To plan or not to plan? Goal achievement or interrupting the performance of mundane behaviors

The present experiment investigated cognitive and behavioral effects of planning (i.e. forming implementation intentions) on goal pursuit during the performance of mundane behaviors. Participants received the goal to collect a coupon halfway the hall from the lab to the cafeteria. Later, they were also given the task to go from the lab to the cafeteria. Thus participants had to attain a new goal by interrupting a mundane behavior. Some participants enriched their goal with implementation intentions, others did not. Results showed that participants who formed implementation intentions were more effective in goal pursuit than the control group. Importantly, the data suggest that the effects of planning on goal completion are mediated by a heightened mental accessibility of environmental cues related to the goal completion task. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the foundations of beliefs in free will: intentional binding and unconscious priming in self-agency

The concept of an ability to make choices and to determine one's own outcomes fits well with experiences that most people have, and these experiences form the basis for beliefs in free will. However, the existence of conscious free will is challenged by modern research findings highlighting the unconscious origins of goal-directed behavior that gives rise to free-will beliefs. This report expands on these insights by revealing that both conscious and unconscious processes play an important role in free-will beliefs. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrates that free-will beliefs are strengthened when conscious intentions to produce action outcomes bind the perception of action and outcome together in time. Experiment 2 shows that these beliefs are strengthened when unconscious priming of action outcomes creates illusory experiences of self-agency when the primed outcomes occur. Together, these findings suggest that beliefs in free will are associated with self-agency and are enhanced by both conscious and unconscious information processing of goal-directed behavior.     

When observing gaze shifts of others enhances object desirability

The present research explored when observing gaze shifts of another person, involving both the observer and a specific object, enhances desirability of the gazed-at object. Specifically, we offer an initial attempt to test the idea that a three-step sequence consisting of direct gaze at the observer, followed by object-directed gaze and then by direct gaze at the observer, cues the desirability of an object to the observer and hence increases the perceived desirability of the gazed-at object. We examined this hypothesis in three experiments by manipulating eye-gaze shifts and including a no-gaze control condition. In line with our prediction, results showed that the dynamic sequence of gaze shifts indeed increases perceived object desirability. These findings provide new evidence that a sequence of gaze behavior involving the observer and an object plays an important role in influencing affective evaluation of objects.     

Inhibition in Goal Systems: A Retrieval-Induced Forgetting Account

In social psychological models of goals, particular means or goals that receive more activation are pursued while their counterparts are “inhibited.” To account for inhibition, these theories emphasize structural distribution of resources and the consequences of goal or means choices. Absent are alternate accounts of inhibition based on memory processes that rely on retrieval or recall of items. We propose that the act of recalling means or goals from memory entails inhibition of competing alternatives. Two experiments using repeated retrieval paradigms present evidence that recalling one means associated with a particular goal inhibits competing means. Moreover, this inhibitory mechanism is sensitive to the structural relationship of goals and means. Implications for models of inhibition in goal pursuit are discussed.     

Goal-discrepant situations prime goal-directed actions if goals are temporarily or chronically accessible

This research tested the hypothesis that perception of goal-discrepant situations automatically (i.e., without conscious intent) facilitates access to representations of instrumental actions if goal representations are mentally accessible. Employing a probe-recognition paradigm, Experiment 1 established that sentences describing situations that are discrepant with the goal of "looking well-groomed" (e.g., having dirty shoes) automatically increased the accessibility of representations of appropriate instrumental actions (e.g., polishing) in comparison to control situations, but only when participants frequently pursued the goal. Experiments 2a and 2b suggest that this effect was due to chronic accessibility of the goal representation and demonstrate that the same effects occur if the accessibility of the goal is temporarily enhanced (by subliminal priming) for people that nonfrequently pursue the goal.     

Prime and probability: causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences

Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action–outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their (combined) contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal knowledge that was either relevant or irrelevant by varying the probability of co-occurrence (50% or 80%) of specific actions and outcomes. Afterwards, we measured self-agency experiences in an action–outcome task where outcomes were primed or not. Results showed that motor prediction only affected self-agency when relevant actions and outcomes were learned to be causally related. Interestingly, however, inference effects also occurred when no relevant causal knowledge was acquired.     

On the inference of personal authorship: enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information

Three experiments examined whether the mere priming of potential action effects enhances people's feeling of causing these effects when they occur. In a computer task, participants and the computer independently moved a rapidly moving square on a display. Participants had to press a key, thereby stopping the movement. However, the participant or the computer could have caused the square to stop on the observed position, and accordingly, the stopped position of the square could be conceived of as the potential effect resulting from participants' action of pressing the stop key. The location of this position was primed or not just before participants had to stop the movement. Results showed that (subliminal as well as supraliminal) priming of the position enhanced experienced authorship of stopping the square. Additional experimentation demonstrated that this priming of agency was not mediated by the goal or intention to produce the effect.     

Predicting Behavior From Actions in the Past: Repeated Decision Making or a Matter of Habit?

This paper summarizes research on determinants of repeated behaviors, and the decision processes underlying them. The present research focuses on travel mode choices as an example of such behaviors. It is proposed that when behavior is performed repeatedly and becomes habitual, it is guided by automated cognitive processes, rather than being preceded by elaborate decision processes (i.e., a decision based on attitudes and intentions). First, current attitude-behavior models are discussed, and the role of habit in these models is examined. Second, research is presented on the decision processes preceding travel mode choices. Based on the present theoretical and empirical overview, it is concluded that frequently performed behavior is often a matter of habit, thereby establishing a boundary condition for the applicability of attitude-behavior models. However, more systematic research is required to disentangle the role of habit in attitude-behavior models and to learn more about the cognitive processes underlying habitual behavior.