The non-ideal theory of conflict management: a response to critics of A Theory of Truces

This essay responds to criticisms of and reflections on A Theory of Truces offered by Keith Breen, David Lyons, Colleen Murphy and Thaddeus Metz. I focus on the place of truces within just war theory, the permissibility of making truces with particularly unsavory actors, the tension between present and future considerations in truce making, and Truce Thinking as an instance of non-ideal theory.     

The effects of learned helplessness on the processing of a persuasive message

The current study examines the effects of exposure to unsolvable problems on the processing of a persuasive message. Participants exposed to either unsolvable failure or no-feedback tasks were presented with one of four versions of an advertisement about a hair shampoo and rated their attitude towards this product. Two aspects of the message were manipulated: the quality of arguments (strong, weak) and the attractiveness of the communicator (attractive, non-attractive). In addition, participants rated their anxiety and the frequency of off-task thoughts during the experiment. Attitude towards the target product of participants in the failure condition was less affected by the argument’s quality and more influenced by communicator attractiveness than the attitude of participants in the no-feedback condition. Participants exposed to failures reported more anxiety and task-related worries than those exposed to no-feedback, and these ratings were found to mediate the effects of failure on the processing of a persuasive message. Results were discussed in terms of Learned Helplessness theories and the Elaboration Likelihood Model.     

Toward a unifying model of identification with groups: integrating theoretical perspectives.

Building on the contributions of diverse theoretical approaches, the authors present a multidimensional model of group identification. Integrating conceptions from the social identity perspective with those from research on individualism-collectivism, nationalism- patriotism, and identification with organizations, we propose four conceptually distinct modes of identification: importance (how much I view the group as part of who I am), commitment (how much I want to benefit the group), superiority (how much I view my group as superior to other groups), and deference (how much I honor, revere, and submit to the group's norms, symbols, and leaders). We present an instrument for assessing the four modes of identification and review initial empirical findings that validate the proposed model and show its utility in understanding antecedents and consequences of identification.     

Gift Giving at Israeli Weddings as a Function of Genetic Relatedness and Kinship Certainty

This study examines gift giving at Israeli weddings. In accordance with kin selection theory, we hypothesized that wedding guests possessing greater genetic relatedness to the newlyweds would offer greater sums of money as wedding gifts. We also hypothesized that family members stemming from the maternal side (where the genetic lineage has higher kinship certainty) would offer the newlyweds more money than those stemming from the paternal side. Data on the monetary gift sums of the wedding guests from 30 weddings were collapsed according to two criteria: (a) genetic relatedness (0%, 6.25%, 12.5%, 25%, and 50%) and (b) kinship certainty (maternal or paternal lineage). Both hypotheses were supported. We discuss the implications of these data in understanding family dynamics, as well as practical applications associated with the marketing of gifts.     

Inequality in Political Philosophy and in Epidemiology: A Remarriage

In political philosophy and in economics, unfair inequality is usually assessed between individuals, nowadays often on luck‐egalitarian grounds. You have more than I do (through no fault of my own) and that's unfair. By contrast, in epidemiology and sociology, unfair inequality is traditionally assessed between groups. More is concentrated among people of your class or race than among people of mine, and that's unfair. I shall call this difference the egalitarian ‘divorce’. Epidemiologists, and their ‘divorce lawyers’ Paula Braveman, Norman Daniels, and Iris Marion Young, explain that not every inequality between individuals is an inequity. Only inequality between social status groups is unfair. Only such inequality stems from problems like partiality, discrimination, oppression, inequality‐related population health problems, and unfair distribution of prospects. And it alone is actionable. By contrast, inequality between individuals, e.g. in longevity, is natural, inevitable, less important, or otherwise less informative — not unjust. In ‘divorce trial’ mode, I respond to epidemiologists that group inequalities lack the intrinsic disvalue that they ascribe them. They may be instrumentally or contingently bad or wrong, not essentially so. I then shift to ‘remarriage’: although group inequalities lack intrinsic badness or wrongness, for multiple reasons they remain useful to measure.     

On becoming a child: Reverie in the psychotherapy of children

My aim in this paper is to examine the role of reverie in facilitating the development of the child‐subject, that is, the child's continuous motion towards subjectivity. I begin by briefly reviewing the concept of reverie and proceed with an examination of elements I believe are fundamental and common to both reverie and child psychotherapy, that is, primary thought processes and primitive impulses. I then describe and demonstrate the atmosphere created by these elements using three examples from the psychotherapy of 8 year‐old Jonathan. Next, I discuss an intersubjective parallel of Bion's reverie and a developmentally oriented version of Ogden's reverie, focusing on its relation to processes of destruction and recognition. I argue that reverie provides the recognition of the child's struggle for his own birth and growth as a subject, that is, of his child‐subject. Finally, I refer to the presence of reverie from the primary preoccupation of mother and father till the child's reverie of himself, his day‐dreaming.     

Making sense of Smith on sympathy and approbation: other-oriented sympathy as a psychological and normative achievement

ABSTRACT

Two problems seem to plague Adam Smith’s account of sympathy and approbation in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). First, Smith’s account of sympathy at the beginning of TMS appears to be inconsistent with the account of sympathy at the end of TMS. In particular, it seems that Smith did not appreciate the distinction between ‘self-oriented sympathy’ and ‘other-oriented sympathy’, that is, between imagining being oneself in the actor’s situation and imagining being the actor in the actor’s situation. Second, Smith’s account of approbation, according to which a sentiment of approval arises when there is recognition of concordance between the spectator’s sympathetic passion and the actor’s original passion, seems to face the following problem: since the spectator attains both his own sympathetic passion and the actor’s original passion by sympathizing with the actor, the sympathetic passion of the spectator and the original passion of the actor will necessarily be identical. Therefore, Smith’s account of approbation requires that the spectator utilize both self-oriented and other-oriented sympathy (‘the double-sympathy model of approbation’). I offer a novel developmental account of sympathy in TMS that renders Smith’s account of sympathy consistent and allows for the utilization of the double-sympathy model of approbation.