Cofinal Stable Logics

We generalize the \({(\wedge, \vee)}\)-canonical formulas to \({(\wedge, \vee)}\)-canonical rules, and prove that each intuitionistic multi-conclusion consequence relation is axiomatizable by \({(\wedge, \vee)}\)-canonical rules. This yields a convenient characterization of stable superintuitionistic logics. The \({(\wedge, \vee)}\)-canonical formulas are analogues of the \({(\wedge,\to)}\)-canonical formulas, which are the algebraic counterpart of Zakharyaschev’s canonical formulas for superintuitionistic logics (si-logics for short). Consequently, stable si-logics are analogues of subframe si-logics. We introduce cofinal stable intuitionistic multi-conclusion consequence relations and cofinal stable si-logics, thus answering the question of what the analogues of cofinal subframe logics should be. This is done by utilizing the \({(\wedge,\vee,\neg)}\)-reduct of Heyting algebras. We prove that every cofinal stable si-logic has the finite model property, and that there are continuum many cofinal stable si-logics that are not stable. We conclude with several examples showing the similarities and differences between the classes of stable, cofinal stable, subframe, and cofinal subframe si-logics.     

Dual Identities and Their Recognition: Minority Group Members' Perspectives

Minorities may define themselves at a superordinate (e.g., national) level and also at a subgroup (minority) level. However, others' recognition of such dual identifications cannot be guaranteed. This paper investigates how members of a minority (Muslims in the UK) constructed their superordinate and subgroup identities in such a way as to assert a commonality with British non‐Muslims whilst asserting their religious subgroup's distinctiveness. Reporting qualitative data obtained through interviews (N = 28), the analysis explores how British Muslims negotiated concerns over commonality and distinctiveness through describing themselves as being British in a Muslim way. The implications of these self‐definitions for the theorization of dual identities, their recognition, and intergroup relations are discussed.     

Visual aftereffects for walking actions reveal underlying neural mechanisms for action recognition

The results of this study illustrate a new high-level visual aftereffect: Observing actors walking forward, without horizontal translation, makes subsequent actors appear to walk backward, and the opposite effect is obtained after observing backward walking. We used this aftereffect, which cannot be explained by simple low-level adaptation to motion direction, to investigate the properties of neural mechanisms underlying recognition of walking actions. Our results suggest that the perception of walking and the perception of static images of actors in walking postures rely on common brain mechanisms that are primarily object centered, rather than viewer centered, and that are blind to the identity of the actor. These results, obtained with human psychophysical adaptation techniques, support previous evidence accumulated using single-unit recording in nonhuman primates. In addition, these results provide evidence that current models of human action recognition require an object-centered processing stage.     

The influence of prior knowledge on the retrieval‐directed function of note taking in prior knowledge activation

Background. Prior knowledge activation facilitates learning. Note taking during prior knowledge activation (i.e., note taking directed at retrieving information from memory) might facilitate the activation process by enabling learners to build an external representation of their prior knowledge. However, taking notes might be less effective in supporting prior knowledge activation if available prior knowledge is limited. Aims. This study investigates the effects of the retrieval‐directed function of note taking depending on learners' level of prior knowledge. It is hypothesized that the effectiveness of note taking is influenced by the amount of prior knowledge learners already possess. Sample. Sixty‐one high school students participated in this study. A prior knowledge test was used to ascertain differences in level of prior knowledge and assign participants to a low or a high prior knowledge group. Method. A 2×2 factorial design was used to investigate the effects of note taking during prior knowledge activation (yes, no) depending on learners' level of prior knowledge (low, high) on mental effort, performance, and mental efficiency. Results. Note taking during prior knowledge activation lowered mental effort and increased mental efficiency for high prior knowledge learners. For low prior knowledge learners, note taking had the opposite effect on mental effort and mental efficiency. Conclusions. The effects of the retrieval‐directed function of note taking are influenced by learners' level of prior knowledge. Learners with high prior knowledge benefit from taking notes while activating prior knowledge, whereas note taking has no beneficial effects for learners with limited prior knowledge.     

Perceptual and decisional factors influencing the discrimination of inversion in the Thatcher illusion

The Thatcher illusion (Thompson, 1980) is considered to be a prototypical illustration of the notion that face perception is dependent on configural processes and representations. We explored this idea by examining the relative contributions of perceptual and decisional processes to the ability of observers to identify the orientation of two classes of forms-faces and churches-and a set of their component features. Observers were presented with upright and inverted images of faces and churches in which the components (eyes, mouth, windows, doors) were presented either upright or inverted. Observers first rated the subjective grotesqueness of all of the images and then performed a complete identification task in which they had to identify the orientation of the overall form and the orientation of each of the interior features. Grotesqueness ratings for both classes of image showed the standard modulation of rated grotesqueness as a function of orientation. The complete identification results revealed violations of both perceptual and decisional separability but failed to reveal any violations of within-stimulus (perceptual) independence. In addition, exploration of a simple bivariate Gaussian signal detection model of the relationship between identification performance and judged grotesqueness suggests that within-stimulus violations of perceptual independence on their own are insufficient for producing the illusion. This lack of evidence for within-stimulus configurality suggests the need for a critical reevaluation of the role of configural processing in the Thatcher illusion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).     

Genetic essentialism, neuroessentialism, and stigma: commentary on Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011)

Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) presented a masterfully broad review of the implications of genetic essentialism for understandings of human diversity. This commentary clarifies the reasons that essentialist thinking has problematic social consequences and links genetic forms of essentialism to those invoking neural essences. The mounting evidence that these forms of essentialist thinking contribute to the stigma of mental disorder is reviewed. Genetic and neuroessentialisms influence media portrayals of scientific research and distort how they are interpreted by laypeople. The common thread of these essentialisms is their tendency to deepen social divisions and promote forms of social segregation.     

How the Bayesians got their beliefs (and what those beliefs actually are): comment on Bowers and Davis (2012)

Bowers and Davis (2012) criticize Bayesian modelers for telling "just so" stories about cognition and neuroscience. Their criticisms are weakened by not giving an accurate characterization of the motivation behind Bayesian modeling or the ways in which Bayesian models are used and by not evaluating this theoretical framework against specific alternatives. We address these points by clarifying our beliefs about the goals and status of Bayesian models and by identifying what we view as the unique merits of the Bayesian approach.