Second thoughts on the alleged failure of free will theodicies

In this paper I further the discussion on the adequacy of free will theodicies initiated by Joel Tierno. Tierno’s principal claim is that free will theodicies fail to account for the wide distribution of moral evil. I attempt to show that, even if Tierno need not rely on a compatibilist conception of free will in order to substantiate the aforementioned claim, there remains good reason to think that free will theodicies are not explanatorily inadequate in the way suggested by Tierno.     

An examination of the processing capacity of features in the Thatcher illusion

Detection of the Thatcher illusion (Thompson, Perception, 9:483–484, 1980) is widely upheld as being dependent on configural processing (e.g., Bartlett & Searcy, Cognitive Psychology, 25:281–316, 1993; Boutsen, Humphreys, Praamstra, & Warbrick, NeuroImage, 32:352–367, 2006; Donnelly & Hadwin, Visual Cognition, 10:1001–1017, 2003; Leder & Bruce, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53A:513–536, 2000; Lewis, Perception, 30:769–774, 2001; Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6:255–260, 2002; Stürzel & Spillmann, Perception, 29:937–942, 2000). Given that supercapacity processing accompanies configural processing (see Wenger & Townsend, 2001), supercapacity processing should occur in the processing of Thatcherised upright faces. The purpose of this study was to test for evidence that the grotesqueness of upright Thatcherised faces results from supercapacity processing. Two tasks were employed: categorisation of a single face as odd or normal, and a same/different task for sequentially presented faces. The stimuli were typical faces, partially Thatcherised faces (either eyes or mouth inverted) and fully Thatcherised faces. All of the faces were presented upright. The data from both experiments were analysed using mean response times and a number of capacity measures (capacity coefficient, the Miller and Grice inequalities, and the proportional-hazards ratio). The results of both experiments demonstrated some evidence of a redundancy gain for the redundant-target condition over the single-target condition, especially in the response times in Experiment 1. However, there was very limited evidence, in either experiment, that the redundancy gains resulted from supercapacity processing. We concluded that the oddity signalled by inversion of eyes and mouths does not arise from positive interdependencies between these features.     

Search for multiple targets of different colours: Misguided eye movements reveal a reduction of colour selectivity

Searching for two targets simultaneously is often less efficient than conducting two separate searches. Eye movements were tracked to understand this dual‐target cost. Findings are discussed in the context of security screening. In both single‐target and dual‐target search, displays contained one target at most. Stimuli were abstract shapes modelled after guns and other threat items. With these targets and distractors, colour information helped more in guiding search than shape information. When the two targets had different colours, distractors with colours different from either target were fixated more often in dual‐target search than in single‐target searches. Thus a dual‐target cost arose from a reduction in colour selectivity, reflecting limitations in the ability to represent two target features simultaneously and use them to guide search. Because of these limitations, performance in security searches may improve if each image is searched by two screeners, each specializing in a different category of threat item. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Economic inequality is linked to biased self-perception

People's self-perception biases often lead them to see themselves as better than the average person (a phenomenon known as self-enhancement). This bias varies across cultures, and variations are typically explained using cultural variables, such as individualism versus collectivism. We propose that socioeconomic differences among societies--specifically, relative levels of economic inequality--play an important but unrecognized role in how people evaluate themselves. Evidence for self-enhancement was found in 15 diverse nations, but the magnitude of the bias varied. Greater self-enhancement was found in societies with more income inequality, and income inequality predicted cross-cultural differences in self-enhancement better than did individualism/collectivism. These results indicate that macrosocial differences in the distribution of economic goods are linked to microsocial processes of perceiving the self.     

Predicting recidivism with the Psychopathy Checklist: are factor score composites really necessary?

In two previous studies on general and violent recidivism (Walters & Heilbrun, 2010; Walters, Knight, Grann, & Dahle, 2008), the summed composite antisocial facet of the Psychopathy Checklist displayed incremental validity relative to the other 3 facets (interpersonal, affective, lifestyle), whereas the other 3 facets generally failed to demonstrate incremental validity relative to the antisocial facet. Because summed composite scores do not account for ordinal item distributions, the 6 Walters et al. (2008) samples were reanalyzed with factor score composites derived from a 4-factor confirmatory factor analysis. The results, however, showed little change from what had been obtained earlier with summed composite scores. Two additional samples not previously included in any incremental validity analyses of the Psychopathy Checklist evidenced a 3-factor structure, with the lifestyle and antisocial facets merged into a single factor. This single factor displayed incremental validity relative to the interpersonal and affective facets, but the reverse was not true regardless of whether summed composite scores or factor score composites were used. A comparison of zero-order correlations from all 8 samples revealed that the antisocial summed composite score predicted significantly better than the summed composite scores for the other 3 facets and that a superordinate factor failed to improve on the performance of either the antisocial summed composite score or the antisocial factor score composite.     

The mental representation of causal conditional reasoning: mental models or causal models

In this paper, two experiments are reported investigating the nature of the cognitive representations underlying causal conditional reasoning performance. The predictions of causal and logical interpretations of the conditional diverge sharply when inferences involving pairs of conditionals—such as if P₁then Q and if P₂then Q—are considered. From a causal perspective, the causal direction of these conditionals is critical: are the P_icauses of Q; or symptoms caused byQ. The rich variety of inference patterns can naturally be modelled by Bayesian networks. A pair of causal conditionals where Q is an effect corresponds to a “collider” structure where the two causes (P_i) converge on a common effect. In contrast, a pair of causal conditionals where Q is a cause corresponds to a network where two effects (P_i) diverge from a common cause. Very different predictions are made by fully explicit or initial mental models interpretations. These predictions were tested in two experiments, each of which yielded data most consistent with causal model theory, rather than with mental models.     

Language acquisition meets language evolution

Recent research suggests that language evolution is a process of cultural change, in which linguistic structures are shaped through repeated cycles of learning and use by domain-general mechanisms. This paper draws out the implications of this viewpoint for understanding the problem of language acquisition, which is cast in a new, and much more tractable, form. In essence, the child faces a problem of induction, where the objective is to coordinate with others (C-induction), rather than to model the structure of the natural world (N-induction). We argue that, of the two, C-induction is dramatically easier. More broadly, we argue that understanding the acquisition of any cultural form, whether linguistic or otherwise, during development, requires considering the corresponding question of how that cultural form arose through processes of cultural evolution. This perspective helps resolve the "logical" problem of language acquisition and has far-reaching implications for evolutionary psychology.