed no relationship. The results are unable to disentangle causal paths but suggest a focus on individual differences in imagery vividness may be fruitful for understanding individual differences in aversion learning.     

Distinctiveness in flashbulb memory: Comparative analysis of five terrorist attacks

The purpose of the present study was to find out whether a series of terrorist attacks, which share some common features, elicit flashbulb memories (of the personal circumstances in which the person first learned about these events) that are usually elicited by a single, unexpected, surprising, and personally important event. A total of 131 participants answered questions regarding details of five terrorist attacks that had taken place in Israel during the years 1995–1997. In addition, they assessed, for each of the five events, the number of overt rehearsals, and the degrees of emotional intensity, surprise, novelty, personal importance, and distinctiveness. Data analyses showed that most variables that are usually associated with the formation of flashbulb memories were also found in memories of the terrorist attacks that were judged by the participants as being distinctive. Distinctiveness may therefore be considered an important factor in the formation of flashbulb memories.     

Different rates of forgetting following study versus test trials

Two experiments investigated recall following two study conditions, (1) repeated test: a study trial followed by multiple recall trials, and (2) repeated study: multiple study trials with no tests. At a retention interval of 5 minutes, repeated study produced a higher level of recall than repeated test. When the retention interval was extended, forgetting was much more rapid in the study condition, with the repeated test manipulation leading to higher recall at an interval of 7 days. We conclude that study and test trials have different effects upon memory, with study trials promoting memory acquisition, and test trials enhancing the retrieval process itself, which protects against subsequent forgetting.     

Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism

Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment s/he forms that is rationalized by those judgments. My contention is that, given the Openness Requirement, no version of Extreme Determinsim can allow for the role played by logical insight in the rationalization of judgment. I end by indicating briefly how this result might figure in a wider argument against any form of determinism about rationalized judgment, and by explaining why I have focused specifically upon rebutting a deterministic view of theoretical as opposed to 'practical' rationalization.     

Creativity research: Originality,utility, and integration

Case studies of major creative figures who were active in different domains can help to indicate commonalities and distinctive features in the creative process. With this goal in mind, a comparison is made between the mathematician Georg Cantor's study of various orders of infinity and the psychologist Sigmund Freud's exploration of the operation of the unconscious. In both cases, similar processes can be discerned: (a) articulations of a new intuition; (b) construction of local coherences; (c) the reworking of standard symbol systems, giving way to the creation of a new, more adequate symbolic system; and (d) the articulation of a new thema (Holton, 1988). The study also describes a number of contrasts, among them the criteria by which formulations are judged in the two domains, the contrasting cosmological stances assumed by the investigators toward their projects, and the differing needs for a formal symbol system.     

Stimulating the creativity of elderly institutionalized women through works of art

The present article reports a controlled intervention study concerning the effects of a nondirected use of pictures of works of art as a way of stimulating creativity in elderly institutionalized women. Participants were randomly allocated either to the intervention (n = 20) or to the control (n = 20) group. After the intervention significant improvement in ratings between the groups was measured, with the intervention group more open and flexible and with a stronger deposition to a creative behavior than subjects in the control group. They also showed greater freedom and variation than the control group in drawing circles and making pictures. In puzzle tests the intervention group constructed increasingly imaginative, irregular, and open alternatives with colored patterns. The control group constructed closed and black forms. Importantly, the status of increased creativity continued to exist four months after the intervention. No changes were seen in the control group. This group showed a rational and precautious personality.