Risk and Religion: Toward a Theology of Risk Taking

Historically the concept of risk is rooted in Renaissance lifestyles, in which autonomous agents such as sailors, warriors, and tradesmen ventured upon dangerous enterprises. Thus, the concept of risk inseparably combines objective reality (nature) and social construction (culture): Risk = Danger + Venture. Mathematical probability theory was constructed in this social climate in order to provide a quantitative risk assessment in the face of indeterminate futures. Thus we have the famous formula: Risk = Probability (of events) × the Size (of future harms). Because the concept of harm is always observer relative, however, risk assessment cannot be purely quantitative. This leads to the question, What are the general conditions under which risks can be accepted? There is, after all, a difference between incurring a risk and bearing the costs of risks selected for by other agencies. Against this background, contours of a theology of risk emerge. If God creates a self‐organizing world of relatively autonomous agents, and if self‐organization is favored by cooperative networks of autopoietic processes, then the theological hypothesis of a risk‐taking God is at least initially plausible. Moreover, according to the Christian idea of incarnation, God is not only taking a risk but is also bearing the risks implied by the openness of creation. I thus argue for a twofold divine kenosis—in creation as well as in redemption. I discuss some objections to this view, including the serious counterargument that risk taking on behalf of others remains, even for God, a morally dubious task. What are the conditions under which the notion of a risk‐taking God can be affirmed without leaving us with the picture of God as an arbitrary, cosmic tyrant? And what are the practical implications for the ways in which human agents of faith, hope, and love can learn to cope with the risks of everyday life and of political decisions?     

From adorable to worthless: implicit and self‐report structure of highly evaluative personality descriptors

So‐called highly ‘evaluative’ personality judgments (e.g. describing someone as exceptional, odd, or vile,) are an integral component of people's daily judgments of themselves and others. However, little is known about the conceptual structure, psychological function, and personality‐relevance of these kinds of attribution. Two studies were conducted to explore the internal (i.e. implicit) and external (i.e. self‐report) structure of highly evaluative terms. Factor analyses of semantic‐similarity sortings and self‐reports on several representative samples of highly evaluative personality adjectives yielded internal and external structures that were very similar. Both types of structure included five dimensions representing distinction, worthlessness, depravity, unconventionality, and stupidity. The robustness of the uncovered dimensions across the two studies suggests that typically excluded highly evaluative personality terms, far from being behaviorally ambiguous and psychologically uninformative, allude to meaningful dispositions that people both implicitly understand and possess to different degrees. These findings also suggest that highly evaluative personality judgments are organized around the basic domains of morality (i.e. depravity), power (distinction and worthlessness), peculiarity (unconventionality), and intelligence (stupidity). We discuss the implications of our findings for the study of self‐ and other‐esteem processes, personality perception, and the Big Seven factor model of personality. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The libertarian predicament: a plea for action theory

Synthese - Libertarians in the contemporary free will debate find themselves under attack from two angles. They face the challenge of defending the necessity of indeterminism for freedom against...     

Teaching Responsible Research and Innovation: A Phronetic Perspective

Science and Engineering Ethics - Across the European research area and beyond, efforts are being mobilized to align research and innovation processes and products with societal values and needs,...     

Attachment Representation and Sensitivity: The Moderating Role of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in a Refugee Sample

It has been hypothesized that adult attachment representations guide caregiving behavior and influence parental sensitivity, and thus affect the child's socio‐emotional development. Several studies have shown a link between posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and reduced parental sensitivity, so it is possible that PTSD moderates the relationship between insecure attachment representations and insensitivity. In this study symptoms of PTSD (Harvard Trauma Questionnaire), parental sensitivity (Emotional Availability Scales), and attachment representations (Attachment Script Assessment) were assessed in 53 parents who were asylum seekers or refugees. Results showed that when parents were less able to draw on secure attachment representations, symptoms of PTSD increased the risk of insensitive parenting. These findings suggest that parental sensitivity is affected not just by attachment representations, but by a conjunction of risk factors including symptoms of PTSD and insecure attachment representations. These parents should therefore be supported to establish or confirm secure models of attachment experiences, to facilitate their ability interact sensitively and form a secure relationship with their children.     

Envy and admiration: emotion and motivation following upward social comparison

Two key emotions people can experience when someone else is better than them are envy and admiration. There are conflicting findings in the scientific literature on which behaviour is elicited by these emotions. In one study (with two samples, total N?=?345), we test which motivations are triggered by envy and admiration. The main finding is that (benign) envy and admiration both lead to a motivation to improve oneself. This confirms earlier findings that admiration leads to a motivation to affiliate with the admired other and a motivation to improve one's own position. Furthermore, it supports the idea that envy can lead to both a motivation to improve oneself and a motivation to pull down the envied other, finding support for a subtypes theory of envy.     

Relevance differently affects the truth,acceptability, and probability evaluations of “and”, “but”, “therefore”, and “if–then”

In this study, we investigate the influence of reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals and “and”/“but”/“therefore” sentences on various cognitive assessments. According to the Frege–Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading of these sentences should affect participants’ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their truth value. In two experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance manipulation into the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participants’ acceptability and probability evaluations. Across the two experiments, a strong dissociation was found. The reason-relation reading of all four sentences strongly affected their probability and acceptability evaluations, but hardly affected their respective truth evaluations. Implications of this result for recent work on indicative conditionals are discussed.     

Threaded cognition: an integrated theory of concurrent multitasking

The authors propose the idea of threaded cognition, an integrated theory of concurrent multitasking--that is, performing 2 or more tasks at once. Threaded cognition posits that streams of thought can be represented as threads of processing coordinated by a serial procedural resource and executed across other available resources (e.g., perceptual and motor resources). The theory specifies a parsimonious mechanism that allows for concurrent execution, resource acquisition, and resolution of resource conflicts, without the need for specialized executive processes. By instantiating this mechanism as a computational model, threaded cognition provides explicit predictions of how multitasking behavior can result in interference, or lack thereof, for a given set of tasks. The authors illustrate the theory in model simulations of several representative domains ranging from simple laboratory tasks such as dual-choice tasks to complex real-world domains such as driving and driver distraction.     

The acquisition of robust and flexible cognitive skills

The authors introduce a model of skill acquisition that incorporates elements of both traditional models and models based on embedded cognition by striking a balance between top-down and bottom-up control. A knowledge representation is used in which pre- and postconditions are attached to actions. This model captures improved performance due to learning not only in terms of shorter solution times and lower error rates during the task but also in an increased flexibility to solve similar problems and robustness against unexpected events. In 3 experiments using a complex aviation task, the authors contrasted instructions that explicitly stated pre- and postconditions with conventional instructions that did not. The instructions with pre- and postconditions led to better and more robust performance than other instructions, especially on problems that required transfer. The parameters of the model were estimated to obtain a quantitative fit of the results of Experiment 1, which was then successfully used to predict the results of Experiments 2 and 3.