Underestimating Youth's Commitment to Schools and Society: Toward a More Differentiated View

Many media reports contend that American youth are dangerous, self-possessed, and care too little about their personal education or the broader society. Not only are youth criticized, but their teachers and schools are subjected to exaggerated criticism. We argue that the average, undifferentiated view of youth as presented by the media is inaccurate and pejorative. Researchers have added to the chorus of unfounded negative assertions about youth and their schools. As an example, Laurence Steinberg, in Beyond the Classroom, argued that American students' levels of academic achievement were woefully inadequate. He argued that students did not do enough homework, that they cheated, and that pervasive, negative peer pressure undermined academic achievement. The purpose of our study was to examine students' attitudes and perceptions in three major areas – cheating, homework, and peer pressure. Using data from over 700 students drawn from one public high school and one junior high school, our results indicated that students' beliefs and norms concerning cheating, homework, and peer pressure varied widely in terms of gender, GPA, and school context. Our data failed to replicate the findings from Beyond in that (a) our average findings were more positive than those reported in that study, and (b) we showed that the reporting of average was highly misleading. Our findings provided evidence that one cannot describe American students in a general, sweeping way. Average statements about youth, especially adolescent youth, are apt to be very misleading.     

Quantification of Conflicts of Interest in an Online Point-of-Care Clinical Support Website

Science and Engineering Ethics - Online medical reference websites are utilized by health care providers to enhance their education and decision making. However, these resources may not adequately...     

Moral dilemmas and moral rules

Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits.