The role of the ‘other’ in national identity: exploring the context‐dependence of the national ingroup stereotype

Analysts from a range of disciplines (especially sociology and social anthropology) highlight the role of the ‘other’ in the construction and definition of national identity. Recently some social psychologists have come to emphasize the inherently relational nature of identity. Drawing upon these recent investigations, the present paper reports a field study investigating the context‐dependent nature of group identity. Using a modified version of the Katz–Braly task, British subjects (n=240) stereotyped two national groups: Americans and British. They did so in two conditions. In the ‘one‐group’ conditions, subjects rated either of the two groups. In the ‘two‐group’ conditions, they rated one whilst also considering the other. Following Oakes, Haslam and Turner (1994) we predicted that whereas subjects' stereotypes of the national outgroup (the Americans) would be unaffected by this manipulation, their stereotype of the national ingroup (the British) would be affected. This prediction was confirmed. We also predicted that the national ingroup stereotype obtained in the ‘two‐group’ condition would be one which was defined in contrast to the American ‘other’ which constituted the comparative context. Using a measure which takes into account the applicability of ingroup‐defining terms to both the ingroup and the outgroup (the diagnosticity measure of stereotyping proposed by McCauley and Stitt, 1978) we show that the ingroup identity definition produced in this condition did indeed differentiate the British from the Americans. The significance of these data for those concerned with the application of social psychological theory to real‐life social problems is discussed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Removal of epileptically compromised tissue in the frontal cortex restores oculomotor selection in the antisaccade task

The frontal cortex is heavily involved in oculomotor selection. Here, we investigated the neural correlates of eye movement selection during an antisaccade task in a young epileptic patient in whom the seizure focus included the frontal cortex and affected its function. Before resection surgery, the patient had difficulty in performing correct antisaccades towards the visual field contralateral to the seizure focus. Because the FEF is the only area in the human frontal cortex that is known to have a lateralized oculomotor function in the antisaccade task, this behavioural imbalance between the two visual fields suggests a disruption of FEF functioning by the nearby seizure focus. Electrocorticographic recordings at the seizure focus indeed showed that the seizure focus interfered with correct antisaccade performance. These results were in line with fMRI recordings revealing less task-related frontal activity for the hemisphere of the seizure focus, possibly reflecting diminished top-down engagement of the oculomotor system. Two months after removal of the compromised tissue, the seizures had disappeared, and antisaccade performance was the same for both visual hemifields. We conclude that a seizure focus in the frontal cortex can induce a dysfunction in the selection of eye movements, which is resolved after removal of interfering tissue.     

Observer-Relative Chances In Anthropic Reasoning?

John Leslie presents a thought experiment to show that chances are sometimes observer-relative in a paradoxical way. The pivotal assumption in his argument – a version of the weak anthropic principle – is the same as the one used to get the disturbing Doomsday argument off the ground. I show that Leslie's thought experiment trades on the sense/reference ambiguity and is fallacious. I then describe a related case where chances are observer-relative in an interesting way. But not in a paradoxical way. The result can be generalized: At least for a very wide range of cases, the weak anthropic principle does not giverise to paradoxical observer-relative chances. This finding could be taken to give new indirect support to the doomsday argument.     

Toward a Connectionist Model of Recursion in Human Linguistic Performance

Naturally occurring speech contains only a limited amount of complex recursive structure, and this is reflected in the empirically documented difficulties that people experience when processing such structures. We present a connectionist model of human performance in processing recursive language structures. The model is trained on simple artificial languages. We find that the qualitative performance profile of the model matches human behavior, both on the relative difficulty of center-embedding and cross-dependency, and between the processing of these complex recursive structures and right-branching recursive constructions. We analyze how these differences in performance are reflected in the internal representations of the model by performing discriminant analyses on these representations both before and after training. Furthermore, we show how a network trained to process recursive structures can also generate such structures in a probabilistic fashion. This work suggests a novel explanation of people's limited recursive performance, without assuming the existence of a mentally represented competence grammar allowing unbounded recursion.