Trait anxiety and dynamic adjustments in conflict processing

Recently, it has been assumed that high- and low-trait-anxious subjects differ in the way they use fundamental cognitive control mechanisms. The present study was designed to further elucidate this topic by focusing on trial-to-trial adjustments in neuronal correlates of conflict processing. An electroencephalogram was recorded while subjects (N=71) performed a gender discrimination version of the Stroop task. The conflict-related N400 of the ERP was influenced by an interaction between trait anxiety and previous trial context: An additional negative-going deflection in the N400 range was observed when the target—distractor pairing of the directly preceding trial was incongruent, but only in highly anxious subjects. Thus, highly anxious subjects appear to more strongly engage neuronal modules involved in conflict monitoring when previously exposed to a high stimulus-response conflict. These results indicate that trait anxiety is crucially linked to the way the cognitive system dynamically adapts to recent demands.     

Gender Differences in Self-Reports of Depression: The Response Bias Hypothesis Revisited

This study was designed to revisit the response bias hypothesis, which posits that gender differences in depression prevalence rates may reflect a tendency for men to underreport depressive symptoms. In this study, we examined aspects of gender role socialization (gender-related traits, socially desirable responding, beliefs about mental health and depression) that may contribute to a response bias in self-reports of depression. In addition, we investigated the impact of two contextual variables (i.e., cause of depression and level of intrusiveness of experimental follow-up) on self-reports of depressive symptoms. Results indicated that men, but not women, reported fewer depressive symptoms when consent forms indicated that a more involved follow-up might occur. Further, results indicated differential responding by men and women on measures of gender-related traits, mental health beliefs, and beliefs about depression and predictors of depressed mood. Together, our results support the assertion that, in specific contexts, a response bias explanation warrants further consideration in investigations of gender differences in rates of self-reported depression.     

2~5年级小学生汉字识别中预视效应的发展研究

在阅读时,读者可以获取副中央凹处的词汇信息,副中央凹加工是构成流畅阅读的重要因素。本研究从儿童语言发展的角度,通过3个实验（共534名被试）,考察了汉语视觉字词加工中2~5年级学生的字形、语音、语义预视效应。结果发现：（1）2~5年级小学生均有字形预视效应;（2）2、3年级学生没有语音预视效应,4、5年级学生有此效应;（3）2年级学生没有语义预视效应,3、4、5年级学生有此效应。这表明,低水平的视觉信息—字形信息在儿童副中央凹加工中一直稳定地发挥作用;高水平的语言信息—语音和语义信息,随着儿童年级的升高和阅读技能的提升,逐渐地在儿童的副中央凹加工中发挥作用。儿童对汉字各类型信息的获取与使用的发展模式不同于拼音文字阅读发展理论的预测。     

The Influence of Hero and Villain Labels on the Perception of Vice and Virtue Products

The placement of heroes and villains is ubiquitous on labels and packages in the marketplace. In this research, we examine the influence of a hero versus a villain label on the preference for virtue versus vice products. Across seven laboratory and field studies, we find that consumers derive higher utility for a hero (villain) label with a vice (virtue) food than from a hero (villain) label with a virtue (vice) food. Relying on a coherence‐based explanation, we propose that a hero label adds a beneficial aspect to vice foods, making them appear less harmful, whereas a villain label adds an edgy aspect to virtue foods, making them appear more fun. This research provides insights into the effect of hero and villain branding and offers implications for marketing strategy and public policy.     

Actualism without Presentism? Not by way of the Relativity Objection

Actualism is the view that only actually existing things exist. Presentism is the view that only presently existing things exist. In this paper, I argue that being an actualist without also being a presentist is not as easy as many philosophers seem to think. A common objection to presentism is that there is an unavoidable conflict between presentism and relativity theory. But actualists who do not wish to be presentists cannot point to this relativity objection alone to support their position. Unless they have some antecedent reason for thinking that actualism is more plausible than presentism, anyone who is moved by the relativity objection to give up presentism should be moved by a related objection to give up actualism as well. If there is a reason to be an actualist without also being a presentist, it must go beyond the relativity objection to presentism.     

Reduced electroencephalographic coherence asymmetry in the Chernobyl accident survivors

An electroencephalograph (EEG) study was carried out from 1990 to 2006, using power spectra, averaged coherence, and integral EEG coherence asymmetry coefficients to compare 189 clean-up workers of the Chernobyl accident with 63 age-matched healthy controls. Most of the Chernobyl workers showed three abnormal EEG patterns, as indicated by EEG power mapping. The higher power, most prominent in slow alpha and theta bands, or in fast alpha frequencies, were observed in persons 3-5 years after the clean-up works (the early stage). The lower EEG power in alpha band was found in Chernobyl workers 10 or more years after the accident (the late stage). EEG coherence analysis revealed the existence of two stages in EEG alterations following the Chernobyl clean-up. In the early stage, an increase of EEG coherence in the central brain areas was observed, whereas at the later stage, a decrease of EEG coherence, most prominent in the frontal brain areas, and reduced brain asymmetry prevailed. These results allow us to propose that the described EEG signs may be a reflection of radiation-induced brain dysfunction at the late period after the Chernobyl clean-up and were similar to the EEG markers of brain ageing. The results, in comparison to data of the literature, provide additional support to the premature brain ageing hypothesis in Chernobyl survivors as a result of the radiation brain damage after-effect.     

Mothers who were severely abused during childhood and their children talk about emotions: Co‐construction of narratives in light of maternal trauma

The article focuses on detailed examination of the co‐construction of emotion dialogues between mothers and their 6‐year‐old children in light of mothers' experiences of being sexually, physically, and emotionally abused during childhood. We present examples from dialogues between 3 mothers and their children about emotional events experienced by the children and illustrate emotionally mismatched co‐construction processes. To better understand these difficulties, the article also provides vignettes from interviews with mothers about children's inner worlds and show how examining the interviews may help explain the unfolding of the dialogues and particularly points of difficulty. The dialogues between the mothers and their children were assessed using the Autobiographical Emotional Events Dialogue procedure (Koren‐Karie, Oppenheim, Chaimovich, & Etzion‐Carasso, 2000). The maternal interviews were obtained using the Insightfulness Assessment procedure (Oppenheim & Koren‐Karie, 2002). The discussion focuses on the significance of mother–child dialogues in shaping children's inner world, and points to the importance of providing intervention for adults who experienced childhood traumas that address not only their own personal issues but also their functioning as parents.     

THE ROLE OF COGNITION AND FEELING IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Abstract Inquiry into religious experience is informed by conceptualizations of emotion. Although a long history of theoretical and empirical work has provided considerable insight into the philosophical, psychological, and (more recently) neurobiological structure of emotion, the role of cognition and feeling in religious emotional states remains poorly conceived, and, hence, so does the concept of religious experience. The lack of a clear understanding of the role of emotion in religious experience is a consequence of a lack of an adequate interdisciplinary account of emotions. Our primary aim here is to examine the consequences of a properly interdisciplinary understanding of emotions for the analysis of religious experience. To this end, we note points of convergence between psychological, philosophical, and neuroscientific accounts of emotion and between such accounts and reports on the neurobiology of religious experience, in particular two recent human brain imaging studies. We conclude that emotions are richer phenomena than either pure feeling or pure thought and that, rightly understood, emotion affords religious experience its distinctive content and quality. Accordingly, we argue that religious experience cannot be reduced to pure feeling or pure thought. Rather, on our analysis, religious experience emerges as “thinking that feels like something.”