On difficult questions and evident answers: dispositional inference from role-constrained behavior

The present research investigated the underlying processes of how perceivers draw correspondent dispositional inferences about two interacting targets in the presence of situationally induced role constraints. Specifically, it is argued that a sufficient under-standing of role-dependent attributional biases (e.g., the fundamental attribution error) requires a separate consideration of the respective dispositional inference processes about each of the tar-gets involved, particularly with respect to deliberate attributional inferences. Employing the quiz-role paradigm results from four experiments generally support this assumption. Moreover, the present findings suggest that perceivers are much more sensitive to situationally induced role constraints than previous results may suggest. Implications for the fundamental attribution error and theories of dispositional inference are discussed.     

Olfactory learning in individually assayed Drosophila larvae

Insect and mammalian olfactory systems are strikingly similar. Therefore, Drosophila can be used as a simple model for olfaction and olfactory learning. The brain of adult Drosophila, however, is still complex. We therefore chose to work on the larva with its yet simpler but adult-like olfactory system and provide evidence for olfactory learning in individually assayed Drosophila larvae. We developed a differential conditioning paradigm in which odorants are paired with positive (“+” fructose) or negative (“-” quinine or sodium chloride) gustatory reinforcers. Test performance of individuals from two treatment conditions is compared—one received odorant A with the positive reinforcer and odorant B with a negative reinforcer (A+/B-); animals from the other treatment condition were trained reciprocally (A-/B+). During test, differences in choice between A and B of individuals having undergone either A+/B- or A-/B+ training therefore indicate associative learning. We provide such evidence for both combinations of reinforcers; this was replicable across repetitions, laboratories, and experimenters. We further show that breaks improve performance, in accord with basic principles of associative learning. The present individual assay will facilitate electrophysiological studies, which necessarily use individuals. As such approaches are established for the larval neuromuscular synapse, but not in adults, an individual larval learning paradigm will serve to link behavioral levels of analysis to synaptic physiology.     

Similarity as transformation

We propose that similarity is determined by the transformation distance between representations: entities which are perceived to be similar have representations which are readily transformed into one another, whereas transforming between dissimilar entities requires many transformations. We present three experiments that indicate that similarity is strongly influenced by transformation distance. These data present a challenge for featural or spatial accounts of similarity. Finally, we introduce a family of transformation-based accounts of similarity, called 'Representational Distortion', as a specific example of a transformational approach to similarity.     

Judging mens rea: the tension between folk concepts and legal concepts of intentionality

Concepts such as intention, motive, or forethought have generated a great deal of doubt, dispute, and confusion in legal decision making. Here we argue for an empirically based strategy of defining and using such mens rea concepts. Instead of the standard approach of settling these concepts by theoretical argument and the debaters' own intuitions, we rely on social psychological research to determine the meaning and significance of folk concepts concerning mens rea. We demonstrate the reliable and systematic use of people's concept of intentionality, contrast it with the bewildering variety of related legal concepts, and apply the folk model of intentionality to debated distinctions between intention and intentionality, desire and intention, and belief and intention. This folk-conceptual approach promises clarity of mens rea concepts and a reconciliation of the legal and layperson's view of human behavior.     

Thirsty for H2O? Multiple essences and psychological essentialism

Within psychology, essentialism has often been understood as the imputation of a hidden natural underpinning that determines the identity and membership of a given category. This naturalistic understanding has failed to address the varied and multi-faceted manner in which essentialist beliefs function on a cognitive level. Specifically, such an understanding does not account for essentialist beliefs that are related to functional categories derivative of a particular individual's present needs or social context. A parsimonious theory of psychological essentialism that accounts for beliefs in essences with respect to all categories, including those believed to be “natural”, is found in the writing of James (The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, Dover, New York, NY, 1890/1950). After accounting for the manner in which James’ theory addresses the limitations of the naturalistic view and extends it, it is recommended that his theory be incorporated into future empirical study of psychological essentialism.     

On the field aspect of Quantum fields

In this paper we contrast the idea of a field as a system with an infinite number of degrees of freedom with a recent alternative proposed by Paul Teller in Teller (1990). We show that, although our characterisation lacks the immediate appeal of Teller's, it has more success producing agreement with intuitive categorisations than his does. We go on to extend the distinction to Quantum Mechanics, explaining the important role that it plays there. Finally, we take some time to investigate the way in which strings are to be considered fields, and the important differences with scalar fields. Overall, we aim to show that many types of systems may be viewed as fields, and to point out significant distinctions amongst them, thereby expanding our understanding of what it is to fall in this category.Thanks to our anonymous referees for invaluable comments.     

Child protection investigations: Discourse analysis and the management of incommensurability

This paper asks whether discourse analytic approaches in social psychology have yet produced methodologies adequate to the investigation of institutional ‘gaze’. Institutional language has been explored to the extent that state agencies construct members of the public by speaking about them in particular ways. This has often provided insight into the co-existence and competition of incommensurable discourses. However, studies of representation in the sense of speaking for have been notably absent from social psychology. It is argued that this aspect of discourse is a vital component in the study of contemporary governmental multi-agency strategy in the area of child protection, where recent legislation and policy aims at the coordination of incommensurable discourses. A methodology for studying this strategy is outlined through an account of the actor network approach in science studies, accounts of the State under the post-modern condition, and analyses of sections of interviews with social workers.     

Are there human rights?

Conclusion In conclusion, I have tried to show that if there are any rights at all, legal, moral and political, there are at least the sorts of human rights cited in the Universal Declaration, rights which extend beyond the slender base provided by Hart's right to be free and which include the right to an adequate human life for everyone, rights shared by all, rights that, as rights, imply correlative duties. Even though the duties thus implied are admittedly imperfect, as rights, they confer upon right-holders, the authority to obligate others.I have argued for the most part against regarding any rights, even some human, rights (interchangable here with manifesto rights, welfare rights, rights of recipience, social and economic rights, programme rights, Fawcett calls them, positive in rem rights) as claims to rights or proposals for adoption as rights. I have argued that to have a right of any kind, including especially a human right, one shared by and held equally by all human beings,while not unconditional or unalterable, is fundamentally important, - to return once again to Feinberg's definition at the opening of this paper. A human right is fundamentally important, however, only if it, too, implies an obligation on the part of other people, one in which other people are obligated to use their power and resources to make things happen. To havea right is to be in a position to impose corresponding obligations on others. As Kant pointed out, a right of any kind gives a right holder a title to compel.

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On the Misrecognition of Identity: Muslims' Everyday Experiences in Scotland

Political theory is interested in the misrecognition of identity because it impacts individuals' autonomy in their self-definition and thus their ability to articulate and pursue identity-related interests. Here, we explore minority group members' experiences of being seen in terms that do not accord with their self-definition. Our data are qualitative, gathered through walking interviews with 24 Muslims in Scotland. Focusing on interactions in which they reported discrepancies between how they and others saw them, we differentiate four forms of misrecognition: (1) having the meaning of a valued identity (i.e., one's Muslim identity) defined by others in ways that one judges inaccurate and inappropriate; (2) having one's membership of a valued community (e.g., as a member of Scottish society) denied or rejected; (3) having one's identity (i.e., one's Muslim identity) overlooked such that one's distinctive identity-related needs are not taken into account; (4) being seen in terms of just one of one's many social identities (i.e., one's Muslim identity) such that other identities (judged more situationally relevant) are ignored. This empirically grounded typology contributes to wider debates about the forms of identity (mis)recognition and their political implications.     

The Rational Analysis Of Mind And Behavior

Rational analysis (Anderson 1990, 1991a) is an empiricalprogram of attempting to explain why the cognitive system isadaptive, with respect to its goals and the structure of itsenvironment. We argue that rational analysis has two importantimplications for philosophical debate concerning rationality. First,rational analysis provides a model for the relationship betweenformal principles of rationality (such as probability or decisiontheory) and everyday rationality, in the sense of successfulthought and action in daily life. Second, applying the program ofrational analysis to research on human reasoning leads to a radicalreinterpretation of empirical results which are typically viewed asdemonstrating human irrationality.