Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency

Humans can think about their conscious experiences using a special class of “phenomenal” concepts. Psychophysical identity statements formulated using phenomenal concepts appear to be contingent. Kripke argued that this intuited contingency could not be explained away, in contrast to ordinary theoretical identities where it can. If the contingency is real, property dualism follows. Physicalists have attempted to answer this challenge by pointing to special features of phenomenal concepts that explain the intuition of contingency. However no physicalist account of their distinguishing features has proven to be satisfactory. Leading accounts rely on there being a phenomenological difference between tokening a physical-functional concept and tokening a phenomenal concept. This paper shows that existing psychological data undermine that claim. The paper goes on to suggest that the recalcitrance of the intuition of contingency may instead by explained by the limited means people typically have for applying their phenomenal concepts. Ways of testing that suggestion empirically are proposed.     

Therapeutic response to Cognitive Processing Therapy in White and Black female veterans with military sexual trauma-related PTSD

Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) is an evidence-based treatment (EBT) for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which has been validated for female veterans with military-related PTSD. Existing trials have enrolled predominantly White veterans with some studies documenting higher rates of early termination from EBTs among Black females when compared to White females. Data from a previously published randomized clinical trial were used to evaluate the effectiveness of CPT for Black female veterans with military sexual trauma (MST)-related PTSD. Reductions in PTSD symptom severity, number of sessions attended, and early termination rates were compared between Black (n = 20) and White (n = 16) female veterans. A hierarchical linear modeling approach was used, with PTSD symptom severity over the course of treatment and follow-up entered as a level-1 variable and race (Black or White) entered as a level-2 predictor. Piecewise growth curves analyses revealed that both Black and White female veterans experienced significant reductions in PTSD symptom severity over the course of treatment and gains were maintained up to 6 months post-treatment. Race was not found to be a significant predictor of change in the slope of PTSD symptom severity over the course of CPT treatment. Additionally, number of sessions attended and rates of early termination did not significantly differ based on race. Results suggest that CPT was a well-tolerated and effective psychotherapeutic treatment for this sample regardless of racial self-identification.     

Suppression of overt attentional capture by salient-but-irrelevant color singletons

For more than 2 decades, researchers have debated the nature of cognitive control in the guidance of visual attention. Stimulus-driven theories claim that salient stimuli automatically capture attention, whereas goal-driven theories propose that an individual’s attentional control settings determine whether salient stimuli capture attention. In the current study, we tested a hybrid account called the signal suppression hypothesis, which claims that all stimuli automatically generate a salience signal but that this signal can be actively suppressed by top-down attentional mechanisms. Previous behavioral and electrophysiological research has shown that participants can suppress covert shifts of attention to salient-but-irrelevant color singletons. In this study, we used eye-tracking methods to determine whether participants can also suppress overt shifts of attention to irrelevant singletons. We found that under conditions that promote active suppression of the irrelevant singletons, overt attention was less likely to be directed toward the salient distractors than toward nonsalient distractors. This result provides direct evidence that people can suppress salient-but-irrelevant singletons below baseline levels.     

“It Just Always Seemed Like it Wasn't a Big Deal,Yet I Know for Some People They Really Struggle with It”: LGBT Religious Identities in Context

Scholarly examinations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) religious identities have typically focused on “identity reconciliation,” which assumes that being both LGBT and religious is a “contradiction,” and posits a “coherent” identity as a desired end goal. The present research draws on a qualitative study of three LGBT‐identified congregations to demonstrate that there are a variety of ways in which LGBT religious people approach the connection between their LGBT identity and their religion. While some participants of the study did feel a need to reconcile these aspects of their self, others report never feeling a strong conflict between their LGBT identity and faith. The differences in these understandings of LGBT identity emerge out of the sociotemporal contexts the interviewees exist in, suggesting that different contexts provide divergent resources for identity performances. Through these findings, I contribute to our understanding of the intersection of religious agency, religious identities, and religion as a quality of social spaces.     

A Brief Argument For Consciousness Without Access

This paper proposes a new argument in favour of the claim that phenomenal consciousness overflows – that is, has a far higher capacity than – cognitive access. It shows that opponents of overflow implicate a necessary role for visual imagery in the change detection paradigm. However, empirical evidence suggests that there is no correlation between visual imagery abilities and performance in this paradigm. Since the use of imagery is not implicated in the performance strategy of subjects, we find a new argument for consciousness without access.     

Right Action as Virtuous Action

I argue in favour of the central claim of virtue-ethical accounts of right action: that right action is virtuous action. First, I disambiguate this claim and argue for a specific interpretation of it. Second, I provide reasons to prefer target-centred over both agent-centred and motive-centred accounts of virtuous action. Third, I argue that an action is right if, only if, and because it is overall virtuous. Finally, I respond to important arguments to the contrary.     

An overview of South African psychology

This overview of psychology in South Africa presents a concise and historical account of its science and practice, from its early origins in the late nineteenth century to the present, and traces seminal influences on the discipline. It is a review of how psychology in South Africa developed over more than a century to become one of the most popular subjects in universities and an established and recognized profession, whose members play a variety of roles in the South African polity and larger society. The impact that apartheid racism had on key aspects of psychology's development is traversed, and the influences that previous ruling party politics had on professional psychological organizations are delineated. The unification of psychology under the Psychological Society of South Africa, a few months before the advent of democracy in South Africa, is explicated. The protection of the title of psychologist in law and certain other changes in the legislative environment, enabling a greater role for psychologists, are reported. The primary research sites for psychology and its funding and the main university psychology programs are described, as are the requirements for registration and licensure. The genesis and the importance of the work of internationally acclaimed South African psychologists, such as J. Wolpe and A. A. Lazarus, are contextualized. With the increased participation of progressive black psychologists in leadership and research in the past two decades, a transformed psychology has the potential to play a significant role in addressing human issues confronting South Africa.     

Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement

In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as synthetic, and what his explanatory claim means. I argue that the principle of complete determination does not follow from the principle of excluded middle because the externally negated or ‘negative’ judgement ‘Not (S is P)’ does not entail the internally negated or ‘infinite’ judgement ‘S is not-P.’ Kant's puzzling explanatory claim means that empirical objects are determined by the content of the totality of experience. This entails that empirical objects are completely determinate if and only if the totality of experience has a completely determinate content. I argue that it is not a priori whether experience has such a completely determinate content and thus not analytic that objects obey the principle of complete determination.     

Dealing With Complexity Differently: From Interaction-Dominant Dynamics to Theoretical Plurality

We describe how the work of Guy Van Orden has been deeply influential in a variety of ways and focus on 2 important features: measurement and context. The centrality of these variables in understanding how psychological regularities emerge in our investigative contexts, and evolve into theories, recommends a different way of dealing with complexity. We argue that the Van Orden approach has, as one possible consequence, a plural approach to psychological phenomena. We end by describing what this means for cognitive science.     

Morality and political orientations: An analysis of their relationship

Groups are social constructions with differences. People spontaneously attempt to explain differences between groups. Stereotypes often play this explanatory role. Specifically, group members tend to attribute different essences to social categories. Given widespread ethnocentrism, it is not surprising that individuals reserve “the human essence” for their ingroup, while other groups are attributed a lesser humanity. This phenomenon is called infra‐humanisation and happens outside people's awareness. Secondary emotions (e.g., love, hope, contempt, resentment) are considered uniquely human emotions in contrast to primary emotions (e.g., joy, surprise, fear, anger) that are shared with animals. The research programme summarised in this chapter demonstrates through various paradigms that members of groups not only attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups, but are also reluctant to associate these emotions with outgroups. Moreover, people behave less cooperatively with an outgroup member who expresses himself with secondary emotions than with an ingroup member who uses the same terms. Interestingly, infra‐humanisation occurs for both high‐ and low‐status groups, even in the absence of conflict between groups.