When the ends outweigh the means: mood and level of identification in depression

Research in healthy controls has found that mood influences cognitive processing via level of action identification: happy moods are associated with global and abstract processing; sad moods are associated with local and concrete processing. However, this pattern seems inconsistent with the high level of abstract processing observed in depressed patients, leading Watkins (2008, 2010) to hypothesise that the association between mood and level of goal/action identification is impaired in depression. We tested this hypothesis by measuring level of identification on the Behavioural Identification Form after happy and sad mood inductions in never-depressed controls and currently depressed patients. Participants used increasingly concrete action identifications as they became sadder and less happy, but this effect was moderated by depression status. Consistent with Watkins' (2008) hypothesis, increases in sad mood and decreases in happiness were associated with shifts towards the use of more concrete action identifications in never-depressed individuals, but not in depressed patients. These findings suggest that the putatively adaptive association between mood and level of identification is impaired in major depression.     

Prospective predictors of suicidality: defeat and entrapment lead to changes in suicidal ideation over time

Theoretical perspectives into suicidality have suggested that heightened perceptions of defeat and entrapment lead to suicidality. However, all previous empirical work has been cross-sectional. We provide the first longitudinal test of the theoretical predictions, in a sample of 79 students who reported suicidality. Participants completed self-report measures of suicidal ideation, depression, defeat, and entrapment at two time points, approximately 12 months apart. People higher in defeat became more suicidal over time (β= .45), with baseline levels of suicidality and depressive symptoms controlled. The current results support the posited role of perceived defeat in driving suicidal ideation.     

The general factor of personality: Questions and elaborations

Predictions from Rushton’s theory that a general factor of personality (GFP) has evolved based on effective social participation were examined in two large samples of adult Australian twins (5834 and 3672 individuals) and their relatives (8303 and 2677). General factors based on items and scales were compared to each other, across two different questionnaires, and between adults and adolescents. Behavior-genetic analyses based on the twin samples tested predictions comparing GFPs to scales with the GFP partialled out. Some support was found for Rushton’s theory, but the GFP was only marginally more heritable than the GFP-free scales and was not especially marked by the expected non-additivity of its genetic variance; moreover, the adult and adolescent GFPs showed substantial differences.     

SHUTTING DRETSKE’S DOOR

Dretske proposes a theory of knowledge in terms of a theory of information, but wishes to deny that empirical knowledge settles the large question of scepticism. This leads him to deny the closure of knowledge under known entailment. In a recent paper J?ger argues that Dretske’s theory of information entails closure for knowledge, ‘at least for the kind of propositions here at issue’ (J?ger 2004:194). If J?ger is right, Dretske is seriously embarrassed and must give something up. In this paper I show that there are two flaws in J?ger’s argument. The principle of informational closure considered by J?ger is incompatible with Dretske’s theory of information, and J?ger’s argument that Dretske is committed to a certain kind of substitution instance of that principle of informational closure is invalid. I propose adequacy conditions on signalled information and use them to motivate a formulation of a general closure principle for signalled information. I show that Dretske’s account of information satisfies the adequacy conditions, but in a way which commits him to an instance of the general closure principle. I argue that Dretske is consequently committed to closure for some cases of knowledge for which he wishes to deny closure. Finally, I sketch how, on the basis of the closure principle to which Dretske is committed, J?ger’s broader argument may yet go through.     

Presentation as anti-phenomenon in Alain Badiou's Being and Event

In his magnum opus Being and Event, Alain Badiou identifies ontology with mathematics and uses a mathematical formalization of ontological discourse to generate an account of extra-ontological 'truth-events'. Informed by deconstructive critiques of the metaphysical ontologies of presence, Badiou establishes an anti-phenomenological conception of ontological presentation. Presentation's internal structure is that of an anti-phenomenon: presence's necessarily empty and insubstantial contrary. But the result is that Being and Event is riven by a fundamental methodological idealism. Badiou cannot secure the connection he wishes to establish between the formal discursive structure of mathematical ontology and extra-discursive reality. The decisive link between being and event, i.e. between Badiou's purely formal conception of ontological presentation and the extra-ontological reality of the event, is precluded by the very structure of the concept of presentation which is central to Badiou's argument.     

Intersectional Consciousness in Collective Victim Beliefs: Perceived Intragroup Differences Among Disadvantaged Groups

Although our experiences are shaped by multiple social identities such as race, class, and gender, most research has focused on single‐identity groups (e.g., race). This includes research on collective victimization, which assumes that violence impacts group members uniformly. Conversely, work on intersectional consciousness examines awareness of how multiple social identities intersect and create within‐group differences. Integrating and expanding the research on intersectional consciousness and on collective victimhood, this article investigates perceived intragroup differences in experiences of victimization stemming from intersecting identities of gender and class among two disadvantaged groups in the understudied context of India. We conducted individual interviews (N = 33) and focus groups (K = 12; N = 66) among Muslims and Dalits (lower‐caste Hindus). Thematic analysis revealed that—even though ingroup cohesion (i.e., intragroup similarity) is often enhanced by external threat— people expressed awareness of intragroup differences in experiences of victimization in three distinct ways: highlighting relative privilege, engaging in competitive victimhood, or describing qualitative differences. We discuss the implications for conflict and solidarity within minority groups in the context of political developments in India, where there have been attempts to polarize intragroup divisions.     

Anger Mediates the Effects of Fear on Support for the Far Right—A Rejoinder

We are grateful to John Jost for carefully engaging with our work and presenting a different interpretation of our findings on the effects of fear and anger stemming from the November 13, 2015, Paris attacks on the propensity to vote for the far right. Jost advances a model that holds that anger mediates the effect of fear on support for the far right. In this rejoinder, we respond to the issues he raises regarding our model specification, consider his alternative suggestion, and offer some conclusions about how to resolve this debate empirically. We hope this exchange advances the literature on the impact of various societal threats on voting for the far right.