Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view—teleological essentialism—is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), and inferences about offspring (study 3)—we find support for the view that a broad range of categories—living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds, and artifactual kinds—are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments.     

Moral dilemmas and moral rules

Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits.     

Linking dynamical perceptual decisions at different levels of description in motion pattern formation: computational simulations

A two-level dynamical model of motion pattern formation is developed in which local motion/ nonmotion perceptual decisions are based on inhibitory competition between area V1 detectors responsive to motion-specifying versus motion-independent stimulus information, and pattern-level perceptual decisions are based on inhibitory competition between area MT motion detectors with orthogonal directional selectivity. The model accounts for the effects of luminance perturbations on the relative size of the pattern-level hysteresis effects reported by Hock and Ploeger (2006) and also accounts for related experimental results reported by Hock, Kelso, and Sch?ner (1993). Single-trial simulations demonstrated the crucial role of local motion/nonmotion bistability and activation-dependent future-shaping interactions in stabilizing perceived global motion patterns. Such interactions maintain currently perceived motion patterns by inhibiting the soon-to-be-stimulated motion detectors that otherwise would be the basis for the perception of an alternative pattern.     

Integrative Family Therapy

This paper describes an integrative approach to marital and family therapy in which psychodynamic (particularly object relations), family systems, and behavioral (particularly cognitive–behavioral) theory are blended in a flexible and tailored therapeutic approach. Human personality in its most significant contexts is a consistent focus. Background factors in the development to the approach and illustrative case materials are included.     

Traits and trade-offs are insufficient for evolutionary personality psychology

Comments on the article by D. Nettle, who has clearly shown that evolutionary psychologists need to focus more attention on individual differences, not just species-typical universals. Such differences are not mere "noise," and evolutionary theory will gain by understanding how they are produced and maintained. However, by focusing on personality traits and the five-factor personality model, Nettle left unaddressed many of the most important aspects of human personality. An evolutionary psychology of personality must ultimately explain not just trait differences but also differences in personal goals, values, motives, identities, and life narratives--essential elements of human individuality and functionality. K. M. Sheldon et al suggest four reasons why traits and the five-factor personality model do not provide an optimal approach for explaining the evolution of personality: (a) As constructs, traits provide little purchase for explaining the causes of behavior; (b) trait concepts do not acknowledge or explain people's variations around their own baselines, variations that are likely crucial for adaptation; (c) traits do not explain or even describe true human uniqueness, i.e. the ways in which a person is different from everybody else; and (d) traits do not explain personality from the inside, by considering what people are trying to do in their lives. In raising these issues Sheldon et al are suggesting that the important question for evolutionary personality study is not why people fall at different points on a continuum regarding traits x, y, and z, but rather why each person is inevitably unique while still sharing the same evolved psychology.