Implicit learning of what comes when and where within a sequence: The time-course of acquiring serial position-item and item-item associations to represent serial order

Much research has been conducted aimed at the representations and mechanisms that enable learning of sequential structures. A central debate concerns the question whether item-item associations (i.e., in the sequence A-B-C-D, B comes after A) or associations of item and serial list position (i.e., B is the second item in the list) are used to represent serial order. Previously, we showed that in a variant of the implicit serial reaction time task, the sequence representation contains associations between serial position and item information (Schuck, Gaschler, Keisler, & Frensch, 2011). Here, we applied models and research methods from working memory research to implicit serial learning to replicate and extend our findings. The experiment involved three sessions of sequence learning. Results support the view that participants acquire knowledge about order structure (item-item associations) and about ordinal structure (serial position-item associations). Analyses suggest that only the simultaneous use of the two types of knowledge acquisition can explain learning-related performance increases. Additionally, our results indicate that serial list position information plays a role very early in learning and that inter-item associations increasingly control behavior in later stages.     

Orientation-specific aftereffects to mentally generated lines

After staring at a pattern of tilted lines, subsequent lines appear to be tilted in the opposite direction (direct tilt aftereffect, TAE). In a previous fMRI study we have demonstrated a direct TAE solely induced by the mental imagination accompanied by adaptation of orientation-selective neurons located in the extrastriate cortex, supporting the assumption of a perception-like coding of mental images. In this study we enlarge and specify the evidence for a perception-like coding of orientation-imagination. First, we replicated the previously detected direct TAE induced by line imagination with altered design-variations to control possible perceptual task confounds. Second, we tried to induce two other orientation-specific aftereffects: indirect TAE and contrast-threshold elevation aftereffect by mental imagery. The results replicate a robust direct TAE by mental imagery and by visual stimulation, with no influence of attentional resource allocation or perceptual task confounds. We could not induce an indirect TAE, but observed a perception bias in the opposite direction of the indirect TAE. The mental imagery of lines induced no orientation-selective contrast-threshold elevation aftereffect. In general, mental imagery seems to influence visual perception, indicating that perceptual resources are used by mental imagery. However, the utilisation of visual resources seems to be somewhat different from utilisation by perception.     

The influence of suggestibility on memory

We provide a translation of Binet and Henri's pioneering 1894 paper on the influence of suggestibility on memory. Alfred Binet (1857-1911) is famous as the author who created the IQ test that bears his name, but he is almost unknown as the psychological investigator who generated numerous original experiments and fascinating results in the study of memory. His experiments published in 1894 manipulated suggestibility in several ways to determine effects on remembering. Three particular modes of suggestion were employed to induce false recognitions: (1) indirect suggestion by a preconceived idea; (2) direct suggestion; and (3) collective suggestion. In the commentary we suggest that Binet and Henri's (1894) paper written over 115 years ago is still highly relevant even today. In particular, Binet's legacy lives on in modern research on misinformation effects in memory, in studies of conformity, and in experiments on the social contagion of memory.     

The Family Alliance Assessment Scales: Steps Toward Validity and Reliability of an Observational Assessment Tool for Early Family Interactions

We present the first steps in the validation of an observational tool for father-mother-infant interactions: the FAAS (Family Alliance Assessment Scales). Family-level variables are acknowledged as unique contributors to the understanding of the socio-affective development of the child, yet producing reliable assessments of family-level interactions poses a methodological challenge. There is, therefore, a clear need for a validated and clinically relevant tool. This validation study has been carried out on three samples: one non-referred sample, of families taking part in a study on the transition to parenthood (normative sample; n = 30), one referred for medically assisted procreation (infertility sample; n = 30) and one referred for a psychiatric condition in one parent (clinical sample; n = 15). Results show that the FAAS scales have (1) good inter-rater reliability and (2) good validity, as assessed through known-group validity by comparing the three samples and through concurrent validity by checking family interactions against parents’ self-reported marital satisfaction.     

Similarity on the rebound: inhibition of similarity assessment leads to an ironic postsuppressional rebound

A widely held but rarely tested assumption among cognitive scientists is that different cognitive tasks may rely upon a single basic cognitive process. Using an established methodology to examine the suppression and subsequent rebound of mental operations, the present research indicates that suppressing use of similarity in one domain results in the subsequent rebound of similarity assessment in a different domain, suggesting that both domains rely on the same underlying cognitive process. In two studies, we demonstrate that leading people to suppress natural similarity assessment in one task produces increased reliance on similarity in subsequent, different, and apparently unrelated tasks. In Experiment 1, participants led to suppress similarity in a concentration task subsequently made more errors in a false-memory paradigm than did control participants. In Experiment 2, participants suppressing similarity in a categorization task made more false-memory errors and perceived more similarity between word pairs than participants who did not suppress. The findings suggest that the cognitive process of similarity assessment may be a domain-general process, such that it is widespread across a number of different mental tasks.     

What is the impact of the explicit knowledge of sequence regularities on both deterministic and probabilistic serial reaction time task performance?

The aim of this study was to explore the role of prior explicit sequence knowledge by comparing its influence on serial reaction time (SRT) performance with either a deterministic or a probabilistic sequence. The results confirm that, with a deterministic sequence, preliminary explicit learning improves SRT performance. On the other hand, with a probabilistic sequence, the results show no advantage for SRT performance in explicit-learning conditions. In addition, by using the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991), we show that performance on a subsequent generation task was more sustained by controlled processes for participants in the explicit-learning conditions than for those in the incidental condition. On the whole, these results, showing that the influence of explicit knowledge can be suppressed in certain specific conditions, are consistent with the intervention of both implicit and explicit mechanisms in SRT tasks, and the results also show that their relative influence can be modulated by the particular demands of the task.     

Stimulus complexity and prospective timing: clues for a parallel process model of time perception

Whereas many studies have considered the role of attention in prospective timing, fewer have established relations between movement complexity and prospective timing. The present study aims at assessing to what extent motion complexity interferes with prospective timing and at delineating a neuropsychophysical plausible model. We have thus designed a visual paradigm presenting stimuli in sequential pairs (reference comparison interval). Stimuli are motionless or moving according to different complexities, and stimulus complexities are intermixed within each pair. To prevent a possible attention-sharing effect, no concurrent task was required. Our study suggests that movement complexity is a key component of duration perception, and that the relative judgement of durations depends on spatio-temporal features of stimuli. In particular, it shows that movement complexity can bias subjects’ perception and performance, and that subjects detect that comparison intervals are longer than reference before their end. In the discussion, we advocate that the classical internal clock model cannot easily account for our results. Consequently, we propose a model for time perception, based on a parallel processing between comparison interval perception and the reconstruction of the reference duration.     

What does the nature of the stimuli tell us about the Global Precedence Effect?

The "Global Precedence Effect" (GPE) is a well-established phenomenon characterised by a global advantage (global response times that are faster than local response times) and an interference effect from global distractors during identification of local targets but not vice versa. In the present study, two experiments were carried out to examine how the GPE is affected by the meaningfulness of the stimuli. Using global/local compound stimuli based on either meaningful or meaningless stimuli, we found, on the one hand, that the global level was always processed faster than the local level, irrespective of the meaningfulness of the material. On the other hand, results show that the interference effect occurred only with meaningful stimuli. We propose that automatic identification of meaningful stimuli plays a role in the interference effect. These results suggest that the GPE involves both "sensory mechanisms" (responsible for the global advantage) and "cognitive mechanisms" (responsible for the interference effect).     

Speaker overestimation of communication effectiveness and fear of negative evaluation: Being realistic is unrealistic

Speakers systematically overestimate their communication effectiveness (Keysar & Henly, 2002). We argue that doing so is adaptive, reducing the risk of social anxiety and withdrawal from social situations. This hypothesis was tested by having speakers who scored low and high for fear of negative evaluation (FNE), a hallmark of social phobia, attempt to convey a specific meaning of ambiguous statements to a listener and then estimate their communication effectiveness. Low-FNE speakers consistently overestimated their effectiveness, expecting the listener to understand their intended meaning more often than listeners actually did. In contrast, high-FNE speakers’ estimates of communication effectiveness were consistent with the listener’s actual understanding. Signal detection analysis revealed that low- and high-FNE speakers were equally able to discriminate communication success from failure, but low-FNE speakers exhibited a stronger positive response bias. In conclusion, overestimating one’s communication effectiveness is adaptive, and accurate estimation is associated with dysfunction.