Background beliefs in Bayesian inference

We report five experiments in which the role of background beliefs in social judgments of posterior probability was investigated. From a Bayesian perspective, people should combine prior probabilities (or base rates) and diagnostic evidence with equal weighting, although previous research shows that base rates are often underweighted. These experiments were designed so that either piece of information was supplied either by personal beliefs or by presented statistics, and regression analyses were performed on individual participants to assess the relative influence of information. We found that both prior probabilities and diagnostic information significantly influenced judgments, whether supplied by beliefs or by statistical information, but that belief-based information tended to dominate the judgments made.     

The pursuit of Leonardo's constraint

Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) identified two stimulus situations that cannot be painted faithfully on a canvas: (a) when two objects are located in the same direction with respect to the painter's head, and (b) when parts of a surface are visible to one eye, but occluded from the other eye. He analysed these situations in terms of rays being emitted from the two eyes and, aside from the origin of the rays, the projective geometry he used was correct. His analyses showed that what can be seen from two vantage points cannot be represented on a canvas, because a 'correct' painting must be created from a single 'station point'. He was struck by the consequence of this fact that the depth seen on a canvas cannot match that of viewing the scene with two eyes. Subsequent visual scientists focused on Leonardo's observation about the lack of vivid depth in a picture. We argue that a complete understanding of what we see in the two stimulus situations requires consideration of visual direction in addition to visual depth. More specifically, we argue that the visual directions of the two objects, (a) above, and the visual direction of the monocular areas, (b) above, are dependent upon the constraint that two opaque objects cannot be represented in the same direction. Demonstrations that readers can perform, and that support this argument, are provided on the Perception website at http://www.perceptionweb.com/perc0102/ono.html.     

Regulation of Negative Affect During Mother–Child Problem-Solving Interactions: Adolescent Depressive Status and Family Processes

Despite recent suggestions that depression can be conceptualized as a disorder of affect regulation, relatively little research has focused on affect regulation skills in depressed individuals. This paper investigated whether depressed adolescents (N = 25) differ from nondepressed adolescents (N 25) on two indices of affect regulation (i.e., duration of negative affective states and reciprocity of maternal negative affect) as well as whether these indices are related to microsocial family interactional processes. Analyses revealed that depressed teens differed from their nondepressed peers with regard to duration of negative affective states but not in their likelihood of reciprocating negative affect. Additionally, indices of adolescent affect regulation were related to family interactional processes. Duration of depressive affect was positively associated with maternal display of facilitative behavior contingent on adolescent depressive behavior. Duration of aggressive behavior was inversely related to maternal problem-solving responses to aggressive behavior. Finally, adolescent reciprocity of maternal depressive and aggressive behaviors was strongly associated with mothers' reciprocity of adolescents' negative affective behavior.     

An experimental study of strategy development

Three experiments are reported in which the strategy usage for a compass point directions task was investigated. For this task, people may use either an efficient cancellation strategy or an inefficient spatial strategy (see Roberts, Gilmore, & Wood, 1997). Experiment 1, together with Experiment 2, showed that users of cancellation are unlikely to have explicit prior knowledge of this strategy; instead they discover it as a result of experience with the task. Experiment 1 also showed that strategy selection is unlikely to be based on stylistic preferences, and that reducing the cognitive demands of the task does not increase the discovery of cancellation. Experiment 3 showed that evaluation of strategy validity is also of importance: Unsuccessful evaluation may prevent the selection of a newly discovered strategy, even if it is the more efficient method.     

Transmission Failure Failure

I set out the standard view about alleged examples of failure of transmission of warrant, respond to two cases for the view, and argue that the view is false. The first argument for the view neglects the distinction between believing a proposition on the basis of a justification and merely having a justification to believe a proposition. The second argument for the view neglects the position that one 9s justification for believing a conclusion can be one 9s premise for the conclusion, rather than simply one 9s justification for the premise. Finally, the view is false since it is inconsistent with the closure of knowledge as closure is properly understood.     

Free Choice Permission is Strong Permission

Free choice permission, a crucial test case concerning the semantics/ pragmatics boundary, usually receives a pragmatic treatment. But its pragmatic features follow from its semantics. We observe that free choice inferences are defeasible, and defend a semantics of free choice permission as strong permission expressed in terms of a modal conditional in a nonmonotonic logic.     

The relationship between initial errorless learning conditions and subsequent performance

This experiment explores a suggestion by [Maxwell, J.P., Masters, R.S.W., Kerr, E., Weedon, E. (2001). The implicit benefit of learning without errors. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 54, 1049-1068] that an initial bout of implicit motor learning confers beneficial performance characteristics, such as robustness under secondary task loading, despite subsequent explicit learning. Participants acquired a complex motor skill (golf putting) over 400 trials. The environment was constrained early in learning to minimize performance error. It was predicted that in the absence of explicit instruction, reducing error would prevent hypothesis testing strategies and the concomitant accrual of declarative (explicit) knowledge, thereby reducing dependence on working memory resources. The effect of an additional cognitive task on putting performance was used to assess reliance on working memory. Putting performance of participants in the Implicit-Explicit condition was unaffected by the additional cognitive load, whereas the performance of Explicit participants deteriorated. The relationship between error correction and episodic verbal reports suggested that the explicit group were involved in more hypothesis testing behaviours than the Implicit-Explicit group early in learning. It was concluded that a constrained, uninstructed, environment early in learning, results in procedurally based motor output unencumbered by disadvantages associated with working memory control.     

Cognition and Self-Control: Cognitive Control of Painful Sensory Input

Eighty Ss were first tested for base-level response to a pain-producing stimulus and then were re-tested on the same pain stimulus after receiving 1 of 8 experimental treatments. The 8 treatments were arranged in a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design: presence or absence of hypnotic induction procedure; presence or absence of instructions for anesthesia; and presence or absence of demands for honest reports. Neither the hypnotic-induction procedure nor the demands for honesty affected the Ss'reports of the degree of pain experienced. The anesthesia instructions--"think of the hand as numb and insensitive as if it were a piece of rubber..."--produced an equal degree of pain reduction in hypnotic and non-hypnotic Ss and in Ss who were and those who were not exposed to demands for honesty. The results indicate that (a) Ss' reports of pain are less affected by demands for honesty and are more closely related to their actual experiences than has been previously assumed and (b) instructions which direct Ss to exercise cognitive control over painful sensory input are effective (with or without 'hypnosis') in reducing the experience of pain.