Unsupervised categorization and category learning.

When people categorize a set of items in a certain way they often change their perceptions for these items so that they become more compatible with the learned categorization. In two experiments we examined whether such changes are extensive enough to change the unsupervised categorization for the items-that is, the categorization of the items that is considered more intuitive or natural without any learning. In Experiment 1 we directly employed an unsupervised categorization task; in Experiment 2 we collected similarity ratings for the items and inferred unsupervised categorizations using Pothos and Chater's (2002) model of unsupervised categorization. The unsupervised categorization for the items changed to resemble more the learned one when this was specified by the suppression of a stimulus dimension (both experiments), but less so when it was almost specified by the suppression of a stimulus dimension (Experiment 1, nonsignificant trend in Experiment 2). By contrast, no changes in the unsupervised categorization were observed when participants were taught a classification that was specified by a more fine tuning of the relative salience of the two dimensions.     

Exemptions,Sincerity and Pastafarianism

Because Pastafarianism – or the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster – is a parodic religion, common sense suggests its ‘adherents’ should not receive exemptions. However, the prima facie case for excluding Pastafarians is complicated by the fact that many assert their religion is as legitimate as any other religion and that their beliefs are genuine. Indeed, Pastafarians have already obtained exemptions in various countries. Taking the dominant liberal egalitarian, integrity-based approach to exemptions, this article investigates whether there is a principled, objective basis for excluding Pastafarians that accounts for their assertions. To that end, I examine four tests: a religion, seriousness, obligation, and sincerity test. I assess whether each test can actually exclude Pastafarians, and if it could, can it do so in a way that is consistent with liberal egalitarian commitments. I argue that only a sincerity test – based on consistent behaviour and a willingness to bear the costs of one's beliefs – satisfies both of these conditions, but, on a weak and contingent basis.     

The Clinical Challenge of Mentalization-based Therapy with Children Who are in “Pretend Mode”

ABSTRACT

The “pretend mode” is one of the so-called “pre-mentalizing modes of thinking”, which were first introduced by Target and Fonagy over 20 years ago. In a series of papers about play and reality, “pretend mode” thinking was understood as a mode of pre-mentalizing thinking which is typical in the early years, but which can reappear in a more problematic way in adults. Although the concept of pretend mode was first introduced in a developmental context, as a clinical term it has primarily been discussed in the context of adult or adolescent psychotherapy. This paper suggests that the pretend mode is a valuable clinical concept for therapists working with school-age children, but that its use in this context needs some clarification. After reviewing how pretend mode has been understood as a normal part of early development, this paper goes to demonstrate the various roles of pretend mode in clinical work with school-age children and sets out a number of clinical strategies that may be used in therapeutic work.