Aggression in Children With Reactive Attachment Disorder: A Sign of Deficits in Emotional Regulatory Processes?

Children diagnosed with reactive attachment disorder (RAD) have been reported to exhibit a multitude of symptoms and behaviors that are not captured by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders criteria. One behavior in particular that has been the source of much argument and controversy is aggression. Although limited research on this topic does support an association between aggression and RAD behaviors, the exact nature of this link remains unclear. This study aims to fill this gap by reporting data from a study that examined the behavioral processes that occur in adopted children with RAD. Guided by the principles of grounded theory, this study employed a multi-stage semi-structured interview design. The sample consisted of 5 adoptive families, and included both adult and child participants, including the adopted children with RAD. The findings revealed 5 prominent themes: The adopted children are reported to engage in extreme and prolonged tantrums, known as rages; children were often inconsolable during these rages; these rages are perceived as uncontrollable by children with RAD; these rages are directed toward a discriminate caregiver; and the impetus for these rages appears to be associated with difficulties in adapting to environmental demands. An in-depth discussion that draws a theoretical connection between these rages and possible deficits in brain-based processes responsible for emotional regulation is presented.     

How individual was conscience in the early-modern period? Observations on the development of Catholic moral theology

This article investigates how the notion of individual conscience has to be understood within the early-modern development of Catholic moral theology. It highlights that 16th-century Catholic theologians continued to understand conscience mainly in Thomist terms as a rational judgment. Yet they also came to investigate more deeply questions of intention and individual circumstances that might interfere with the perfect execution of moral reasoning. Particular emphasis is given to the question of probabilism and whether this new method of analyzing moral agency provided a stepping stone towards a more individualized conception of conscience, as some intellectual historians have contended. The article argues that whilst probabilism sharpened the awareness for problems of conscience, this development cannot be disconnected from the culture of counsel of conscience, inscribed into the fundamentally Thomist definition of it.