Emotion and vantage point in autobiographical

Autobiographical memories may be recalled from two different perspectives: Field memories in which the person seems to remember the scene from his/her original point of view and observer memories in which the rememberer sees him/herself in the memory image. Here, 122 undergraduates participated in an experiment examining the relation between field vs. observer perspective in memory for 10 different emotional states, including both positive and negative emotions and emotions associated with high vs. low intensity. Observer perspective was associated with reduced sensory and emotional reliving across all emotions. This effect was observed for naturally occurring memory perspective and when participants were instructed to change their perspective from field to observer, but not when participants were instructed to change perspective from observer to field.     

A comparison of dimensional models of emotion: Evidence from emotions,prototypical events,autobiographical memories,and words

The intensity and valence of 30 emotion terms, 30 events typical of those emotions, and 30 autobiographical memories cued by those emotions were each rated by different groups of 40 undergraduates. A vector model gave a consistently better account of the data than a circumplex model, both overall and in the absence of high-intensity, neutral valence stimuli. The Positive Activation – Negative Activation (PANA) model could be tested at high levels of activation, where it is identical to the vector model. The results replicated when ratings of arousal were used instead of ratings of intensity for the events and autobiographical memories. A reanalysis of word norms gave further support for the vector and PANA models by demonstrating that neutral valence, high-arousal ratings resulted from the averaging of individual positive and negative valence ratings. Thus, compared to a circumplex model, vector and PANA models provided overall better fits.     

Cross-cultural variability of component processes in autobiographical remembering: Japan,Turkey, and the USA

Although the underlying mechanics of autobiographical memory may be identical across cultures, the processing of information differs. Undergraduates from Japan, Turkey, and the USA rated 30 autobiographical memories on 15 phenomenological and cognitive properties. Mean values were similar across cultures, with means from the Japanese sample being lower on most measures but higher on belief in the accuracy of their memories. Correlations within individuals were also similar across cultures, with correlations from the Turkish sample being higher between measures of language and measures of recollection and belief. For all three cultures, in multiple regression analyses, measures of recollection were predicted by visual imagery, auditory imagery, and emotions, whereas measures of belief were predicted by knowledge of the setting. These results show subtle cultural differences in the experience of remembering.     

You can't get something for nothing: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on how not to overcome Nihilism 1

This paper analyzes Kierkegaard's Religiousness A sphere of existence, presented in his edifying works, and Heidegger's concept of authenticity, proposed in Being and Time, as responses to modern nihilism. While Kierkegaard argues that Religiousness A is an unsuccessful response to modern nihilism, Heidegger claims that authenticity, a secularized version of Religiousness A, is a successful response. We argue that Heidegger's secularization of Religiousness A is incomplete and unsuccessful, that Heidegger's later work offers a reconsideration of the problem of modern nihilism, and that later Heidegger suggests a way out of nihilism which is compatible with Kierkegaard's Religiousness B sphere of existence.     

Polyaminergic agents modulate contextual fear extinction in rats

Polyamines, such as spermidine and spermine, have been reported to improve memory retention through the activation of N-methyl-d-aspartate receptors (NMDAr). However whether polyamine agonists and antagonists alter extinction remains unclear. In the current study, we investigated whether spermidine and polyamine antagonists that selectively block the NR2B subunit at the NMDAr alter the extinction of contextual conditioned fear in male Wistar rats. The bilateral intra-hippocampal administration of exogenous spermidine (2 nmol/site) immediately after, but not 6 h after extinction training, facilitated the extinction of fear conditioning. The injection of the NMDAr antagonists arcaine (0.2 nmol/site), ifenprodil (20 nmol/site) and traxoprodil (0.2 nmol/site), disrupted fear extinction and, at doses that had no effect per se, reversed the facilitatory effect of spermidine on fear extinction. These results suggest that exogenous and endogenous polyamines facilitate the extinction of contextual conditioned fear through activation of NR2B subunit-containing NMDAr in the hippocampus. Since extinction-based exposure therapy is widely used as treatment for a number of anxiety-related disorders, including phobias and post-traumatic stress, the currently reported facilitation of extinction by polyaminergic agents suggest these compounds as putative candidates for drug development.     

Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics

In order to defend the Cornell variety of naturalistic moral realism from Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth objection, several philosophers have proposed what I call Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics (NEMMS). According to NEMMS, the natural properties that serve as the contents of moral predicates are fixed (at least in part) by non‐moral normative facts. In this paper, I elucidate two versions of NEMMS: one proposed by David Brink, and the other proposed by Mark van Roojen. I show what these meta‐semantics have in common, and how each one promises the Cornell realist a response to the Moral Twin Earth objection. I then argue that Cornell realists ought to be wary of adopting NEMMS. A naturalist realist who adopts this meta‐semantics confronts a trilemma. The proponent of NEMMS owes a meta‐ethical account of the relevant content‐fixing normative facts. Such facts are either reducible to recognizably natural facts or they are not. If they are not reducible, then NEMMS entails the denial of ethical naturalism (and so, the denial of Cornell realism). If such facts are taken to be reducible to facts about agents’ actual or hypothetical attitudes, then (among other problems) the account renders moral facts stance‐dependent. Consequently, moral realism is false. Alternatively, one might propose that the content‐fixing normative facts are reducible to attitude‐independent natural facts. However, such a proposal is refuted by its own Twin Earth objection.     

Boundaries of Citizenship Behavior: Curvilinearity and Context in the Citizenship and Task Performance Relationship

Resource allocation, attentional capacity, and role theories all suggest that the well‐documented linear relationship between citizenship behavior and task performance may be more complex than previously believed. In a study of 352 incumbents, we develop hypotheses that propose a curvilinear effect of employee citizenship on task performance. We further argue that this nonmonotonic relationship is different across the targets of citizenship performance and is moderated by several factors from the task context. Results support the curvilinear assertion, indicating that the relationship with task performance inflects when citizenship is more frequently performed. These diminishing returns are amplified when the target of citizenship is the organization compared to the individual. Findings further reveal that the task context elements of accountability and autonomy moderate the curvilinear relationship, whereas ambiguity does not. Implications for a reappraisal of the citizenship–task performance relationship are discussed.     

Total Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Permissiveness

This article explores the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and epistemic permissiveness. If the suggestion that all epistemic notions are interest‐relative is viable (as Jason Stanley has recently claimed), then it seems that a certain species of epistemic permissivism must be viable as well. For, if all epistemic notions are interest relative then, sometimes, parties in paradigmatic cases of shared evidence can be maximally rational in forming competing basic doxastic attitudes towards the same proposition. However, I argue that this total pragmatic encroachment is not tenable, and, thus, epistemic permissivism cannot be vindicated in this way.