When standards are wide of the mark: nonselective superiority and inferiority biases in comparative judgments of objects and concepts

People are frequently required to judge how particular group members measure up against others in their group. According to the local-comparisons-general-standards (LOGE) approach, in these member-to-group comparisons, people fail to use the normatively appropriate local (group) standard and are infelicitously affected by a more general standard (involving instances from outside the judged group). Within positive groups, target group members are judged superior to the other members of the group, and within negative groups, inferior. To date, these nonselective superiority and inferiority biases have been demonstrated solely in judgments about human beings. In 6 experiments, nonselective biases were found in perceptual, affective, and cognitive judgments of nonhuman targets, objects, and concepts, thus supporting a cognitive rather than a social account.     

The effects of learned helplessness on the processing of a persuasive message

The current study examines the effects of exposure to unsolvable problems on the processing of a persuasive message. Participants exposed to either unsolvable failure or no-feedback tasks were presented with one of four versions of an advertisement about a hair shampoo and rated their attitude towards this product. Two aspects of the message were manipulated: the quality of arguments (strong, weak) and the attractiveness of the communicator (attractive, non-attractive). In addition, participants rated their anxiety and the frequency of off-task thoughts during the experiment. Attitude towards the target product of participants in the failure condition was less affected by the argument’s quality and more influenced by communicator attractiveness than the attitude of participants in the no-feedback condition. Participants exposed to failures reported more anxiety and task-related worries than those exposed to no-feedback, and these ratings were found to mediate the effects of failure on the processing of a persuasive message. Results were discussed in terms of Learned Helplessness theories and the Elaboration Likelihood Model.     

Ostrich Nominalism and Peacock Realism: A Hegelian Critique of Quine

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to offer a Hegelian critique of Quine’s predicate nominalism. I argue that at the core of Hegel’s idealism is not a supernaturalist spirit monism, but a realism about universals, and that while this may contrast to the nominalist naturalism of Quine, Hegel’s position can still be defended over that nominalism in naturalistic terms. I focus on the contrast between Hegel’s and Quine’s respective views on universals, which Quine takes to be definitive of philosophical naturalism. I argue that there is no good reason to think Quine is right to make this nominalism definitive of naturalism in this way – where in fact Hegel (along with Peirce) offers a reasonably compelling case that science itself requires some commitment to realism about universals, kinds, etc. Furthermore, even if Hegel is wrong about that, at least his case for realism is still a naturalistic one, as it is based on his views on concrete universality, which is an innovative form of in rebus realism about universals.     

HUME'S GENERAL POINT OF VIEW: A TWO-STAGE APPROACH

I offer a novel two-stage reconstruction of Hume's general-point-of-view account, modeled in part on his qualified-judges account in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. In particular, I argue that the general point of view needs to be jointly constructed by spectators who have sympathized with (at least some of) the agents in (at least some of) the actor's circles of influence. The upshot of the account is twofold. First, Hume's later thought developed in such a way that it can rectify the problems inherent in his Treatise account of the general point of view. Second, the proposed account provides the grounds for an adequate and well-motivated modest ideal observer theory of the standard of virtue.     

Exhausting or exhilarating? Conflict as threat to interests,relationships and identities

Some conflicts are experienced as depleting and exhausting whereas others are experienced as stimulating and invigorating. We explored the possibility that the focus of perceived threat in conflict determines whether it produces taxing stress or vitalizing arousal. Studies 1 and 2 established that attending to threats to interests, relationships, and identities during interpersonal conflict differentially relates to motivational goals, empathy and perspective-taking, femininity, and a collectivistic self-construal. Study 2 also found that perceived threats to relationships are associated with lower challenge appraisals and energy mobilization. Studies 3 and 4 experimentally manipulated threats to different targets and demonstrated causal effects of threat perceptions on self-reported energy mobilization and the consumption of comfort foods. Taken together, these studies demonstrate that conflicts which threaten relationships are experienced as significantly more depleting than conflicts that threaten either tangible interests or elements of individuals' identities, and explain when, why and for whom conflict is exhausting.