How Collective Participation Impacts Social Identity: A Longitudinal Study from India

A key issue for political psychology concerns the processes whereby people come to invest psychologically in socially and politically significant group identities. Since Durkheim, it has been assumed that participation in group‐relevant collective events increases one's investment in such group identities. However, little empirical research explicitly addresses this or the processes involved. We investigated these issues in a longitudinal questionnaire study conducted at one of the world's largest collective events—a month‐long Hindu festival in north India (the Magh Mela). Data gathered from pilgrims and comparable others who did not attend the event show that one month after the event, those who had participated (but not the controls) exhibited heightened social identification as a Hindu and increased frequency of prayer rituals. Data gathered from pilgrims during the festival predicted these outcomes. Specifically, perceptions of sharing a common identity with other pilgrims and of being able to enact one's social identity in this event helped predict changes in participants' identification and behavior. The wider significance of these data for political psychology is discussed.     

Conspiracist beliefs,intuitive thinking,and schizotypal facets: A further evaluation

This study examined whether thinking style mediated relationships between belief in conspiracy and schizotypy facets. A UK-based sample of 421 respondents completed the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences Short (O-Life), and measures indexing preferential thinking style (proneness to reality testing deficits and Need for Cognition). Path analysis revealed direct and indirect relationships between Conspiracy Beliefs and schizotypy facets. Unusual Experiences had a direct effect on Conspiracy Beliefs and predicted Reality Testing and Need for Cognition. Preferential thinking style mediated the schizotypy-belief in conspiracy relationship. This pattern of results (higher experiential-based processing and lower Need for Cognition) was consistent with intuitive thinking. Introverted Anhedonia and Impulsive Nonconformity predicted Reality Testing and had indirect effects on Conspiracy Beliefs. Finally, Reality Testing predicted Conspiracy Beliefs, whereas Need for Cognition did not. These results confirm that cognitive processes related to thinking style mediate the schizotypy-conspiracist beliefs relationship.     

Observer-Relative Chances In Anthropic Reasoning?

John Leslie presents a thought experiment to show that chances are sometimes observer-relative in a paradoxical way. The pivotal assumption in his argument – a version of the weak anthropic principle – is the same as the one used to get the disturbing Doomsday argument off the ground. I show that Leslie's thought experiment trades on the sense/reference ambiguity and is fallacious. I then describe a related case where chances are observer-relative in an interesting way. But not in a paradoxical way. The result can be generalized: At least for a very wide range of cases, the weak anthropic principle does not giverise to paradoxical observer-relative chances. This finding could be taken to give new indirect support to the doomsday argument.     

Predicting high risk sexual behaviour in heterosexual and homosexual men: the roles of impulsivity and sensation seeking

Impulsivity and sexual sensation seeking were examined as personality correlates of high risk sexual behaviour — unprotected sex with multiple partners — in samples of heterosexual (n=112) and homosexual (n=104) men. Among heterosexuals, both personality variables were associated with frequency of unprotected sex but only sexual sensation seeking was associated with number of sex partners. Sexual sensation seeking also mediated the association between use of drugs other than alcohol and number of sex partners. Among homosexuals, no personality or substance use variables predicted high risk sexual behaviour. Implications of the findings for the study of determinants of sexual risk-taking are discussed.     

Conditional Probabilities, Potential Surprise, and the Conjunction Fallacy

Tversky and Kahneman (1983) found that a relationship of positive conditional dependence between the components of a conjunction of two events increases the prevalence of the conjunction fallacy. Consistent with this finding, the results of two experiments reveal that dependence leads to higher estimates for the conjunctive probability and a higher incidence of the fallacy. However, contrary to the theoretical account proposed by Tversky and Kahneman, the actual magnitude of the conditional relationship does not directly affect the extent of the fallacy; all that is necessary is for a positive conditional relationship to exist. The pattern of results obtained can be accounted for in terms of Shackle's (1969) 'potential surprise' theory of subjective probability. Surprise theory predicts that the impact of the conditional event will be at its maximum where the relationship is a negative one. Tversky and Kahneman's model, on the other hand, predicts the maximum effect when the relationship is positive. In all 12 scenarios tested, multiple regression analysis revealed that the standardized beta weight associated with the conditional event was greater when the relationship was a negative one. Thus the outcome was supportive of the surprise model rather than Tversky and Kahneman's account.     

Reconfiguration of task-set: Is it easier to switch to the weaker task?

Switching between two tasks afforded by the same stimuli results in slower reactions and more errors on the first stimulus after the task changes. This “switch cost” is reduced, but not usually eliminated, by the opportunity to prepare for a task switch. While there is agreement that this preparation effect indexes a control process performed before the stimulus, the “residual” cost has been attributed to several sources: to a control process essential for task-set reconfiguration that can be carried out only after the stimulus onset, to probabilistic failure to engage in preparation prior to the stimulus, and to two kinds of priming from previous trials: positive priming of the now-irrelevant task set and inhibition of the now-relevant task-set. The main evidence for the carry-over of inhibition is the observation that it is easier to switch from the stronger to the weaker of a pair of tasks afforded by the stimulus than vice versa. We survey available data on interactions between task switching and three manipulations of relative task strength: pre-experimental experience, stimulus-response compatibility, and intra-experimental practice. We conclude that it is far from universally true that it is easier to switch to the weaker task. Either inhibition of the stronger task-set is a strategy used only in the special case of extreme inequality in strength, or its consequences for later performance may be masked by slower post-stimulus control operations for more complex tasks. Inhibitory priming may also be stimulus specific. Received: 31 March 1999 / Accepted: 23 July 1999