Differential dependence of Pavlovian incentive motivation and instrumental incentive learning processes on dopamine signaling

Here we attempted to clarify the role of dopamine signaling in reward seeking. In Experiment 1, we assessed the effects of the dopamine D(1)/D(2) receptor antagonist flupenthixol (0.5 mg/kg i.p.) on Pavlovian incentive motivation and found that flupenthixol blocked the ability of a conditioned stimulus to enhance both goal approach and instrumental performance (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer). In Experiment 2 we assessed the effects of flupenthixol on reward palatability during post-training noncontingent re-exposure to the sucrose reward in either a control 3-h or novel 23-h food-deprived state. Flupenthixol, although effective in blocking the Pavlovian goal approach, was without effect on palatability or the increase in reward palatability induced by the upshift in motivational state. This noncontingent re-exposure provided an opportunity for instrumental incentive learning, the process by which rats encode the value of a reward for use in updating reward-seeking actions. Flupenthixol administered prior to the instrumental incentive learning opportunity did not affect the increase in subsequent off-drug reward-seeking actions induced by that experience. These data suggest that although dopamine signaling is necessary for Pavlovian incentive motivation, it is not necessary for changes in reward experience, or for the instrumental incentive learning process that translates this experience into the incentive value used to drive reward-seeking actions, and provide further evidence that Pavlovian and instrumental incentive learning processes are dissociable.     

SAVING THE “SECULAR”: The Public Vocation of Moral Theology1

The London suicide bombings of July 7, 2005 were partly the revolt of moral earnestness against a liberal society that, enchanted by the fantasy of rationalist anthropology, surrenders its passionate members to a degrading consumerism. The “humane” liberalism variously espoused by Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls, and Jeffrey Stout offers a dignifying alternative; but it is fragile, and each of its proponents looks for allies among certain kinds of religious believer. Stanley Hauerwas, however, counsels Christians against cooperation. On the one hand, he is right to resist, insofar as liberalism illiberally excludes theology from public discourse. On the other hand, not all humane liberalism does this: Stout's, for example, is genuinely polyglot, requiring not a common secularist language but a common ethic of communicating. Such a liberal ethic and its attendant anthropology merit the support of Christians: there may be more to be said about the Kingdom of God than respect, tolerance, and fairness, but there will not be less. The Christian has good theological reasons to expect some concord with other inhabitants of secular space. Ethical distinctiveness is no measure of theological integrity; and neither theology (pace Barth) nor biblical narrative (pace Richard Hays) should be expected to do all of the ethical running. If Christians are to be thorough in their moral theology and intelligible in their public statements, then they must borrow non‐theological material, formulate abstract concepts, and engage in casuistical analysis. Nevertheless, if an anxious insistence on distinctiveness is a mistake, concern for theological integrity is not. When the moral theologian borrows ethical material from elsewhere, he should integrate it into a theological vision structured by the Christian salvation‐historical narrative, which will sometimes modify the meaning of what is incorporated. So in affirming humane, polyglot liberalism, the moral theologian will at the same time make salutary qualifications. One of these is the assertion of the need of liberal institutions to own and promote their moral and anthropological commitments. In such a confessionally liberal society, universities in general, and the Arts and Humanities in particular, would recover their vocation to form citizens in communicative virtues and to offer them a dignifying, morally serious vision of human being that could save future generations from a degrading consumerism on the one hand and violent over‐reaction on the other.     

FORGIVING ENEMIES IN IRELAND

The Peace Process in Northern Ireland is about to reach another milestone: the Consultative Group on the Past is due to publish a report in the autumn of 2008 on “the best way to deal with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland” and to support the building of “a shared future.” It is timely therefore to think again—and further—about what political expression forgiveness might find, using the concrete case of Northern Ireland today as grist for our conceptual mill. This essay opens with two preliminaries: an account of what forgiveness is and how it relates to resentment, punishment, repentance, and reconciliation; and a brief summary of the “Troubles.” It then proceeds to caution that reconciliation will have to be realized in the midst of persistent enmity; to explore what a Truth Commission might achieve, and the limits of it; to consider whether the discovery of fresh truth should issue in further judicial proceedings, and how far these will disturb the Peace Process; and to suggest that the British Government could erect public memorials to the dead on all sides. It concludes that in addition to Government action, there is need for the popular exercise of certain virtues—including grateful, hopeful patience, forgiveness‐as‐compassion, and public penitence.