Objectification leads to depersonalization: The denial of mind and moral concern to objectified others

Philosophers have argued that when people are objectified they are treated as if they lack the mental states and moral status associated with personhood. These aspects of objectification have been neglected by psychologists. This research investigates the role of depersonalization in objectification. In Study 1, objectified women were attributed less mind and were accorded lesser moral status than non‐objectified women. In Study 2, we replicated this effect with male and female targets and extended it to include perceptions of competence and pain attribution. Further, we explored whether target and perceiver gender qualify depersonalization. Overall, this research indicates that when people are objectified they are denied personhood. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Internalizing and Externalizing Behaviors Share a Common Predictor: the Effects of Early Maladaptive Schemas Are Mediated by Coping Responses and Schema Modes

We investigated the relationships of adolescents’ internalizing and externalizing behaviors with their early maladaptive schemas (EMS), coping responses, and schema modes. We focused on EMS related to experiences of disconnection and rejection that comprise vulnerable emotions, such as shame, mistrust, deprivation, abandonment, and isolation/alienation. This cross-sectional study included a total of 699 adolescents (combined clinical and non-referred sample) who were 11 to 18 years old (M?=?14.6; SD?=?1.6), and of which 45% was male. All participants completed self-report questionnaires on EMS, coping responses, schema modes, and behavior problems. We aimed to clarify the relationships between these variables by testing mediation, moderation, and moderated mediation models. In general, coping responses functioned as mediators rather than moderators in the relationships between EMS and schema modes. Furthermore, EMS regarding experiences of disconnection and rejection were related to both internalizing and externalizing behavior problems, and coping responses and schema modes mediated these effects. In conclusion, although adolescent internalizing and externalizing behavior problems manifest quite differently, they seem related to the same EMS.     

Truth and epistemic value

The notion of more truth, or of more truth and less falsehood, is central to epistemology. Yet, I argue, we have no idea what this consists in, as the most natural or obvious thing to say—that more truth is a matter of a greater number of truths, and less falsehood is a matter of a lesser number of falsehoods—is ultimately implausible. The issue is important not merely because the notion of more truth and less falsehood is central to epistemology, but because an implicit, false picture of what this consists in underpins and gives shape to much contemporary epistemology.     

Internet and the support of psychology education

The Computers in Teaching Initiative (CTI) Centre for Psychology has been promoting the use of computers in psychology education for the last 5 years. The advent of the Internet and ubiquitous access to the World-Wide Web has the potential to revolutionize the way the teaching and learning of psychology can be supported. This paper describes how we are using the Web to support psychology education through information dissemination, through the provision of teaching resources, and through facilities for communication.     

Daydreams and Anarchy: A Defense of Anomalous Mental Causation

Must mental properties figure in psychological causal laws if they are causally efficacious? And do those psychological causal laws give the essence of mental properties? Contrary to the prevailing consensus, I argue that, on the usual conception of laws that is in play in these debates, there are in fact lawless causally efficacious properties both in and out of the philosophy of mind. I argue that this makes a great difference to the philosophical relevance of empirical psychology. 1 begin by making the case that revolutions and hurricanes are lawless phenomena, before arguing for a similar thesis about creativity, love, courage, dreams, daydreams, and musings. Furthermore, the empirical research on these phenomena suggests that the philosophical issues may be independent of what empirical psychology can tell us.     

Against Analytic Moral Functionalism

I argue against the analytic moral functionalist view propounded by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I focus on the 'input' clauses of our alleged 'folk moral theory'. I argue that the examples they give of such input clauses cannot plausibly be interpreted as analytic truths. They are in fact substantive moral claims about the moral 'domain'. It is a substantive claim that all human beings have equal moral standing. There are those who have rejected this, such as Herman Göring. He was loyal to a sub-class of humankind, but he suffered no conceptual confusion. Claims about what is morally relevant are substantive claims that cannot be known on purely conceptual grounds.     

Beliefs about personality change and continuity

Lay conceptions of personality change and continuity were examined in a sample of 112 undergraduates. Participants rated their personal change over 5 years (past or future), the change they perceived to be normative over 10-year age spans between 15 and 65, their beliefs about whether personality is fixed or malleable (“lay theories”) and their beliefs about the causes of personality change and continuity. Beliefs about normative personality change generally corresponded to research evidence on adult trajectories of the Big Five factors, with some age bias, whereas recalled and anticipated personal change tended to be more positive than these norms. Participants tended to endorse environmental causes more for personality change than for continuity. Lay theories were not consistently associated with these causal beliefs, or with beliefs about personal and normative change.