Measuring Spiritual Needs in a Secular Society: Validation and Clinimetric Properties of the Danish 20-Item Spiritual Needs Questionnaire

Journal of Religion and Health - In secular cultures, such as Denmark, tools to measure spiritual needs are warranted to guide existential and spiritual care. We examined the clinimetric properties...     

When envy leads to schadenfreude

Previous research has yielded inconsistent findings concerning the relationship between envy and schadenfreude. Three studies examined whether the distinction between benign and malicious envy can resolve this inconsistency. We found that malicious envy is related to schadenfreude, while benign envy is not. This result held both in the Netherlands where benign and malicious envy are indicated by separate words (Study 1: Sample A, N = 139; Sample B, N = 150), and in the USA where a single word is used to denote both types (Study 2, N = 180; Study 3, N = 349). Moreover, the effect of malicious envy on schadenfreude was independent of other antecedents of schadenfreude (such as feelings of inferiority, disliking the target person, anger, and perceived deservedness). These findings improve our understanding of the antecedents of schadenfreude and help reconcile seemingly contradictory findings on the relationship between envy and schadenfreude.     

The return trip effect: Why the return trip often seems to take less time

Three studies confirm the existence of the return trip effect: The return trip often seems shorter than the initial trip, even though the distance traveled and the actual time spent traveling are identical. A pretest shows that people indeed experience a return trip effect regularly, and the effect was found on a bus trip (Study 1), a bicycle trip (Study 2), and when participants watched a video of someone else traveling (Study 3). The return trip effect also existed when another, equidistant route was taken on the return trip, showing that it is not familiarity with the route that causes this effect. Rather, it seems that a violation of expectations causes this effect.     

Risk and Religion: Toward a Theology of Risk Taking

Historically the concept of risk is rooted in Renaissance lifestyles, in which autonomous agents such as sailors, warriors, and tradesmen ventured upon dangerous enterprises. Thus, the concept of risk inseparably combines objective reality (nature) and social construction (culture): Risk = Danger + Venture. Mathematical probability theory was constructed in this social climate in order to provide a quantitative risk assessment in the face of indeterminate futures. Thus we have the famous formula: Risk = Probability (of events) × the Size (of future harms). Because the concept of harm is always observer relative, however, risk assessment cannot be purely quantitative. This leads to the question, What are the general conditions under which risks can be accepted? There is, after all, a difference between incurring a risk and bearing the costs of risks selected for by other agencies. Against this background, contours of a theology of risk emerge. If God creates a self‐organizing world of relatively autonomous agents, and if self‐organization is favored by cooperative networks of autopoietic processes, then the theological hypothesis of a risk‐taking God is at least initially plausible. Moreover, according to the Christian idea of incarnation, God is not only taking a risk but is also bearing the risks implied by the openness of creation. I thus argue for a twofold divine kenosis—in creation as well as in redemption. I discuss some objections to this view, including the serious counterargument that risk taking on behalf of others remains, even for God, a morally dubious task. What are the conditions under which the notion of a risk‐taking God can be affirmed without leaving us with the picture of God as an arbitrary, cosmic tyrant? And what are the practical implications for the ways in which human agents of faith, hope, and love can learn to cope with the risks of everyday life and of political decisions?     

From adorable to worthless: implicit and self‐report structure of highly evaluative personality descriptors

So‐called highly ‘evaluative’ personality judgments (e.g. describing someone as exceptional, odd, or vile,) are an integral component of people's daily judgments of themselves and others. However, little is known about the conceptual structure, psychological function, and personality‐relevance of these kinds of attribution. Two studies were conducted to explore the internal (i.e. implicit) and external (i.e. self‐report) structure of highly evaluative terms. Factor analyses of semantic‐similarity sortings and self‐reports on several representative samples of highly evaluative personality adjectives yielded internal and external structures that were very similar. Both types of structure included five dimensions representing distinction, worthlessness, depravity, unconventionality, and stupidity. The robustness of the uncovered dimensions across the two studies suggests that typically excluded highly evaluative personality terms, far from being behaviorally ambiguous and psychologically uninformative, allude to meaningful dispositions that people both implicitly understand and possess to different degrees. These findings also suggest that highly evaluative personality judgments are organized around the basic domains of morality (i.e. depravity), power (distinction and worthlessness), peculiarity (unconventionality), and intelligence (stupidity). We discuss the implications of our findings for the study of self‐ and other‐esteem processes, personality perception, and the Big Seven factor model of personality. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The libertarian predicament: a plea for action theory

Synthese - Libertarians in the contemporary free will debate find themselves under attack from two angles. They face the challenge of defending the necessity of indeterminism for freedom against...     

Teaching Responsible Research and Innovation: A Phronetic Perspective

Science and Engineering Ethics - Across the European research area and beyond, efforts are being mobilized to align research and innovation processes and products with societal values and needs,...     

The influence of stimulus array on training of a speeded response

We conducted two experiments to study the training of speeded responses to stimuli in a clock face array. Participants were trained on one clock face and later tested on either the same or a different clock face. The clock faces varied along 3 dimensions of change (left-right flip, up-down flip, and 180 degrees rotation). Skill acquisition was reflected in decreases in overall, initiation, and movement response times in the training and test phases except that movement time reached an asymptote during training and did not decrease further during test. Test performance was best when training and test used the same clock face and worst when the training to test change involved an up-down flip. The transition to different clock faces was consistent with an interpretation based on the violation of expectations about target positions acquired during training. Consistent trial-by-trial feedback led to better initiation time but not movement time during training than periodic feedback, but this effect did not persist into the test phase.