Relationships between three auditory inspection time tasks and processing speed

This study investigated the relationship between a spatial auditory inspection time task and previous versions of AIT, as well as the relationships of these tasks with visual inspection time (VIT) and general speediness (Gs). A total of 96 university undergraduates (age mean (M) = 20.0 years, standard deviation (SD) = 4.0 years) completed three AIT tasks, VIT, auditory reaction time (ART) and visual reaction time (VRT), and two Gs marker tests. Auditory inspection time‐spatial (AIT‐S) did not relate to VIT, but it did relate to the Gs marker tests. It also loaded moderately on a Gs factor along with VIT. Neither of the alternate AIT tasks showed any consistent relationships to reaction time (RT) or Gs measures. The AIT‐S task did, however, share substantial variance with its predecessors, suggesting that performance on all AIT tasks relies to some extent on similar processes. Further research is required to determine the nature of these processes.     

Depressed people are not less motivated by personal goals but are more pessimistic about attaining them

Despite its theoretical importance, personal goal motivation has rarely been examined in clinical depression. Here we investigate whether clinically depressed persons (n = 23) differ from never-depressed persons (n = 26) on number of freely generated approach and avoidance goals, appraisals of these goals, and reasons why these goals would and would not be achieved. Participants listed approach and avoidance goals separately and generated explanations for why they would (pro) and would not (con) achieve their most important approach and avoidance goals, before rating the importance, likelihood, and perceived control of goal outcomes. Counter to hypothesis, depressed persons did not differ from never-depressed controls on number of approach or avoidance goals, or on the perceived importance of these goals. However, compared to never-depressed controls, depressed individuals gave lower likelihood judgments for desirable approach goal outcomes, tended to give higher likelihood judgments for undesirable to-be-avoided goal outcomes, and gave lower ratings of their control over goal outcomes. Furthermore, although controls generated significantly more pro than con reasons for goal achievement, depressed participants did not. These results suggest that depressed persons do not lack valued goals but are more pessimistic about their likelihood, controllability, and reasons for successful goal attainment.     

Listeners invest in an assumed other's perspective despite cognitive cost

We explored perspective-taking behavior in a visuospatial mental rotation task that requires listeners to adopt an egocentric or “other-centric” frame of reference. In the current task, objects could be interpreted relative to the point-of-view of the listener (egocentric) or of a simulated partner (other-centric). Across three studies, we evaluated participants’ willingness to consider and act on partner-specific information, showing that a partner’s perceived ability to contribute to collaborative mutual understanding modulated participants’ perspective-taking behavior, either by increasing other-centric (Study 2) or egocentric (Study 3) responding. Moreover, we show that a large proportion of participants resolved referential ambiguity in terms of their partner’s perspective, even when it was more cognitively difficult to do so (as tracked by online movement measures), and when the presence of a social partner had to be assumed (Studies 1 and 2). In addition, participants continued to consider their partner’s perspective during trials where visual perspectives were shared. Our results show that participants will thoroughly invest in either an other-centric or egocentric mode of responding, and that perspective-taking strategies are not always dictated by minimizing processing demands, but by more potent (albeit subtle) factors in the social context.     

‘Not in our front garden’: Land use conflict,spatial meaning and the politics of naming place

Strategies aimed at reducing land use conflict often stress the need to make planning decisions more democratic. However, this goal is obstructed by overly‐narrow conceptual perspectives that neglect the symbolic significance of place. We illustrate this by examining place names, which function as repositories of socio‐political meaning. Drawing on elements of discursive and rhetorical psychology and subject positioning theory, we investigated the variety of meanings associated with place names in the context of a proposed housing development in Swindon, in the South of England. Thirty interviews with different stakeholders were conducted to gauge their opinions towards the proposal. Noting differences in the way the proposed site was named, we analysed the range of meanings associated with each name in relation to participants' stances towards development. Our results show how, in naming place, spatial meanings are negotiated and contested in ways that support contrasting political objectives. We conclude that planning professionals should exercise greater sensitivity towards existing spatial meanings, especially place names. In addition, socio‐political understandings of subjective spatial relationships can serve as a basis for achieving more productive dialogue and improving development designs. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Insight-Related Challenges in the Treatment of Hoarding

Compulsive hoarding is a chronic and debilitating condition that has proven difficult to treat. The cognitive behavioral approaches that have otherwise been successful for people suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder do not work very well for hoarding (Abramowitz, Franklin, Schwartz, & Furr, 2003). Many have suggested that this is due to the ego-syntonic nature of the symptoms and the accompanying lack of insight. This paper describes several challenges related to insight that limit the effectiveness of traditional cognitive behavioral approaches for compulsive hoarding. Problems with anosognosia, overvalued ideation, and defensiveness that characterize hoarding are described and suggestions offered for dealing with them.     

The attention-getting capacity of whines and child-directed speech

The current study tested the ability of whines and child-directed speech to attract the attention of listeners involved in a story repetition task. Twenty non-parents and 17 parents were presented with two dull stories, each playing to a separate ear, and asked to repeat one of the stories verbatim. The story that participants were instructed to ignore was interrupted occasionally with the reader whining and using child-directed speech. While repeating the passage, participants were monitored for Galvanic skin response, heart rate, and blood pressure. Based on 4 measures, participants tuned in more to whining, and to a lesser extent child-directed speech, than neutral speech segments that served as a control. Participants, regardless of gender or parental status, made more mistakes when presented with the whine or child-directed speech, they recalled hearing those vocalizations, they recognized more words from the whining segment than the neutral control segment, and they exhibited higher Galvanic skin response during the presence of whines and child- directed speech than neutral speech segments. Whines and child-directed speech appear to be integral members of a suite of vocalizations designed to get the attention of attachment partners by playing to an auditory sensitivity among humans. Whines in particular may serve the function of eliciting care at a time when caregivers switch from primarily mothers to greater care from other caregivers.     

Speak No Evil: Scientists,Responsibility, and the Public Understanding of Science

In this paper, I will discuss the responsibilities that scientists have for ensuring their work is interpreted correctly. I will argue that there are three good reasons for scientists to work to ensure the appropriate communication of their findings. First, I will argue that scientists have a general obligation to ensure scientific research is communicated properly based on the vulnerability of others to the misrepresentation of their work. Second, I will argue that scientists have a special obligation to do so because of the power we as a society invest in them as specialists and professionals. Finally, I will argue that scientists ought to ensure their work is interpreted correctly based on prudential, self-interested considerations. I will conclude by offering suggestions regarding policy considerations.     

Solving the (Real) Other Minds Problem

People care about others’ thoughts, feelings, and intentions but can have considerable difficulty reading others’ minds accurately. Recent advances in understanding how people make such inferences provide significant insight into when people are likely to be reasonably accurate mind readers and when they are not. People tend to reason about others’ mental states by starting with their own and only subsequently adjusting that egocentric default to accommodate differences between themselves and others. Such adjustments tend to be insufficient, rendering final estimates egocentrically biased. When more information about others is available, people tend to rely on existing stereotypes or other expectations to intuit others’ mental states. Systematic errors resulting either from excessive egocentrism or inaccurate expectations can lead to miscommunication, misunderstanding, and social conflict, but these biases also suggest useful strategies for improving mind reading in everyday life.